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ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS  
EXPLAINED

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*K. D. COTES*

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4

# ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS EXPLAINED

BY QUESTION AND ANSWER.

BOOKS I.—IV., X., CH. VI.—IX.

WITH SHORT ESSAYS AND EXAMINATION QUESTIONS.


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K. D. COTES, M.A.

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LONDON :  
SIMPKIN, MARSHALL AND CO.  
OXFORD :  
J. VINCENT, 90, HIGH STREET.  
MDCCCLXXXIII.

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## P R E F A C E .

The object of this book is to put into an easily intelligible form the portion of the Ethics required for the Oxford Pass School.

The student in commencing this subject is in almost every case entirely ignorant, not only of the peculiar terminology and the particular object of the book, but also of all philosophic ideas.

His first, and perhaps chief difficulty, is in discovering what he has to learn ; a long time is spent in acquiring vague and unsystematic knowledge, and it is fortunate if a clear idea is ever obtained of the method of the book, and of the questions to which it furnishes an answer.

The questions and answers given here are chiefly for the use of passmen, that is they only contain such matter as is to be found in the text.

They may be useful to the reader who cares to become acquainted with the subject without referring to the Greek, or to the candidate for honours who is willing in this way to become familiar with the matter, while seeking elsewhere for comment and criticism.

Constant quotations from the Greek of the more striking sentences have been placed as headings partly



because such sentences are frequently set in examination, but principally for the reason that the presence in almost every section of some words that serve the end naturally suggest this use.

A few essays or summaries are placed at the end of points on which a connected idea is not easily obtained, but they do very little more than gather up the allusions to each subject which are to be found in the different books.

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## ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS.

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### BOOK I.—SUMMARY.

*Tέλος* is the word which furnishes the key-note to Aristotle's Ethics, and he fully brings out its meaning.

*The chief good in life* must be *the* end of life.

*Politics* is the science that is connected with this end.

*The Method of the Enquiry* is next settled.

*The received opinions* of others are canvassed and shown to be insufficient.

The conception of *the end and the all-sufficient* guide us to the chief good.

By considering *the function of man*, and adding three qualifications, we get the definition of happiness.

*The opinions of other philosophers* are harmonised in the definitions.

*Four difficulties* are examined—1. The way in which happiness is obtained. 2. The influence of fortune. 3. The connection between the present and future life. 4. Is happiness praised or honoured?

*Enquiry into the Nature of the Soul.*

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What are the Ethics?

“Ethics” is a word derived from *ἦθος* character, and the Ethics are a treatise on the best way of securing a good character, that is, how to make men morally good. To do this it analyses the nature of man; the object for which he exists. It shows the various parts of his nature, and how they develop themselves into

vices and virtues. It discusses actions and what makes them voluntary, involuntary, and sometimes partly both. It settles whether man is responsible or irresponsible for his actions. The knowledge of what man *is*, helps the person entrusted with education to guide his pupil, or the man himself to make the best of himself. For instance—to guide a steam-engine, you must have had something to do with them, or you would, unless by a miracle, cause an accident.

### CHAP. I.

*The meaning of "end."—The different kinds of ends.—*

*The ends of the subject-sciences are less worthy than those of the master-sciences.*

*καλῶς ἀπεφώνησαντο τὰγαθόν, οὐ πάντ' ἐφίεται.*

**τέλος.** What is an end?

Aristotle had a maxim "Nature makes nothing in vain," that is, Nature makes nothing without a purpose, nothing that has not some use, if we could only find it out.

Aristotle also had another maxim, "Nature does everything for the best."

These two maxims taken together explain the double meaning of **τέλος**, "end," "perfection": when anything reaches its **τέλος** it is in its perfection. No **τέλος**, or at all events, no **τέλος** fixed by nature, can be bad: to fulfil your **τέλος**, then, is to be in the highest state of perfection you can conceive of; anything else added would be a mere superfluity; it might set you off, but couldn't add to your value.

The **τέλος** of a razor is to shave well: if you put it

in a golden case it would be more valuable to sell, but not to shave. The τέλος of a lily is to be beautiful; to be in a china vase does not make it any more beautiful or less beautiful.

διαφορὰ τις φαίνεται τῶν τελῶν.

*Qu.* How many different kinds of ends are there?

*Ans.* Three: an ἐνέργεια, an ἔργον, or both combined.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ εἰσιν ἐνέργειαι.

(1.) An ἐνέργεια is the end of your action: when you do a thing for its own sake, as play a game because you like it.

τὰ δὲ παρ' αὐτάς ἔργα τινά.

(2.) An ἔργον is when you get some results: you exert yourself in order to win the prize, and in this case the prize is what you look to, and not the pleasure of exciting yourself.

(3.) Both ἐνέργεια and ἔργον are combined, when an artist paints for the pleasure he gets from painting, *and* to produce a picture.

τὰ τῶν ἀρχιτεκτονικῶν τέλη ἐστὶν αἰρετώτερα τῶν ὑπ' αὐτά.

*Qu.* How do you find out which aims are the best in life?

*Ans.* Ask yourself which of the two is subordinate; which is it I do for the sake of the other? "Do I eat to live, or live to eat."

"Bridle-making comes under the head of horsemanship." Men don't ride to furnish employment to the saddler. Horsemanship comes under war, and war

under strategy : therefore strategy is the noblest of them all.

In the same way each immediate end in life is subordinate to a more important end, and this to another, until at last we reach the great end of life : this is the "most final," and therefore "absolutely perfect."

## CHAP. II.

*The definition of the chief good.—Is there a chief good ?  
—The use of finding out the chief good.—The science to which it belongs.—Why it is called a branch of politics.*

τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον.

*Qu.* What is the chief good ?

*Ans.* Is there anything we seek for itself ? Anything to which everything else is only a means ? Which is not sought as a "means," but is an end in itself, the goal of all of our endeavours ; if there is such an end, it is the chief good in life. cf.

As many arrows, loosed several ways,  
Come to one mark.

πρόεισι γὰρ οὕτω γ' εἰς ἄπειρον.

*Qu.* Is there an end of life at all ?

*Ans.* If there is no end of life, all our desires are empty and vain : our road in life is a road that leads no-where, but stretches on for ever.

ἂρ οὖν καὶ πρὸς τὸν βίον ἡ γυνῶσις αὐτοῦ μεγάλην ἔχει  
ρόπην.

*Qu.* Is there any use troubling to find out the end of life ?

*Ans.* If there were two archers shooting at a mark; one who could see it, and one who couldn't, which would be most likely to hit it?

*πολιτική τις ούσα.*

*Qu.* What science will teach the chief good?

*Ans.* The chief science (*ἀρχιτεκτονική*) Politics; and Ethics seems to be a branch of Politics; for Politics directs all the business of life.

*Qu.* Why is Politics the chief science?

*Ans.* The architect directs all the people who help him to build the house; he gives instructions to the bricklayers, carpenters, and paperers, and says how many of them he wants, and for how long he wants them.

Politics guides all the business of life; it says how much of the sciences men are to learn, and how far they are to learn them; it uses them as the architect uses his men.

*Qu.* Is not this very different from modern "politics?"

*Ans.* Even in our own country in the old times the State thought it had far more to do with the people than it thinks it has now. It burnt them for wrong theological views: it prescribed the price at which a tradesman should sell his goods: it told men the kind of clothes that it befitted their station to wear: even now it compels every child to be educated.

So we can understand how, if the idea was fully

carried out, the science of man's moral nature might be called *πολιτική τις οὔσα* (a branch of Politics).

It now leaves men alone a good deal more than it did. Then it tried to *make* you do for the best : now it won't let others interfere to prevent you doing for the best.

*κάλλιον δὲ καὶ θειότερον ἔθνει καὶ πόλεσιν.*

*Qu.* The end that Ethics seeks to reach is the same for one man as for the State : why then is it called a branch of Politics ?

*Ans.* We grant that the chief good is the same for one man as for a thousand, but the good of the state seems greater and more 'absolute to attain and to preserve than the good of one man.

This is in accordance with the Greek idea of the life of the individual being swallowed up in that of the State.

*v.* Essay on " Ethics as a branch of Politics "

*Qu.* Summarize this.

*Ans.* The chief good in life is the end for which we were made, and it will help us a good deal to fulfil this object if we know what it is. The most important science will be the science to teach us what the object of life is, and the most important science is Politics.

### CHAP. III.

*Aristotle settles the method in which the Science of Ethics is to be followed.*

*λέγοιτο δ' ἂν ἱκανῶς.*

*Qu.* What are the three points to be settled before entering on an enquiry ?

(πῶς ἀποδεκτέον) The conditions of the enquiry.

(περὶ ἀκροατοῦ) Who is a fit student?

(τί προτιθέμεθα) The subject of the enquiry.

### THE CONDITIONS OF THE ENQUIRY.

The general rule in enquiring into anything is, "the distinctness must be in proportion to the nature of the subject-matter."

The subject-matter of Ethics is so difficult that we cannot expect accuracy.

*e.g.* Justice is one of the most important subjects in human life, and one which men of every nation have spent the greatest trouble on, and yet after all they disagree so much that justice seems to be "conventional" and not "real." (ὥστε δοκεῖν νόμῳ μόνον εἶναι, φύσει δὲ μὴ). A hundred years ago we hung a man who stole five pounds; to-day we should shrink from inflicting such a penalty.

As with Justice, so with material goods: wealth may cause you to be flattered and deceived: courage may lead you to die on the field of battle.

*Demonstration* is impossible where probabilities are concerned, persuasion is insufficient where proof is possible.

Thus a cultivated man will look for "as much accuracy as the nature of the subject allows." He will not expect an orator to prove to a demonstration, nor allow a mathematician to preach the multiplication-table.

ὁ πεπαιδευμένος.

*Qu.* What is the function of the critic?



*Ans.* Every man judges well on the subject he is acquainted with, and the man who is acquainted with all subjects is the best general judge: ("an all-round man") whose opinion is not as good as that of the specialist, but who knows something about everything.

(περὶ ἀκροατοῦ) THE FIT STUDENT.

The young man will not do for two reasons:

(1) He knows nothing about life, and Ethics is part of the science of life.

(2) He would not practice (because of his passions) though he might preach; and the object of the Ethics is not to make you talk well (οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις).

c.f. "Mere prattle without practice."

The young head on old shoulders will be just as bad as the young man; "There is no fool like an old fool."

τί προτιθέμεθα is fully developed in the next chapter.

*Qu.* Summarize this.

*Ans.* We are seeking the highest good of man, the very nature of the subject precludes any great accuracy; and only the man who knows about life, and can control his passions, is fit to join us in the search. v. Essay on the "Method of The Ethics."

CHAP. IV.

*The end of life.—The opinions on it.—Aristotle's attitude to others.—Preference for the Inductive method of Enquiry.*

ὀνόματι μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν ὑπὸ τῶν πλείστων  
ὁμολογεῖται.

*Qu.* What is the end of life?

*Ans.* All men have agreed on the *name*, all men call it happiness, and suppose it to consist in living well and doing well: but beyond this there is no agreement: some call it pleasure, honour, wealth: the wise think differently from the multitude: the same man will describe it differently at different times; when he is sick he calls it health, when he is poor he calls it wealth. cf.

Oh! happiness our being's end or aim,  
Good, pleasure, ease, content, whate'er thy name.

*Qu.* What attitude does Aristotle assume towards the opinions of others?

*Ans.* It would be idle to examine them all, but he thinks it well to examine the most reasonable and the most prevalent among them.

ἀρκτέον μὲν οὖν ἀπὸ τῶν γνωρίμων, ταῦτα δὲ διττῶς.

*Qu.* What is to be the method of the enquiry?

*Ans.* The inductive method (ἐπὶ τὰς ἀρχάς) from particulars to generals is the best, because men know particular facts before they can know the great law that underlies them.

The other method, the deductive (ἀπὸ τῶν ἀρχῶν.) from universals to particulars, reasoning down from the great law to the small fact would be best, (because the great law is the greatest truth of the two,) if only we were beings of a much higher order than we are.

It is a far higher thing to read Greek at sight than to learn the Greek alphabet, but the boy who is beginning Greek must begin at the alphabet. We

mortals must start with τὰ γνῶριμα ἡμῖν, though it might be better, if we could, to start with τὰ γ' ἀπλῶς γνῶριμα.

ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι.

*Qu.* How can we get up to the great laws of our moral nature?

*Ans.* By being trained in the particular facts, for under the fact the universal principle lies; and then we shall soon be taught the reason why those facts are so. We must learn the alphabet first.

#### CHAP. V.

*Men's opinions of the chief good shown in the lives they lead.*

τρῆις γάρ εἰσι μάλιστα οἱ πρὸνυχοντες.

*Qu.* What three kinds of life have a claim to be considered 'happy'?

*Ans.* The life of pleasure, the statesman's, the philosopher's.

τὸ γὰρ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οὐκ ἀλόγως εἰκόασιν  
ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ καὶ  
φορτικώτατοι τὴν ἡδονήν.

*Qu.* What is the natural way to find out men's idea of the chief good?

*Ans.* From examining the lives they lead.

*The Life of Pleasure.*—Is the life of a beast: it would not even be worth while saying that it has no claim to be the 'happy life' if it were not that it gets a fictitious importance, because people of position, like Sardanapalus, take for their motto, 'eat, drink, and be merry.' cf.

What is a man,  
If his chief good and market of his time,  
Be but to sleep and feed? a beast, no more.

οἱ δὲ χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοὶ τιμήν.

*The Life of a Statesman.*—He seems to seek honour believing that honour will bring happiness, but a capricious or thankless people often withholds honour where it is most due, so honour depends more on the honourers than the honoured, while happiness surely rests with a man's self, and cannot be taken away. cf.

A habitation giddy and unsure,  
He hath that resteth on the public heart.

δῆλον οὖν ὅτι κατὰ γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων.

But even if the statesman gets honour, he seeks it to convince himself he is virtuous, and therefore by his own confession virtue is the real giver of happiness, and not honour.

εἰ μὴ θέσιν διαφυλάττων.

But even if you had virtue you might let it lie idle, and so even virtue cannot bring happiness (v. def. of Happiness), unless there are other conditions, and no one would say it could, except to show his skill in disputation. (The rest can be found ἐν τοῖς ἐγκυκλίοις.)

*The Philosopher's Life* we discuss in Book X.

The money-getting life is compulsory in a sense: wealth is a mere means, not an end.

## CHAP. VII.

*The chief good is τέλειον, αὐταρκες, and is in a class by itself.—Construction of the definition of happiness.*

τῶν πρακτῶν ἀπάντων τέλος.

*Qu.* To return, what is the chief good?

*Ans.* The good that different actions seek for are different in each case, but still in each case it is the end; since then the good, whatever it is, is always an end, the chief good must be the goal of all the ends.

μεταβαίνων ὁ λόγος εἰς ταῦτόν ἀφίικται.

*Qu.* How do we here come to the same conclusion as before?

*Ans.* After the digression into the opinions held on happiness we again settle that as the end implies perfection, the ends of all ends implies *absolute* perfection.

τὸ ζητούμενον ἀγαθόν.

*Qu.* What is the end of all human action?

*Ans.* That for whose sake we do everything else: that to which *every other end is only a means*: and as every end is perfect, so the end of all ends will be most perfect.

*Qu.* Have ends any different degrees?

*Ans.* There are three degrees or ranks among them.

(1) Chosen for the sake of something else (δι' ἄλλο)

(the lowest). *e.g.*, Greek grammar chosen that you may read the Greek language. (Means *only*).

(2) Chosen for the sake of something else, and for its own sake. *e.g.* The Greek language, partly for its own sake, partly that you may read the literature. (Means *and*).

(3) Chosen for its own sake (*καθ' αὐτό*). *e.g.* Greek Literature. (Ends *only*).

τέλειον δὴ τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκες ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

*Qu.* What two reasons make us say happiness is the end of human life?

*Ans.* (1) It is sought simply for its own sake.

(2) It is all-sufficient (*αὐτάρκης*).

ἐπειδὴ φύσει πολιτικὸς ἄνθρωπος.

*Qu.* Explain "all-sufficient."

*Ans.* Where all the wants of man's nature are satisfied without each getting more or less than its proper share. Where a man has wife, child, and friend; *not* where he mutilates his nature, and instead of satisfying it, deforms or destroys it.

ἔτι δὲ πάντων αἰρετωτάτην μὴ συναριθμουμένην.

*Qu.* Why do we say happiness stands in a class by itself?

*Ans.* Things that stand in the same class can be compared together; they can be added together, and the more you have of them the better off you are.

Diamonds are the most precious of stones; but the owner of the best diamond in the world would be richer if you gave him a ruby as well.

Titles of honour are in the same class, and therefore even a duke is greater for being a K.G. But Tennyson would not be a greater poet, if he had all the jewels in the world ; nor would an angel be honoured, if he were created an Earl.

So happiness is not increased by the addition of other good things, because it is not counted in the same class with them.

εἰ ληφθείη τὸ ἔργον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου.

*Qu.* How shall we find out where man's happiness lies ?

*Ans.* Each thing reaches perfection by reaching its τέλος, and it reaches its τέλος by fulfilling the object for which it exists.

Man will then reach happiness by fulfilling the object for which he exists.

There must be some such object, unless he is the *one* exception to the rule that " Nature makes nothing in vain : " unless his hand, his eye, and every *part* of him have an object, but the *whole* man has none : unless he has an object because he is a carpenter or cobbler, but none because he is a *man*.

ζητεῖται δὲ τὸ ἴδιον.

*Qu.* What is man's function ? (ἔργον).

*Ans.* His peculiar gift (ἴδιον), that which he alone can do, or which nothing else does as well. *e.g.*, the power of shaving is an ἴδιον which distinguishes a razor from other knives.

## THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE " DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS."

*πρακτική τις τῶν λόγων ἔχοντος.*

*Qu.* What is man's ἔργον (τὸ ἴδιον) ?

*Ans.* He has the life of growth, so have the vegetables.

He has the life of perception, so have the animals.

The life of the part possessing reason is his alone, his ἴδιον.

*τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν θετέον.*

*Qu.* In what three ways may he possess a quality ?

*Ans.* κατὰ δύναμιν : *e.g.*, the man who has never seen a horse may have the *capacity* of riding.

*καθ' ἔξιν* : *e.g.*, the finest horseman in the world has a *developed power* of riding, but may never be able to procure a horse again.

*κατ' ἐνέργειαν.* When you are riding, when you actually *exercise power*, you get good out of it ; you can't help doing so : nor can any one prevent you ; so we add *κατ' ἐνέργειαν*.

*προστιθεμένης τῆς κατ' ἀρετὴν ὑπεροχῆς πρὸς τὸ ἔργον.*

*Qu.* Is the capacity the same, whether you use it well or ill.

*Ans.* It is the same in *kind* but different in *degree*. The man who knows ten tunes on the flute is as much a flute-player as the man who knows a thousand.

The lowest savage, the wisest philosopher are both



reasoning beings ; but the reason of the savage cannot make him " happy ;" why is this ?

To perform your function badly is not to fulfil your τέλος ; therefore the addition of κατ' ἀρετήν must be made to the function (in accordance with its law of excellence). The savage, in order to be happy, must exercise his reason κατ' ἀρετήν.

ἔτι δ' ἐν βίῳ τελείω.

Qu. How far have *time* and *circumstances* to do with happiness ?

Ans. If you corked a flute up, you wouldn't get a tune ; nor if it was jerked out of your mouth at the end of half a minute.

Constant neuralgia would prevent your being happy, and so would neuralgia every other week.

The absence of neuralgia would not make you happy, if you didn't use your reason rightly ; but its presence would be in the way of a complete exercise of reason.

Material wants must be satisfied : and your happiness must last a reasonable time to make it worthy of the name. " One swallow does not make a summer."

Qu. Define happiness ?

Ans. ψυχῆς τοῦ λόγον ἔχοντος ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν ἐν βίῳ τελείω. *Vide supra.*

ἐφ' ὅσον οἰκείον τῇ μεθόδῳ.

Qu. Is this definition very clear ?

Ans. It is not intended to be ; you must draw the

outline before you paint the picture. *It is accurate enough to be useful*, and that is all we care about.

The carpenter must keep the right angle just enough to make his tables even, but the mathematician must not be out even a hair's breath. (θεατῆς γὰρ τᾶλη-  
θούς).

ἰκανὸν ἐν τισι τὸ δτι δειχθῆναι καλῶς.

*Qu.* How far must we ask for proof?

*Ans.* As far as we can get it: ultimate facts cannot be proved. "That is the sun." "Why is it the sun?" "Because it is; if you won't believe it, don't." Every first principle is an ultimate fact. cf.

To expostulate

What majesty should be, what duty is,  
Why day is day, night night, and time is time,  
Were nothing but to waste night, day, and time.

*Qu.* How do we get a knowledge of first principles?

*Ans.* 1. ἐπαγωγῇ—Induction, *e.g.*, All men are mortal.

2. αἰσθήσει—Perception, *e.g.*, Fire burns (a general law).

3. ἐθισμῶ—Habituation, *e.g.*, Two and two are four. Lying is wrong.

περιγεγράφθω μὲν οὖν τὰγαθὸν ταύτη.

*Qu.* Summarise this.

*Ans.* 1. Happiness is the end of all human action, because it is chosen for its own sake; and because it is all-sufficient for us.

2. By finding out "man's function," we find the end of human action.

This is "the life of the reason."

3. "In actuality" must be added, because otherwise it might lie idle.

4. The addition "in accordance with the law of excellence" is necessary to prevent its being misused.

5. The clause "in a complete life" is requisite to show that we must have material prosperity, and a reasonable space of time, you cannot be happy in the proper sense for a month.

6. This definition is not very clear; nearly every word of it wants defining: *and this is done later on.*

7. Finally on certain points we must be satisfied to say that everybody sees it is so, and that is enough: "this is a rose," "this is the sun;" if you say it isn't, you must be unreasonable.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Examines the various theories in relation to the definition of happiness. σκεπτόν οὐ μόνον ἐκ τοῦ συμπεράσματος καὶ ἐξ ὧν ὁ λόγος.*

Aristotle shows that this definition is right (1) not only on *a priori* grounds (2) but because it coincides with the various beliefs on the subject.

*Νενεμημένων τῶν ἀγαθῶν τριχῇ.*

A. *A good of the soul.*—It makes happiness not a material good, not a bodily good, but a good of the

soul: and a good of the soul is the highest good all philosophers agree. (The Pythagoreans).

1. *ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς* is part of the definition of happiness.

2. The *τέλος* of life is *πρᾶξις* (moral action) and *ἐνέργειαι* (conscious activity).

*τὸ εὖ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ πράττειν.*

*B.* The saying that happiness is "living well and doing well" is the substance of the definition of happiness.

*τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν.*

- c. Virtue.* { 1. Happiness is identical with virtue.—  
The Cynics.  
2. With *φρόνησις*—Socrates.  
3. With *σοφία*—Anaxagoras.
- d. Pleasure.*—4. With virtue accompanied by pleasure  
—Plato.
- e. Good Fortune.*—5. Addition of external goods.—  
Xenocrates.

*ταύτης γάρ ἐστιν ἡ κατ' αὐτὴν ἐνέργεια.*

*C. Virtue.*—The definition of happiness agrees with those who say it is virtue or a particular virtue: for it contains *κατ' ἀρετήν*: that is, it *involves* virtue. Here we agree with those who make it virtue: we improve on their definition, and make it an *activity*; so that the virtue cannot possibly be idle. (cf. *κτῆσις* and *χρῆσις*.)

τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἡδεσθαι τῶν ψυχικῶν.

*D. Pleasure.*—The virtuous life does not need pleasure appended to it as an amulet (ὥσπερ περιάπτου τινός.) cf. Pleasure is the test of virtue.

For activities of the soul as of the body are accompanied by (καθ' αὐτὸν ἡδύς) *their own* pleasure: the lover of horses takes pleasure in horses: the virtuous man loves virtue, and so takes pleasure in it: and the highest kind of pleasure, for his pleasure comes from the harmonious working of his nature; while pleasure in the bad sense violates the law of his nature.

οὐ ράδιον τὰ καλὰ πράττειν ἀχωρήγητον ὄντα.  
ἐνίων δὲ τητῶμενοι ῥυπαίνουσι τὸ μακαριον.

*E. Good Fortune.*—Happiness must be ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ: great sorrows, great poverty, great misfortunes, will prevent a man being happy. A deformed, low-born, and childless man, is not likely to be happy. Aristotle makes external good *instrumental* to happiness: though they are not happiness itself, only the sphere in which it works, just as pure air is necessary to healthy life though it is not life.

οὐδετέρους δέ τούτων εὖλογον διαμαρτάνειν τοῖς ὅλοις  
ἀλλ' ἐν γέ τι ἢ καὶ τὰ πλεῖστα κατορθοῦν.

*Qu.* Summarize this?

*Ans.* If Aristotle's theory of happiness, that is of the end of human life, hadn't been in a great measure in agreement with what men thought on the point, Aristotle must have been in the wrong.

No man can suddenly discover an absolutely new truth in a matter where all men are vitally interested, and where each man has the opportunity of getting at the main facts.

Aristotle finds that all these theories have some measure of truth in them. The soul is the highest part of man, and here, in the part that makes man *man*, must reside his τέλος.

It is not virtue only, but it involves virtue, and a right performance of one's function involves pleasure.

Since man has certain natural wants and affections he must be in a position to gratify them if he is, as a whole, to reach perfection, that is to be happy.

The Delian inscription is wrong, and happiness is fairest, best, and sweetest.

## CHAP. IX.

*By what means do men obtain happiness?*

*Qu.* Having settled on what happiness is, how is it to be reached: By teaching? by habituation? by chance? by the gift of heaven?

*Ans.* By the gift of heaven? If the Gods give anything to man, this is the fairest gift they could bestow; at any rate happiness is most divine of all things men possess, but this question is theological.

εἴη δ' αὖ καὶ πολύκοινον.

*Qu.* Does it come by chance or by teaching or practice?

ἐπιτρέψαι τύχῃ λίαν πλημμελὲς ἂν εἴη.

*Ans.* 1. It would be something horrible, if the best things on earth came by chance, and we know "Nature does everything for the best."

τὸ τῆς πολιτικῆς τέλος ἐτίθεμεν ἄριστον.

2. Politicians (N.B. Ethics is called *πολιτική τις οὐσα*) believe it is to be taught, for they endeavour to inspire a virtuous character in the citizens.

εἴρηται γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετήν.

3. The definition of happiness makes it a development in accordance with the law of excellence: and not a thing coming by chance; (this is an *a priori* argument).

οὔτε ἄλλο τῶν ζώων οὐδὲν εὐδαιμον λέγομεν.

4. Animals are not happy, because it is impossible to awaken this moral consciousness.

οὐδὲ πᾶσι εὐδαίμων ἐστίν.

5. The same applies to boys, they have only a *capacity* for happiness: for happiness requires perfect virtue, and a complete life.

δεῖ γὰρ ἀρετῆς τελείας καὶ βίου τελείου.

A boy has not had time to develop, and life has so many changes, that till it is ended it is difficult to say whether a man is happy or not. cf. Priam.

## CHAP. X.

*In what sense can we call men happy, and what is the influence of fortune?*

κατὰ Σόλωνα δὲ χρεὼν τέλος ὁρᾶν.

Cræsus, the rich King of Lydia, showed Solon his treasures, and was annoyed because Solon did not seem to envy him.

Solon gave as his reason this maxim, "Call no man happy till he is dead."

Cræsus afterwards lost his kingdom; did *this* justify the maxim of Solon?

*The Meaning of Solon's Dictum.*

1. *Qu.* "Call no man happy till he is dead," does this mean that the dead are happy?

*Ans.* No! happiness consists in activity (*v.* definition).

2. Does it mean "Call no man happy," until he is past the reach of misfortune? If we knew that anyone was to be happy till he was forty, and then to be condemned to penal servitude for the rest of his life, could we call him happy, even though the sentence was a long way off? Must we wait until the happiness is beyond dispute?

*Objections to the Dictum.*

δοκεῖ εἶναι τι τῷ τεθνεῶτι καὶ κακὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, εἴπερ καὶ τῷ ζῶντι μὴ αἰσθανομένῳ δέ.

*Objection 1.*—Does death place beyond the reach of misfortune? If your child is hanged, would not that really mar your happiness if you were alive and didn't know of it? And so it also must, when dead.



χαμαιλέοντά τινα τὸν εὐδαίμονα ἀποφαίνοντες.

*Objection 2.*—(1) You cannot say a dead man is not affected by the fortunes of his descendants.

(2) Neither can you say he follows the accidents of fortune, and is at one time happy, and at another wretched.

εἰ ὅτ' ἔστιν εὐδαίμων, μὴ ἀληθένσεται κατ' αὐτοῦ τὸ ὑπάρχον.

*Objection 3.*—Can you only call a man happy when he has *ceased* to be so? Our conception of happiness requires stability (μόνιμόν τι). Do misfortunes so far affect life, that we cannot call a man happy who is subject to them?

*This discussion goes to prove the correctness of our definition.*

μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τῷ λόγῳ καὶ τὸ νῦν διαπορηθέν.

We feel instinctively that happiness must be stable: our definition makes happiness lie in virtuous acts.

They are the most stable of all things human; *more lasting even than scientific knowledge*, thus, however *unfortunate* a virtuous man may be, he can never be *wretched*.

The mind is its own place and of itself  
Can make of hell a heaven, of heaven a hell.

αὐτὰ συνεπικοσμεῖν πέφυκεν.

Good fortune will grace his life, and bad fortune mar it, for it impedes and trammels him.

ὁμως δὲ καὶ ἐν τούτοις διαλάμπει τὸ καλόν.

*Influence of Fortune.*—Even in bad fortune the

good man will exercise his virtue, for he will bear it well. Little changes will not affect him much either way. If the misfortune is serious enough to mar his happiness, it will need time and good fortune to make him happy again.

*μακαρίους δ' ἀνθρώπους.*

We can call men happy, but we must remember that all men are subject to the reverses of fortune.

*Qu.* Summarise this?

*Ans.* To call no man happy, till he is past happiness, is laying too much stress on the accidents of life, and even if we did so, we are not sure the dead are out of the reach of evil fortune.

Happiness is within you, and though bad fortune may mar it, still it cannot quite destroy it.

Man has no absolute certainty of happiness, and when you call a man happy you qualify it by saying, *so far as man can be*. (c.f. "The changes and chances of this mortal life.")

## CHAP. XI.

*Is there any link between this life and the future?*

*λίαν ἄφιλον φαίνεται καὶ ταῖς δόξαις ἐναντίον.*

*Qu.* Do the fortunes of the living affect the dead?

*Ans.* It would sound unnatural to say they did not, and be contrary to general opinion.

*τὰ παράνομα καὶ δεινὰ προϋπάρχειν ἐν ταῖς  
τραγωδίαις ἢ πράττεσθαι.*

The dead are affected by the troubles of the living,

but only in a shadowy way. Their fortune touches them much in the same way as the recital of some terrible deed moves us compared with actually witnessing it.

Whether a dead man is happy or unhappy, the fortunes of his descendants will not alter his state.


## CHAP. XII.

*Do we give to happiness honour or praise?*

*δηλον ὅτι τῶν γε δυνάμεων οὐκ ἔστιν.*

*Qu.* Into what two classes can good be divided?

*Ans.* Goods



Potential goods are those which may turn out well; and honour is not given to things that lead to something else, but to things good for their own sakes: and which cannot be otherwise.

*γελοῖοι φαίνονται πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀναφερόμενοι.*

*Qu.* Why do we honour the Gods?

*Ans.* Because they can be criticized by no standard of ours: they are above our praise or blame, and so is happiness.

Praise is given to those goods which are referred to a higher standard. (*δι' ἀναφορᾶς.*) *e.g.* We praise the just man because he does just actions. We praise the courageous man, because his courage may save his country. "Praise" means you are in harmony with some higher standard. (Our sense of "praise" to

God is different; cf. "The sacrifice of praise and thanksgiving.")

Δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ Εὐδοξος καλῶς συνηγορῆσαι περὶ τῶν ἀριστείων τῇ ἡδονῇ.

*Qu.* How does the common use of language bear this out?

*Ans.* Eudoxus pleaded that pleasure was the highest of all goods, because it was not *praised*. (Common-sense shows he was wrong, but still the argument from language is a good one.)

*Qu.* What is the difference between "praise" and "encomium?"

*Ans.* Praise is given to the internal quality; panegyric to the external result.

ἔοικε δ' οὕτως ἔχειν καὶ διὰ τὸ εἶναι ἀρχή.

*Qu.* In what sense is happiness an ἀρχή.

*Ans.* (1) It is the τέλος of human action: the final cause, to which all action tends. (2) It is the reason of all action; the guiding principle. On either of these grounds it is worthy of *honour* and above praise.

### CHAP. XIII.

*Aristotle proceeds to examine the words in his definition of happiness: and in this Chapter enquires into the nature of the soul.*

περὶ ἀρετῆς δὲ ἐπισκεπτέον ἀνθρωπίνης δῆλον ὅτι.

It is human good we are seeking: and human good is of the body and not of the soul.

ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικός.

True politicians will enquire what virtue is, so as to make their fellow-citizens virtuous. *e.g.* The law-givers of Crete and Lacedæmon (Sparta) ; this justifies our calling Ethics *πολιτική τις οὔσα* (N.B., collect instances that prove this).

Human virtue is a virtue of the soul : therefore the true politician must enquire the nature of the soul. (*v* definition, " happiness is an activity of the soul.")

ὥσπερ καὶ τὸν ὀφθαλμοὺς θεραπεύσοντα καὶ πᾶν σῶμα.

As the oculist must possess a general knowledge of the body, so the politician must possess a general knowledge of the soul ; he must not trouble himself too much, but only so far as is necessary. (*v*. Chap. III. The method of enquiry.)

ἐν τοῖς ἐξώτεροις λόγοις ἀρκούντως ἔνια.

The popular account of the divisions of the soul is sufficient here, and Aristotle takes it instead of formulating a theory of his own.

THE DIVISIONS OF THE SOUL.

τὸ μὲν ἄλογον, τὸ δὲ λόγον ἔχον.

Ordinary language divides the soul into two parts, " rational " and " irrational."

*Qu.* Are these parts distinct ?

*Ans.* (1) They may be distinct. (2) They may be distinct in thought and not in fact. *e.g.* The outside and inside (convex and concave sides) of a tumbler.

*Qu.* Into how many parts is the soul divided?

*Ans.* Three, (1) The purely physical or vegetative. (2) The semi-rational or appetitive. (3) The purely rational.

*Qu.* What is (1) the vegetative part?

*Ans.* It is the faculty of nutrition and growth, and is shared by plants and animals. It has nothing to do with moral or intellectual excellence. It is most active in sleep, and in sleep the good and the bad men are the same, *except it may be the dreams of the good man are the best.*

*Qu.* What is (2) the semi-rational part?

*Ans.* It is irrational because it *cannot reason for itself*. It is semi-rational because it *can obey the reason*: and thus belongs in a measure to both sides.

ἄλλο τι παρὰ τὸν λόγον πεφυκός.

*Qu.* What is the difference between the continent and incontinent?

*Ans.* In the incontinent the appetites conquer the reason, in the continent the reason conquers the appetites. To "conquer" implies a *struggle*.

*Qu.* To what bodily disorder is incontinence like?


*Ans.* Palsy: the palsied man tries to move his arm to the right, but it swings round to the left: so the reason of the incontinent man tries to control his passions, but they take their own way. We can't *see* this in the soul, but this is what happens.

## TWO TABLES OF DIVISION.

φαίνεται δὴ καὶ τὸ ἄλογον διττόν.

Qu. What is the first division of the soul?

Ans. ψυχή.




Qu. What is the double meaning of “λόγον ἔχειν.”

Ans. (1) ἔχειν λόγον τῶν μαθηματικῶν “to pay attention to mathematics.” The rational part exercises reason for itself. (2) ἔχειν λόγον τοῦ πατρὸς “to pay attention to one’s father.” The semi-rational part can “pay attention” to the rational. A child does not know the right thing to do of itself, but it can “pay attention” to its father.

διττόν ἔσται καὶ τὸ λόγον ἔχον.

Qu. What is the second division of the soul?

Ans. ψυχή



These two tables might perhaps be taken in combination, so as to make at the same time two divisions of the rational and four of the irrational.

διορίζεται δὲ καὶ ἡ ἰρετὴ κατὰ τὴν διαφορὰν ταύτην.

*Qu.* How are the virtues classified?

*Ans.* Into (1) moral, ἠθικαί, *e.g.* temperance and liberality. Into (2) intellectual, διανοητικάί, *e.g.* prudence, philosophy. We don't say a man has a clever character, or a brave intellect.

*Qu.* What is a virtue?

*Ans.* A praiseworthy developed state.

*Qu.* What is a vice?

*Ans.* A blameworthy developed state.

### SUMMARY OF BOOK I.

*What is the chief good in life? if there is any chief good in life at all.* Is man the only created thing which exists in vain. In life do we move on from place to place with no goal to reach, ever moving on after a phantom. The chief good must be something with which we can be satisfied: when we once have it, it will be all-sufficient for us, and beyond it we shall desire nothing.

### THE KNOWLEDGE OF MEN ON THE SUBJECT.

*Have men up to the present time found it out?* No! the *name* is the only thing they agree on: they call it happiness: but when you ask them what happiness is, they all give you different answers: and sometimes the same man will tell you two different things.



*Can we conjecture anything from the lives men lead?* When we examine them we find that they are all unsatisfactory : that the object of pursuit contradicts our idea of what happiness ought to be.

*How far have men got in their knowledge of happiness?* They know that it exists, that there is some supreme good in life, but they know little more than this : and we shall see, each, according to his bent, mistakes the part for the whole.

### THE SCIENCE OF ETHICS.

*Does the chief good belong to the science of Politics?* It is surely the duty of the state to make the citizens happy ; and it seems a far nobler thing for the philosopher to try to make a nation happy, than to try to make an individual happy.

### THE METHOD OF THE ENQUIRY.

*How are we to pursue our enquiry into the nature of happiness?* We must follow the inductive method, and start from what our limited powers will let us see ; and in this way we shall get at principles : for a fact is the expression of a principle.

We must not expect much accuracy : for the subject is human life, and that is very difficult : we must be satisfied if we can only get an outline, which others can fill up : *for in this way all the arts have grown.*

Who is fit to study with us? The full-grown man, who knows what life is, and who will be willing to practice what he knows.

### THE DEFINITION OF HAPPINESS.

*On a priori grounds what is happiness?* The end of human action must be found, by finding out what human action is.

Everything created has a function, and that function is the peculiar gift which marks it off from all the rest of nature.

Man's function is his reason, and in the *right exercise* of reason man will find the end of his existence.

But man has a composite nature: he has material and social as well as spiritual wants, and these must be provided for if he is to be happy.

Neither will one minute make a happy man any more than one sunny hour makes a fine day.

### HARMONY WITH PREVIOUS OPINIONS.

*Can we rely on a priori reasoning?* Yes: if it accords with facts. If this definition of happiness contradicted the opinions of all other men: it must be wrong: but so far from doing this, it includes and harmonises them, and it furnishes answers to two puzzling questions. It explains facts that seemed contradictory before.

*How does it harmonise with other received opinion?*

(1.) The Pythagoreans say the goods of the soul are the highest, and Aristotle makes the supreme good 'an activity of the soul.'

(2.) The proverb says "the happy man lives well and does well:" and the definition of happiness is 'an exercise of the reason in accordance with virtue in a complete (perfect) life.'

(3.) He goes further than those who say it is 'virtue,' for he makes it an 'active virtue.'

(4.) Happiness, say some, is 'pleasure,' and Aristotle's happiness carries pleasure with it, as the sun carries light.

(5.) Some add prosperity to the definition, and Aristotle acknowledges its reasonableness by saying 'in a complete life.'

### TO WHAT QUESTIONS DOES THIS THEORY SUPPLY AN ANSWER?

(1) *How is happiness to be obtained?* By care and training, and not by chance; whether heaven works by human means to give it us, is not for us to settle here.

(2) "*Call no man happy till he is dead.*" Even the best men are men after all: subject to misfortune, and to be touched by the sorrows of others in death perhaps as well as in life: the happiness we seek for is *only* human happiness.

(3) *Is happiness worthy of honour and praise?* Praise implies reference to some higher standard: happiness is a standard in itself, and deserves honour, like the Gods.

Thus Aristotle's definition is correct, tested by the niceties of language, as well as graver standards.

### EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION.

*How does Aristotle commence to analyse his definition of happiness?*

By enquiring into the nature of the soul.

The soul is rational, and irrational, and the irrational is divided into the vegetable and semi-rational.

The semi-rational cannot reason for itself, but like a child can be taught to do well.

In the semi-rational part is the sphere of the moral virtues.

#### CONNECTION BETWEEN BOOKS I. AND II.

In Book I. Aristotle has given us a definition of happiness which contains the terms "soul" and "virtue."

In the XIII. Chapter of Book I. he examines the Nature of the Soul, and Book II. is devoted to a discussion on Virtue and the various questions connected with it.

## BOOK II.

*i.* Virtue is not innate ; if it were, why discuss it ?  
As it is not innate ; what have nature and education to do with it ?

*ii.* Virtue depends on actions.

*iii.* The great question of pleasure and pain.

*iv.* The paradox. We must do just actions before we are just.

*v.* What is the genus of virtue ? *Ans.* Habit.

*vi.* What is its differentia ? *Ans.* The mean.

*vii.* This is shown to hold good in each of the virtues.

*viii.* Virtue and the two extremes are all opposed to each other.

*ix.* A few rules to guide us in actual life ; and to tell us how far to expect perfection.

### CHAP. I.

*Virtue is not innate.—How far is Virtue due to difference of nature and of education ?*

*οὐδεμία τῶν ἠθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται.*

*Qu.* What is the origin of moral excellence ? (virtue) ; is it innate (φύσει) ?

*Ans.* Intellectual excellence comes mostly by training (ἐκ διδασκαλίας). Virtue comes from habit.

Is Virtue innate ? If it were, there would be no use in a treatise like this.

## THE FIVE REASONS WHY VIRTUE IS NOT INNATE.

(1) Its derivation (*ἠθικὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔθους*).

*οὐθὲν γὰρ τῶν φύσει ὄντων ἄλλως ἐθίζεται.*

(2) Nothing *innate* can be changed by habit ; you could never train fire to burn downwards, or a stone to fall upwards : not if you tried ten thousand times.

*ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν.*

(3) Things innate exist before we use them : we have got the power of seeing and hearing directly we are born : but before you can become a builder you must go house-building : so before you can be virtuous you must become habituated to virtue.

*τὰς δ' ἀρετὰς λαμβάνομεν ἐνεργήσαντες πρότερον.*

*οἱ νομοθέται τοὺς πολίτας ἐθίζοντες ποιοῦσιν ἀγαθοὺς.*

(4) When legislators use punishment and reward, they tacitly express a belief that virtue can be taught. (N.B.—*πολιτικὴ τις οὐσα.*)

*γιγνόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι.*

(5) If virtue came by nature, the same causes would produce the same effects, that is, the same set of circumstances would produce the same kind of men, as the waves polish pebbles on the sea-shore.

*εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως εἶχεν, οὐδὲν ἂν ἔδει τοῦ διδάξοντος.*

As in the arts, so in the virtues, men grow up differently, by doing the same things well or ill : some bad and some good ; *if it were not so there would be no need of a teacher, but men would be good or bad from the first.*

οὐτ' ἄρα φύσει οὔτε παρὰ φύσιν ἐγγίνονται αἱ  
ἀρεταί.

*Qu.* What questions does this suggest?

*Ans.* (1) Is virtue contrary to nature?

It cannot be, otherwise it could not exist: "Virtue becomes implanted in men naturally fitted to receive it, and who are perfected by habit."

πράττοντες γινόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι, οἱ δὲ ἄδικοι.

(2) What makes men virtuous?

Training and teaching in a great measure: *from acts of a like nature you must gain certain habits.*

(3) Is training everything or nature everything?

Mathematical certainty cannot be reckoned on in morals: the best teacher in the world will not make his pupils good: a good disposition is something (εὐφύλια) and good training is something too. A good piece of land still needs cultivation: and there is some land for which cultivation can do scarcely anything.

οὐ μικρὸν οὖν διαφέρει τὸ οὕτως ἢ οὕτως εὐθὺς ἐκ  
νέων ἐθίζεσθαι.

*Qu.* What must we do then to be virtuous?

*Ans.* Act virtuously: "a good education makes all the difference."

*Qu.* Summarize this?

*Ans.* How can men be virtuous: virtue is neither implanted by nature or contrary to nature: if it were you might as well trouble about it as about foul or fair

weather : we have, some more and some less, a capacity for virtue, and we must develope it in the right direction by virtuous *acts*.

## CHAP. II.

*Ethics is a practical science.—The application of its principles are difficult.—The law of perfection.*

ἡ παροῦσα πραγματεία οὐ θεωρίας ἕνεκα.

*Qu.* Is this treatise written to find out what virtue is, or to make men virtuous ?

*Ans* To make men virtuous. οὐ γνῶσις ἀλλὰ πρᾶξις is Aristotle's motto *v. Essay*.

κύριαι καὶ τοῦ ποιᾶς γενέσθαι τὰς ἔξεις.

*Qn.* What must we enquire into ?

*Ans.* The different kinds of actions : for actions form a man's character.

τὸ κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον πράττειν κοινόν.

*Qu.* What two principles guide our enquiry ?

*Ans.* (1) It is an axiom that we must follow right reason (ὀρθὸς λόγος).

δεῖ τὰ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν σκοπεῖν.

(2) We can only lay down *general* rules : you can no more tell a man how exactly to act in particular circumstances than a doctor could do till he saw his patient, "in matters of health and morals there is no hard and fast rule."



τὰ τοιαῦτα πέφυκεν ὑπὸ ἐνδείας καὶ ὑπερβολῆς φθεί-  
ρεσθαι.

*Qu.* What is the great law in Nature that leads to perfection?

*Ans.* The law of the mean, excess and defect spoil everything. Too much gymnastics and too little equally makes a man weak : so does too much or too little food and drink, but moderation produces, increases, and preserves health and strength.

*“ The same actions which produce strength, tend to preserve it : and if we cease to practice them men grow weak again.”* “ Men make circumstances.”

### CHAP. III.

#### PLEASURE AND PAIN.

*A right feeling of pleasure is a test of virtue.*

*Plato's definition of education defended.*

*The opinions of the Stoics controverted.*

σημεῖον δεῖ ποιῆσθαι τῶν ἔξεων τὴν ἐπιγινομένην  
ἡδόνην ἢ λύπην τοῖς ἔργοις.

*Qu.* What is the test of our having a virtuous habit?

*Ans.* If we feel pain when we act well, we are not virtuous, if we feel pleasure we are. cf. “Not grudgingly or of necessity, for God loveth a cheerful giver.”

περὶ ἡδονᾶς καὶ λύπας ἐστὶν ἡ ἠθικὴ ἀρετή.

*Qu.* Does it matter, if we act well, whether it causes us pleasure or pain?

*Ans.* Ethical virtue is concerned with pleasure or pain, and if we feel pain at acting well, we are not virtuous.

*ἡ ὀρθὴ παιδεία.*

PLATO'S DEFINITION OF A RIGHT EDUCATION.  
*Men should be trained up from their youth to feel pleasure and pain at the right objects.*

*Qu.* How do you defend this definition?

*Ans.* (1) Punishment makes men better; "*for punishment is a kind of medicine.*"

(2) Pleasure and pain lead us right or wrong.

(3) *On every action and on every feeling pleasure and pain follow:* so to feel pleasure and pain rightly, is to be perfectly well-trained.

(4) The sphere of a habit is that by which it is made better or worse, and this is pleasure and pain.

*ὀρίζονται τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ἡρεμίας!*

THE STOICS AND CYNICS DEFINE VIRTUE AS AN  
APATHY.

*Qu.* Are they right?

*Ans.* (1) *All motives that deter us may be summed up under the head of pain, and all motives that induce us to act under the head of pleasure.* Therefore if pain and pleasure were got rid of we should do nothing.

(2) If we tried to get rid of pleasure and pain we could not; "*it is impossible to bleach out an emotion which is engrained in our souls.*"

(3) Mankind measure their actions by pleasure and pain : so a treatise on the virtue of men must take them into account.

(4) Pleasure is the most difficult thing in the world to regulate, and this is what science of life should teach us to do. *Virtue triumphs in regulating pleasure and pain* ; if there were no difficulty in it, it would not be worth having.

*Qu.* Summarise Aristotle's view of pleasure and pain.

*Ans.* Pleasure and pain are the mainspring of action, when virtue regulates them, man's life is right.

To do away with them would be to bring mankind to a standstill, but you might as well try to do away with man.

They are bound up with man's soul, and to do him good you must teach him how to use them rightly. To accomplish this is true education.

He works in it, in the same spheres of action that it works in virtue springs into being, grow, or decay decay. (Translate Chap. III. ii., very carefully).

#### CHAP. IV.

*The resemblance and the distinction between art and moral virtue.—The importance of action.*

*Paradox.* "By doing just actions we *become* just."

#### RESEMBLANCE OF ART AND VIRTUE.

*ἡ οὐδ' ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν οὕτως ἔχει ;*

*Qu.* How can you act justly unless you are just already ?

*Ans.* It is the simple rule of every day life : if you want to become a carpenter, you must go and set to work : and after a good many failures you'll learn the way, and have no more need to copy others : but it is not until you can act on your own knowledge that you are an artist.

### THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ART AND MORAL VIRTUE

*ἔτι οὐδ' ὁμοίον ἐστὶν ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν.*

*Qu.* Is nothing more needed to make a table than to do a virtuous action ?

*πρῶτον ἐὰν εἰδῶς.*

*Ans.* (1) To make a table you must have knowledge only, and so you must to do a virtuous action, but if the table is a good one, it doesn't matter what sort of a man made it : if it was made by machinery it would be every bit as good as if Aristotle himself had made it. (*τὸ εὖ ἔχει ἐν αὐτοῖς*).

*προαιρούμενος δι' αὐτά.*

(2) A virtuous action must be done of deliberate purpose for the thing's own sake.

*βεβαίως καὶ ἀμετακινήτως.*

(3) There must be a fixed, an unalterable habit of mind : it must be principle and not the impulse of the moment. cf. "And though I give all my goods to feed the poor, and though I give my body to be burned and have not charity, it profiteth me nothing."

### THE WILL AND THE DEED.

"The will to the deed,—the inward principle to the outward act,—is as the kernel to the shell ; but yet, in the first place, the shell is necessary for the kernel,

and that by which it is commonly known ; and, in the next place, as the shell comes first, and the kernel grows gradually and hardens within it, so it is with the moral principle in man."

*τὸ μέν εἰδέναι μικρὸν ἢ οὐδὲν ἰσχύει.*

*Qu.* Which matters most of the three ?

*Ans.* The bare knowledge won't make us virtuous in any sense, if the purity, purposes, and the fixed habit of mind are the only things that are of any weight at all. cf. "A cup of cold water in my name."

*Qu.* What is a just act ?

*Ans.* Such as a just man would do.

*Qu.* If a man does these acts will he be just ?

*Ans.* Only if he does them as the just man does them : (you must not give your guinea to a charitable society to see your name in the subscription list, but for charity's sake).

*ἐπὶ τὸν λόγον καταφεύγοντες οἴονται φιλοσοφεῖν.*

*Qu.* What is the man like who only *talks* about philosophy ?

*Ans.* Like the man who listens attentively to the directions of his doctor and never carries them out. (*v.* Essay).

*Qu.* What have just actions to do with making men just ?

*Ans.* Everything. It is no paradox to say, "we must

do just actions before we are just," any more than it is to say you must make tables and chairs before you can be a carpenter. Still there is this difference, the carpenter's motives don't matter, if only his tables are good; while if a man's actions look just, and his motives are wrong, he is not just. Talking is no good without action.

## CHAP. V.

### THE GENUS OF VIRTUE.

*The genus of virtue arrived at by the exhaustive process—it is not a capacity or a feeling—therefore it is a developed state.*

*Qu.* What is the meaning of genus (τί ἐστίν) ?

*Ans.* A large class containing smaller classes : *e.g.*, "Animal" is a genus containing the smaller classes or species, "man" and "beast," etc.

ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γινόμενα τρία ἐστὶ, τούτων ἂν τι εἴη ἡ ἀρετή.

*Qu.* How does Aristotle find out the genus of virtue ?

*Ans.* There are only three modes of mind and it must be one of them.

### THIRD (v. p. 30) DIVISION OF THE SOUL.


πάθη, δυνάμεις, ἔξεις.

*Qu.* What are these three modes of mind ?

*Ans.* πάθη (feelings), δυνάμεις (faculties), ἔξεις (states): it isn't a πάθος, it isn't a δύναμις, and so by the exhaustive process it must be a ἔξις. (v. Essay.)

τὰ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ γιγνόμενα.

States of the mind.



*Qu.* Define each of these words?

*Ans.* (1) πάθος, all that is accompanied by pleasure and pain, *e.g.*, lust, anger, fear.

(2) δύναμις, that by which we are capable of feeling, *e.g.*, capacity for anger, pain, or pity.

(3) ἔξις, the condition we stand in with regard to the feelings, *e.g.*, if we feel too much anger it is a bad state, if moderately, a good state. cf. A good habit of body.

#### VIRTUE IS NOT A FEELING.

*Qu.* What are the three reasons why the virtues are not feelings (πάθη).

*Ans.* (1) We are not called good or bad because we have occasionally a wrong feeling: (argument from language).

(2) Virtue implies deliberate will, and the feelings do not.

(3) "Impulse" "moved" by our feelings, "disposed" by our virtues, "disposition." (Argument from language).

#### VIRTUE IS NOT A FACULTY.

αἱ δ' ἀρεταὶ προαιρέσεις τινὲς ἢ οὐκ ἄνευ προαιρέσεως.

*Qu.* Why are the virtues not δυνάμεις?

*Ans.* (1) Our capacity for feeling makes us neither good nor bad.

(2) Our capacities are innate (*δυνατοὶ ἐσμεν φύσει*) but our virtues are not. (v. Bk. II., Ch. I.)

VIRTUE IS A FORMED FACULTY.

*λείπεται ἔξεις αὐτὰς εἶναι.*

*Qu.* If virtues are not feelings or capacities, what must they be?

*Ans.* They must be states, for that is the only mode of mind left.

*Qu.* What is the genus of virtue?

*Ans.* There are only three modes of the mind, and it must be one of them: as it is not a feeling (three reasons), or a capacity (two reasons,) it must be a state by the exhaustive process.

## CHAP. VI.

THE DIFFERENTIA OF VIRTUE (*ποία τις*).

*Excellence, moral excellence, the two means, the differentia of virtue is "in the mean."*

*Qu.* What is a differentia?

*Ans.* Species is equivalent to genus + differentia, e.g. (species). "Man" is equivalent to (genus), "animal," + (differentia) "reason," man = rational animal.

The differentia is the quality that makes one of the smaller classes in a genus different from the rest: e.g., reason makes "man" different from all other "animals."

*οὐ ἄν ᾗ ἀρετὴ, αὐτό τε εὖ ἔχον ἀποτελεῖ.*

*Qu.* Define excellence in general.



*Ans. "Every excellence perfects that of which it is the excellence, and causes it to perform its function well." v. ἀρετή and οἰκεία ἀρετή.*

### THE TWO MEANS.

*ἐν παντὶ συνεχεῖ καὶ διαιρετῶ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ μὲν πλεῖον, τὸ δ' ἔλαττον, τὸ δ' ἴσον.*

*Qu. What is the mean?*

*Ans. Neither too much, or too little, but the equal.*

### THE ABSOLUTE MEAN.

*τοῦ πράγματος.*

*Qu. What is the "objective" or "absolute mean?"*

*Ans. That which is equidistant from the two given extremes: e.g. Between ten and two six is the "arithmetical mean."*

### THE RELATIVE MEAN.

*τὸ δὲ πρὸς ἡμᾶς οὐχ οὕτω ληπτέον.*

*Qu. What is the "relative" or "subjective mean?"*

*Ans. That which is neither too much or too little.*

*e.g. Ten pounds of meat may be too much to eat, and two pounds too little, it does not therefore follow that the trainer will order a novice in athletics to eat six pounds.*

*Qu. What is the difference between "objective" and "subjective?"*

*Ans. We use the adjective objective, when we mean to say what a thing is in itself apart from any peculiar point of view: "subjective" when we wish*

to say that is how it looks, when seen from such a position, or by such a man.

*e.g.* Objectively or absolutely a hill 500 feet high may not be steep, but subjectively it would be steep for a child or an old man : it depends on who has to climb it.

### THE PROVERB OF THE MEAN.

*ὅθεν εἰώθασιν ἐπιλέγειν τοῖς εὖ ἔχουσιν ἔργοις ὅτι  
οὐτ' ἀφελεῖν ἔστιν οὔτε προσθεῖναι.*

*Qu.* What is the meaning of the saying "don't touch it or you will spoil it?"

*Ans.* It is perfect, it is the mean, and if you added or took away from it, you would destroy its perfection.

### THE PYTHAGOREANS.

*τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου, ὥς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι εἵκαζον,  
τὸ δ' ἀγαθὸν τοῦ πεπερασμένου.*

*Qu.* Did the Greeks attach any particular idea to the mean?

*Ans.* The Pythagoreans said evil is infinite, undefined, shapeless ; good is finite, whatever had no limit was bad : their idea of beauty was proportion and harmony : as we say well-proportioned, or symmetrical, or harmonious. cf. "The earth was without form and void." (After the creation), "And God saw that it was good."

ἡ δ' ἀρετὴ πάσης τέχνης ἀκριβεστέρα καὶ ἀμείνων  
ἐστίν, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ φύσις, τοῦ μέσου ἂν εἴη στο-  
χαστική.

*Qu.* How does the question of the mean affect virtue?

*Ans.* Artists work with the mean in view, and these reach perfection: how much more nature and moral virtue aim at the mean, for they are much better.

### VIRTUE IS A MEAN.

μεσότης τις στοχαστική γε οὔσα τοῦ μέσου.

*Qu.* Is virtue simply a question of more or less a question of degree?

*Ans.* Virtue is not the mean, but a mean state, that is to say *it hits the mean*.

The mean is the index of what virtue is.

κατὰ μὲν τὴν οὐσίαν καὶ τὸν λόγον τὸν τί ἦν εἶναι  
λέγοντα μεσότης ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετή.

*Qu.* In what sense is virtue a mean state?

*Ans.* If we want to give an account of virtue, to make it plain to our understanding, we call it a mean state: that is if we wished to decide whether an act was right or wrong.

Virtue is not utility, but utility is its index: its outer side.

### VIRTUE IS AN EXTREME.

κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.

*Qu.* How is virtue an extreme?

*Ans.* When we consider it in itself, we *feel* that it is not simply a question of calculation, virtue is best, come what may.

But not for power, power of itself  
Would come uncalled for, but to live by law  
Acting the law we live by without fear,  
And because right is right to follow right,  
Were wisdom in the scorn of consequence.

οὐ πᾶσα δ' ἐπιδέχεται πρᾶξις οὐδὲ πᾶν πάθος τὴν  
μεσότητα· ἓνια γὰρ εὐθὺς ὠνόμασται συνειλημμένα  
μετὰ τῆς φαυλότητος.

*Qu.* Does the question of "more" or "less" enter into everything?

*Ans.* No; some things, such as murder, are wrong in any case.

διὰ τὸ μέσον εἶναι πῶς ἄκρον.

*Qu.* Can there be an excess, or defect in virtue?

*Ans.* Virtue is the summit of perfection: it is impossible to exceed or fail to reach it, *when we are virtuous*. We cannot imagine how it could be nobler: nor how if it was less noble, it could be virtue.

#### DEFINITION OF VIRTUE AND SUMMARY OF PROOFS.

- (1) \*Ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ;
- (2) ἐν μεσότητι οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς,
- (3) ὠρισμένη λόγῳ καὶ ὡς ἂν ὁ φρόνιμος ὀρίσειεν.

(1) Contains the *genus* of virtue, which is explained in Ch. V.

(2) Contains the differentia of virtue, and we must examine the various steps that Aristotle takes to prove this.

*A.* Everything is perfected by its own excellence, man's excellence then will render him perfect.

*B.* The mean is spoken of in two senses, the absolute, and the relative.

*C.* The relative mean is the law of perfection ; is the rule by which all good artists work.

*D.* Nature and virtue are better and more accurate than any art, and therefore they too will be guided by this law.

*E.* The Greeks attached a great value to the idea of proportion and symmetry, whatever was shapeless was bad ; whatever was good was beautiful. cf. *καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθός*.

*F.* But virtue is in a mean state, only in regard to our intellect.

*G.* Our moral nature tells us that it is the acme of what is right and good.

*H.* There can never be then too much or too little virtue, for there cannot be an excess of perfection, and perfection cannot be defective.

*I.* Some acts and feelings are bad in themselves, and these admit of no mean.

(3) But who is to be the judge of what is the mean : who is to say if an act is right or wrong.

The universal law, the immutable law of right and wrong, with which the wise man is in harmony.

## CHAP. VII.

## A CATALOGUE OF THE VIRTUES.

δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ μόνον καθόλου λέγεσθαι, ἀλλὰ καὶ  
τοῖς καθ' ἑκαστα ἐφαρμόττειν.

*Qu.* Why does Aristotle draw up a catalogue of the virtues?

*Ans.* His treatise is to make us act virtuously. and actions are concerned with particulars: so that he is obliged to show that his general theory accords with particulars. For in this case general principles are rather unsatisfactory.

## THE CATALOGUE OF THE VIRTUES.

## PART I.

| Their Spheres.                  | The Mean.  | The Excess. | The Defect.  |
|---------------------------------|--|-------------|--------------|
| περὶ φόβους καὶ θάρρη           | ἀνδρεία  | θρασύτης    | δειλία       |
| περὶ ἡδονὰς καὶ λύπας           | σωφροσύνη  | ἀκολασία    | ἀναισθησία   |
| οὐ πάσας, v. III., xi.          |  |             |              |
| { περὶ δόσιν καὶ λήψιν χρήματων | ἐλευθεριότης   | ἀσωτία      | ἀνελευθερία  |
| { (1) (περὶ μικρά)              |  |             |              |
| { (2) (περὶ μεγάλα)             | μεγαλοπρέπεια  | ἀπειροκαλία | μικροπρέπεια |
|                                 |  | καὶ         |              |
|                                 |  | βαναυσία    |              |
| { περὶ πμὴν καὶ ἀτιμίαν         | μεγαλοψυχία  | χαυνότης    | μικροψυχία   |
| { (1.) (μεγάλην)                | nameless   |             | nameless     |
| { (2.) (μικράν)                 | (sometimes we praise<br>ἀφιλότιμος,<br>sometimes<br>φιλότιμος) | φιλοτιμία   | (ἀφιλότιμος) |
| περὶ ὀργήν                      | πραότης  | ὀργιλότης   | ἀοργησία     |

## PART II.

περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν.

Concerned with daily intercourse in word and action.

|   |         |           |          |
|---|---------|-----------|----------|
| περὶ τάληθες τὸ ἐν αὐτοῖς<br>(i.e. λόγοις καὶ πράξεσιν) | ἀλήθεια | ἀλαζονεία | εἰρωνεία |
|---|---------|-----------|----------|

| Their Spheres.   | The Mean.          | The Excess.                                   | The Defect.                         |
|--|--------------------|---|-------------------------------------|
| περὶ τὸ ἡδύ { τὸ ἐν παιδιᾷ<br>τὸ ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς<br>κατὰ τὸν βίον | εὐτραπεία<br>φίλος | βωμολοχία<br>ἄρεσκος, εἰ μὲν<br>οὐδενὸς ἔνεκα | ἀγροικία<br>δυσερὶς καὶ<br>δύσκολος |
|  |                    | κόλαξ, εἰ<br>δ' ὠφελείας<br>τῆς αὐτοῦ         |                                     |

## PART III.

## μεσότητες ἐν τοῖς πάθεσι.

|   |                  |                      |                               |
|---|------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|
| περὶ λύπην καὶ ἡδονὴν τὰς<br>ἐπὶ τοῖς συμβαίνουσι<br>τοῖς πέλας γινομένας | αἰδώς<br>νέμεσις | (καταπλήξ)<br>φθόνος | (ἀναίσχυτος)<br>ἐπιχαιρεκακία |
|---|------------------|----------------------|-------------------------------|

*Qu.* What strikes you about this catalogue?

*Ans.* Firstly it is tentative.

Aristotle (*v.* § 2) had intended to speak of there being four vices grouped round each virtue.

*e.g.* In the sphere of fear and over confidence.

|   |                         |   |
|---|-------------------------|---|
| <i>Excess</i> { Too much<br>confidence. | <i>Mean.</i> — Bravery. | <i>Excess</i> { Cowardice, <i>i.e.</i> , too<br>much fear.          |
| <i>Defect</i> { Too little of<br>fear.  |                         | <i>Defect.</i> { Cowardice, <i>i.e.</i> , too<br>little confidence. |

Aristotle had some difficulty in finding names for one excess and one defect, and it would have been useless to carry on this refinement: thus after courage he has only two vices to each virtue.

Secondly, Aristotle's method of naming the virtues and vices: it (1) "partly consists in accepting experience as shown in common language, &c." *e.g.* ἀνδρεία σωφροσύνη. (2) "Partly in finding new expressions for it, so as to discover men's thoughts for themselves." *e.g.* ὀργίλος ἔστω. (3) "Restricting a meaning." *e.g.* ἀλήθεια and φιλία.

Thirdly, there are three divisions to the catalogue.  
 1. Personal virtues. 2. Social Virtues. 3. Feelings in the mean (not virtues).

### PART I.

*Qu.* What is there to note in the personal virtues?

*Ans.* That two pairs of virtues have a parallel relation.

Magnificence bears the same relation to generosity as a nameless virtue concerned with small honour does to great-souledness.

*ὅθεν ἐπιδικάζονται οἱ ἄκροι τῆς μέσης χώρας.*

(2) That since the virtue which deals with small honour is nameless, both the extremes of "ambition," and "want of ambition" lay claim to be in the mean.

### PART III.

*Qu.* What is there to note in the third part?

*Ans.* (1) That they are not virtues, because they are not "developed states" of mind.

(2) That *Αἰδώς* and *Νέμεσις* are personified in Greek Mythology: *Αἰδώς* is "the honour which is sensitive about right in oneself."

For a description of *αἰδώς* v. III. 3.

A desire for the noble, since it aims at reputation, and a shrinking from disgrace, since it is base.

*Νέμεσις* the "righteous retribution" to preserve right outside oneself.



(3) *φθόνος* and *ἐπιχαιρεκακία* are not opposed to each other, but different manifestations of the same feeling.

*φθονερός* grieves at the good fortune, *ἐπιχαιρέκακος* rejoices at the evil fortune of the good : their opposites would be those who neither rejoice at the good fortune, or grieve at the ill fortune of the good.

## CHAP. VIII.

### THE RELATION OF VIRTUE TO THE EXTREMES.

*There is an opposition between the extremes, and again between them and virtue, and therefore virtue and vice are not merely questions of quantity.*

διὸ καὶ ἀπωθοῦνται τὸν μέσον οἱ ἄκροι ἐκάτερος πρὸς ἐκάτερον.

*Qu.* How is virtue opposed to the two vices ?

*Ans.* The coward says to the brave man, " you are too confident," (excess) : while the over-confident tells him he is " not confident enough " (defect).

πλείων ἐναντιότης ἐστὶ τοῖς ἄκροις πρὸς ἀλλήλα ἢ πρὸς τὸ μέσον.

*Qu.* Are the extremes more in opposition to each other, than they are to the mean ?

*Ans.* Naturally, as they are much further off from each other.

ἔτι πρὸς μὲν τὸ μέσον ἐνίοις ἄκροις ὁμοιότης τις φαίνεται.

*Qu.* Are both extremes *equally* opposed to the mean?

*Ans.* Nearly always one extreme is worse than the other: and one extreme more like the mean.

*e.g.* (1) The coward (defect) is less like the brave man than the rash man is (excess).

(2) There is more hope that the prodigal (excess) will become generous, than there is that the stingy (defect) will.

πρὸς δὲ τὸ μέσον ἀντίκειται μᾶλλον ἐφ' ὧν μὲν ἡ ἔλλειψις, ἐφ' ὧν δὲ ἡ ὑπερβολή.

*Qu.* Is the defect then always worse than excess?

*Ans.* Sometimes the defect is worse, sometimes the excess.

*e.g.* Debauchery is less like temperance than asceticism.

μία μὲν οὖν αἰτία αὕτη, ἐξ αὐτοῦ τοῦ πράγματος, ἑτέρα δὲ ἐξ ἡμῶν αὐτῶν.

*Qu.* What are the two reasons why one extreme is sometimes worse than the other?

*Ans.* (1) Its own nature.

*e.g.* Cowardice differs from bravery in itself, and objectively more than rashness does.

(2) The bent of our disposition.

*e.g.* We are more naturally disposed to take too much pleasure, than to take too little.

εὐκατάφοροί ἐσμεν μᾶλλον πρὸς ἀκολασίαν ἢ πρὸς  
κοσμιότητα.

*Qu.* Are we then naturally disposed to what is worst?

*Ans.* No, but we are disposed to one side, more than to the other; and therefore it is into that extreme we are most likely to fall; and consequently that extreme is more dangerous to virtue than the other.  
πρὸς ἃ ἡ ἐπίδοσις μᾶλλον γίνεται.

#### CHAP. IX.

##### RULES OF CONDUCT.

*Virtue is very difficult; it is exceedingly difficult to know the "how" and "when," &c. Aristotle gives a few rules to enable us to judge impartially.*

ἐν ἐκάστῳ γὰρ τὸ μέσον λαβεῖν ἔργον.

*Qu.* Now we have settled what virtue is, are all our difficulties over?

*Ans.* To settle all the nice points that arise is a very difficult matter, but there are three rules to enable us to judge *impartially*.

ἀποχωρεῖν τοῦ μᾶλλον ἐναντίου.

I. *Choose the least of two evils*, and when you must pass between Scylla and Charybdis, keep near Scylla, as Circe (not Calypso) warned Ulysses. cf.

And even his failings leaned to virtue's side.

Keep out of the way of the worst extreme of the two, and as it is hard to keep in mid-channel let us make a losing tack (κατὰ τὸν δεύτερον πλοῦν).

ἄλλοι γὰρ πρὸς ἄλλα πεφύκαμεν.

II. *Avoid the sin which doth most easily beset us.*  
We all have a failing of our own, and we had better go to the opposite extreme ; as the people, who have to straighten warped wood, bend it the other way.

ἐν παντὶ δὲ μάλιστα φυλακτέον τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὴν ἡδονήν·  
οὐ γὰρ ἀδέκαστοι κρίνομεν αὐτήν.

III. *Always be on your guard against pleasure.*  
And like the Trojan Counsellors did with Helen, by sending it out of our sight we shall err the less.

χαλεπὸν δ' ἴσως τοῦτο, καὶ μάλιστ' ἐν τοῖς καθ' ἕκαστον.

Qu. Are we to expect perfection ?

Ans. The difficulty lies in the details of each case : these details are matters of immediate perception : and no such matter is easy to determine (οὐδὲ γὰρ ἄλλο οὐδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν) and we must allow some little latitude ; but great divergence from what is right must be wilful.

ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις.

Qu. How are we to know when conduct is right or wrong, if we have no rule ?

Ans. We feel about : our knowledge is intuitive : the mean in which virtue lies is for the " wise " man to settle.

ἀποκλίνειν δὲ δεῖ ὅτε μὲν ἐπὶ τὴν ὑπερβολήν, ὅτε δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἑλλειψιν.

Qu. What is Aristotle's last piece of advice ?

*Ans.* Sometimes incline a little to excess, sometimes to excess : then we shall most easily hit the mean.

*Qu.* Summarise this.

*Ans.* Virtue has been defined generally, and a catalogue of the virtues given ; but what the mean is has to be settled afresh in almost each case ; a few rules are given to enable us to judge without prejudice. We must make some allowance for different temperaments ; and try to get ourselves into a state where we can trust to our feelings of what is best.

## SUMMARY OF BOOK II.

### VIRTUE RESTS ON ACTIONS.

*Is Virtue Innate?* There are five reasons to show that it is not ; but neither is it contrary to nature : some people are naturally fitted to receive it, and are perfected by training.

*Is this a mere speculative treatise?* It is written to teach us how to become good ; and therefore we must take *actions* into consideration.

*Are very precise rules possible?* Of course we are to obey right reason, but men must have a certain latitude allowed them in judging of the circumstances of their case.

### PLEASURE AND PAIN.

*Do pleasure and pain concern us?* They concern the whole subject-matter of virtue, namely, action and feeling, nay more, they are the test of what nature our actions.

Plato's definition of education is right, and the Stoics' and Cynics' definition of virtue wrong.

#### ART AND MORAL VIRTUE.

*"We become just by doing just actions."* This seems a paradox. We must copy others first before we can get knowledge for ourselves.

*Where does the analogy between art and moral virtue fail?* In art knowledge is everything, in virtue, unless there is purity and fixity of purpose, knowledge is worth nothing.

#### DEFINITION OF VIRTUE.

*What is the genus of virtue?* There are three modes of consciousness in the soul, feelings, capacities, and states: it can only be the last.

*What is the differentia of virtue?* Each thing is perfected by its own excellence: art reaches perfection when it is in the mean, and so does nature and virtue.

*Is virtue only a mean?* It is a mean, if you wish to explain it, to make it visible, but in itself it is an extreme.

*How shall we show the doctrine of the mean is true?* By drawing up a table of the virtues, and seeing that it holds good in every one of them.

*How are the mean and the extremes opposed?* Each of the extremes is opposed to the other: and virtue to both, sometimes more, sometimes less.

## RULES FOR ACTION.

*How are we to attain the mean in each case ?* It is very difficult to say, we must make allowance for men's different opinions, as long as they don't go far wrong. There are a few common-sense rules which at all events will enable us to judge impartially.

## CONNECTION BETWEEN BOOKS II. AND III.

Bk. II. has been wholly occupied with an enquiry into the nature of virtue.

Bk. III. commences with a treatise on the voluntary in the first five chapters : and afterwards discusses courage and temperance in detail.

## BOOK III.

### TREATISE ON THE VOLUNTARINESS OF VIRTUE.

*i.*—Defines all kinds of actions which fall under the head of the voluntary and involuntary.

*ii.*—Discusses the nature of purpose.

*iii.*—Deliberation—and the place in the mental process of wish, deliberation, and purpose.

*iv.*—The question of the real and the apparent good.

*v.*—If virtue is voluntary, vice is so too.

### COURAGE.

*vi.*—The object of courage.

*vii.*—The brave man compared with those in the extremes.

*viii.*—The five spurious kinds of courage.

*ix.*—Courage involves loss of all, therefore it is most noble.

### TEMPERANCE.

*x.*—The sphere of temperance.

*xi.*—Comparison of cowardice and intemperance.

### CHAP. I.

*Defines the voluntary, mixed, involuntary, and not-voluntary actions. Temptation. Ignorance of facts of six kinds. Passion and desire. Table of Voluntary and Involuntary actions.*



## FREE-WILL AND VIRTUE.

Virtue is connected with actions and feelings ; virtue is a praiseworthy state ; and vice a blameworthy state. v. I., xiii.

*Qu.* Why must we settle the different kinds of action ?

*Ans.* (1) Because it is impossible to call a man virtuous or not for his actions, unless you settle how far he is a free agent.

(2) It is useful for legislators : for instance we don't punish a madman.

## INVOLUNTARY ACTIONS.

*τὰ ἀκούσια.*

*Qu.* Define Involuntary actions.

*Ans.* " Those which are done through compulsion or ignorance (of the particular). "

## COMPULSORY ACTIONS.

*τὸ βίαιον.*

*Qu.* Define " compulsory. "

*Ans.* (1) " That of which the moving principle is external. "

(2) " And which is of such a character that the agent or patient has no share in it. "

This second clause guards against a man giving way to *temptation, anger, or desire*, and partly making himself an accomplice in his own wrong-doing.

*e.g.* (1) The wind takes you over a precipice.

(2) Superior physical force.

And you *resist in vain*.

*μικταὶ πράξεις.*

*Qu.* Define mixed actions.

*Ans.* "Mixed actions are involuntary, in the abstract, but voluntary at the time, *i.e.*, in [preference to some other alternative."

*εοίκασι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐκουσίοις.*

Actions are concerned with particulars, and these are voluntary.

Aristotle holds that separate actions are voluntary.

*e.g.* A cargo is cast overboard in a storm ; this is involuntary in the abstract, (*i.e.*, if you were safe in port you wouldn't do it), but relatively it is voluntary (*i.e.*, you are likely to be wrecked if you don't).

*τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστίν.*

You must judge of an action being voluntary or not when it is done.

The efficient cause (*ἀρχή*) is in the man, and he therefore could refrain if he liked.

### DIVISION OF MIXED ACTIONS.

*Qu.* Divide mixed actions.

*Ans.* There are four divisions (1) Praised (2) Blamed (3) Pardoned or pitied (4) Unpardonable.

(1) *ἐπαινοῦνται.*

*Qu.* When do mixed actions deserve praise ?

*Ans.* When we suffer something terrible or disgraceful (abstractedly involuntary) to win some noble end.

*e.g.* Martyrdom.

(2) *ἀν δ' ἀνάπαλιν, ψέγονται.*

When there is no adequate reason for our submission.  
*e.g.* A man undergoes humiliation to get some advantage for himself.

(3) Pity and Pardon, *ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώμη.*

When human nature is *overstrained*, and can bear no more.

*e.g.* Galileo driven to confess that the earth was immoveable, under the threats of the Inquisition.

(4) *ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι.*

There are some things nothing should compel us to do.

*e.g.* Monmouth writhing at the feet of James II. to beg for life.

*ἔστι δὲ χαλεπὸν ἐνίστε διακρίναι ποῖον ἀντὶ ποίου  
 αἵρετέον.*

*Qu.* What rules should we lay down as to mixed actions?

*Ans.* Often it is very difficult to say: it is hard to frame rules, and harder still to stand to them: for in these doubtful cases there is generally pain on one side, and disgrace on the other. It is very difficult to decide on Galileo's conduct.

#### TEMPTATION.

*Qu.* Temptation by pleasure is an external motive: are we compelled to yield to it?

*Ans.* (1) All actions, if this plea was admitted,

would be compulsory, for all motives can be summed up under the head of pleasure. v. Bk. II., iv.

My children be good till you're tempted,  
While you're sober be wise and discreet.

(2) Compulsion is not agreeable, pleasure is.

(3) It is absurd to transfer the responsibility from ourselves to external things.

(4) It is ridiculous to say we are the cause of what is noble, and pleasure of what is disgraceful. cf. "My words are my own, my acts are my ministers."

(5) If we do right to applaud ourselves: and if we do wrong to say "the temptation was too strong for me."

(The Greek form of these reasons should be carefully read).

#### INVOLUNTARY AND NOT VOLUNTARY.

*τὸ δὲ δι' ἄγνοιαν οὐχ ἐκούσιον μὲν ἅπαν ἐστίν.*

*Qu.* Are all actions done in ignorance of the facts involuntary?

*ἀκούσιον.*

*Ans.* (1) If they are followed by repentance they are involuntary.

*οὐχ ἐκούσιον.*

(2) If they are not followed by repentance when the agent learns his mistake, you can't say his fault was voluntary, as he did not know what he was doing; nor involuntary, as he does not care, but you give it a separate name, not-voluntary.

## IGNORANCE OF FACTS AND IGNORANCE OF PRINCIPLES.

ἕτερον δ' ἔοικε καὶ τὸ δι' ἄγνοιαν πράττειν τοῦ ἀγνοοῦντα ποιεῖν.

*Qu.* What is the difference between ignorance of facts, and ignorance of principles.

*Ans.* (1) ἄγνοῶν, acting in ignorance.

ἡ καθόλου ἄγνοια, ignorance of universal principles.

εἰ τις ἀγνοεῖ τὸ συμφέρον, ignorance of one's interest.

ἡ ἐν τῇ προαιρέσει ἄγνοια, ignorance of purpose.

Which all come to about the same thing here, are not a man's misfortune but his fault. Drunkenness or passion is no excuse. When we *call* him depraved : we assert his responsibility.

(2) ἡ καθ' ἑκάστα ἄγνοια, ignorance of the several particular details makes a man's action involuntary.

## SIX KINDS OF IGNORANCE IN DETAIL.

1. τίς. The agent. *e.g.* The agent cannot be ignorant of his own identity.

2. τί. The action. *e.g.* Something escapes a man in conversation.

3. περὶ τὸ ἢ ἐν τίνι. *e.g.* Merope thought her son was an enemy.

That with which his action is concerned.

4. τίνι. The instrument. *e.g.* One might fancy that the spear which was pointed was buttoned.

5. ἕνεκα τίνος. The tendency. *e.g.* Aiming a blow to save a man and killing him.

6. πῶς. The Manner. *e.g.* Showing how to hit is sparring, strike a heavy blow. (ἀκροχειριζόμενοι).

Ignorance of any of these points, (καὶ μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς κυριωτάτοις) makes an action involuntary if followed by repentance: if unrepented of, non-voluntary.

### VOLUNTARY ACTIONS.

*Definition.*—The voluntary is that of which the efficient cause (ἀρχή) is in the agent, who knows the circumstances of the action.

τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἢ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν.

### ARE ACTIONS PROMPTED BY ANGER OR DESIRE INVOLUNTARY?

It is not right to call them so for the following reasons:—

(1) This would make the action of animals and children involuntary.

(2) Are *all* actions from anger and desire involuntary, or *only* the bad actions? For some of these actions are *right and good*. "Right" implies "free-will."

(3) Some of these actions we "ought" to desire; and "duty" involves "free-will."

(4) Involuntary acts are unpleasant; desire prompts us to pleasant acts.

(5) Errors of anger are as bad as errors of reason: the passions are as much part of man's nature as the reason.

(These reasons should be carefully studied in the Greek.)


## SUMMARY.

*Qu.* What does the Chapter do?

*Ans.* It shows that those who say our good actions are voluntary, and our bad actions involuntary, are wrong: since they both proceed from the same source.

The classes of actions are gone through; giving rules as to where and in what degree man is to be held responsible; but finally in each case Aristotle's argument comes to this, where men praise and blame, there you have free-will: some actions have less free-will than others, because men blame them less.

## TABLE OF VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY ACTIONS.



## CHAP. II.

*Purpose a species of the genus voluntary,—compared with desire, anger, wish; opinion generally, and specific opinion; summary of purpose.*

*Qu.* Why does Aristotle discuss "purpose?"

*Ans.* "It is very near to virtue, and decides men's characters more than actions do." v. II. iv. Requisites of a virtuous action.

They never fail who die in a good cause.

## PURPOSE A SPECIES OF VOLUNTARY.


ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταῦτον δὲ.

*Qu.* Why is purpose a species of voluntary?

*Ans.* (1) Animals and children have free-will, but no purpose.

(2) Acts done on the spur of the moment are voluntary, but not purposed.

Voluntary.



## PURPOSE DEFINED BY CONTRAST.

*Qu* With what five things has purpose been confounded?

*Ans.* Desire, anger, wish, opinion generally, opinion of any particular kind.

## 1. προαίρεσις not ἐπιθυμία.

(1) Purpose is not shared by the irrational beings, desire and anger are.

(2) The continent acts from purpose, and the incontinent from desire.

(3) Purpose and desire are opposed, but desire is not opposed to desire in the same way as it is to purpose.

(4) Desire, and not purpose have to do with pleasure and pain.



## 2. θυμὸς δ' ἔτι ἤττον.

Partly for the same four reasons it is not desire, and we act more quickly from anger than from desire; a man gives himself no time to think. cf. "In the heat of passion."

## 3. Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησίς γε, καίπερ σύνεγγυς φαινόμενον.

Purpose, in short, is concerned with things in our power.

(1) No one but a fool would purpose *the impossible*, though we might wish for it, *e.g.* deathlessness.

(2) We do not purpose *things that depend on another* (except that other is a friend who can do it for us). *e.g.* That a particular athlete should win.

(3) We can only purpose *the means not the end*, it would be a misuse of language to say "we *purpose* to be happy," we can only wish for happiness, and then purpose what steps we think best to attain it.

## 4. οὐδὲ δὴ δόξα ἂν εἴη.

(1) Opinion concerns itself with everything, even if it is eternal or impossible.

(2) Opinion is divided into "false" and "true," purpose into "good" and "bad."

## 5. ἀλλ' οὐδέ τινι (δόξει).

(1) Nor is purpose any species of opinion more than opinion as a whole.

(2) Our purpose, not our opinion on good and evil, make our character.

His conduct still right, with his argument wrong.

(3) We form our opinion as to the best course, and how to take it, *but when it comes to action* purpose comes in.

(4) We praise "correct" opinions, but we praise purpose in the terms "duty" and "right."

(5) We purpose where we know for certain, but we have opinions where our knowledge is not at all certain.

(6) The people with the best opinions often don't act up to them.

I know what's right, but only so,  
I never practice what I know.

*εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως οὐδὲν διαφέρει.*

*Qu.* Has opinion no influence on purpose? Does it make no difference what our opinions on morals are?

*Ans.* No doubt they act and react on one another: but that doesn't make them *identical*: and this is the question we are discussing.

#### SUMMARY OF THE NATURE OF THE PURPOSE.

Purpose is more a test of character than our actions are.

Purpose is neither anger, desire, wish, opinion in general, nor opinion in particular.

It is voluntary, but narrower than voluntary.

That is, it is deliberate, for it implies reason and reflection.

Nay more its very name (*πρὸ ἐτέρων αἰρετόν*), shows that it is chosen in preference to other alternatives.

(Genus) voluntary + (differentia) deliberation = (species) purpose, *i.e.*, deliberate choice.

### CHAP. III.

*Deliberation.—Its objects.—The mental process.*

#### THE OBJECTS OF DELIBERATION.

(1) *Not* such things as a fool or a madman would deliberate on.

(2) *Not* the eternal. *e.g.* i. The universe ; ii. *The side and diameter are incommensurable.*

(3) *Not* about things in motion, which chance or nature directs in the same way. *e.g.* i. The sun's turns (solstices). ii. The sun's risings.

(4) *Not* about things always varying. *e.g.* Drought or rain.

(5) *Not* about every human matter. *e.g.* No Lacedæmonian deliberates what would be the best constitution for the Scythians.

(6) *Not* about what chance directs. *e.g.* The finding of a treasure.

*Qu.* What is the use of giving this list of things with which deliberation has nothing to do.

*Ans.* By rejecting everything that is out of our power, we arrive, *by the exhaustive process*, at the conclusion that deliberation is concerned with what is in our power.

*Qu.* What are the four efficient causes of everything?

*Ans.* 1, Nature ; 2, necessity ; 3, chance ; 4, reason ; and all that depends on man.

*Qu.* What do men deliberate about?

*Ans.* The things that "can be done by their own means"; but even then there is a limit; we don't deliberate on settled and certain sciences: *e.g.* about writing, but on difficult things, whose issue is uncertain. *e.g.* Navigation, medicine.

#### COUNSELLORS.

"When we distrust our own powers of judgment, we get others to deliberate with us."

*οὐ περὶ τῶν τελῶν ἀλλὰ περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη.*

#### MEANS NOT ENDS.

The physician does not deliberate if he shall cure, but what means he shall take to do it.

#### PROCESS OF DELIBERATION.

*θέμενοι τέλος τι. e.g.* The cure of a patient.

1. *σκοποῦσι διὰ τίνων ἔσται. i.e.* What course of treatment will be best?

*διὰ πλειόνων μὲν φαινομένου γένεσθαι. i.e.* There is more than one course of treatment.

2. (i.) *διὰ τίνος ῥᾶστα καὶ κάλλιστα ἐπισκοποῦσι. i.e.* Which is the best and easiest of the two?

(ii.) *δι' ἐνὸς δ' ἐπιτελουμένου. e.g.* When it may be accomplished through one only?

3. *πῶς διὰ τούτου ἔσται. i.e.* By what step is the course of treatment chosen to be set at work?

4. *καὶ κεῖνο διὰ τίνος. i.e.* What will lead to this step?

5. *ἕως ἂν ἔλθωσιν ἐπὶ τὸ πρῶτον αἷτιον. i.e.* The physician himself.

ὃ ἐν τῇ εὐρέσει ἔσχατόν ἐστιν. *i.e.* Which is the last step in the investigation ?

#### EXAMPLE.

*Qu.* What is meant by comparing this to an analysis ?

#### βούλησις.

*Ans.* You think first what you wish for. *e.g.* Cure my patient.

#### βούλευσις.

(1) Then you say, "What way can I bring that about?" and you see you can do it in two ways.

(2) Which is the best of the two? Why, this is.

(3) What steps will be necessary for the treatment I am going to adopt? I'll give him certain drugs.

(4) How shall I give him them? I'll write a prescription.

#### προαίρεσις.

(5) And then the efficient cause, the doctor himself is reached, the deliberation is over, when the guiding principle, that which purposes, is reached.

#### DELIBERATION FURTHER EXPLAINED.

κἂν μὲν ἀδυνάτῳ ἐντύχωσιν, ἀφίστανται.

*Qu.* Supposing one of the steps impossible?

*Ans.* If we are out of quinine, we try to find a substitute.

φαίνεται δ' ἡ μὲν ζήτησις οὐ πᾶσα εἶναι βούλευσις.

*Qu.* Is every investigation deliberation ?

*Ans.* Mathematical investigations are not: we do not act on them.

*δυνατὰ δὲ ἃ δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἂν.*

*Qu.* "Possibilities" are the subject of deliberation. What does this mean?

*Ans.* Either what we or our friends can do, for in either case the beginning is in ourselves.

*αἰσθήσεως γὰρ ταῦτα.*

*Qu.* Do we deliberate on everything?

*Ans.* Not on objects of perception, *e.g.* is this a loaf? if we did we might go on for ever.

*βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ προαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό.*

*Qu.* Have deliberation and purpose the same object?

*Ans.* We deliberate on a number of alternatives, and the one that we choose, is the object of our purpose.

*τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ προαιρούμενον.*

*Qu.* When does deliberation cease?

*Ans.* When we have gone through all the alternatives, and have settled what to do. When we have identified the efficient cause with the faculty which takes the lead in action.

*ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων πολιτειῶν, ὃς Ὅμηρος ἐμιμῆτο.*

*Qu.* What scenes in Homer illustrate this process of deliberation?

*Ans.* The kings announcing to the people the course they had selected.

## DEFINITION OF PURPOSE.

βουλευτική ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

*Qu.* Define purpose.

*Ans.* Purpose is a deliberate desire of things in our power.

*Qu.* Explain this definition.

1. ὄντος τοῦ προαιρετοῦ ὁρεκτοῦ.

*Ans.* First comes desire, we place some end before us.

2. τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν.

We know that either we or our friends can accomplish it; if we find we are mistaken we give up the idea of doing it.

3. βουλευτοῦ.

We deliberate on the means we must employ, and the worth of the end, for desire and deliberation are connected with one another. Desire deals with the end, and deliberation with the means to attain it: and then, if it seems good to us, we purpose.

## CHAP. IV.

## THE REAL AND APPARENT GOOD.

*It has been decided that (1) "action" may be voluntary; (2) that "deliberation" as to what means men shall take is free; (3) "purpose" has to direct means and is free; this Chapter discusses the question as to whether our "wishes" are free also, are men free to choose the end as well as the means?*

## THE OBJECT OF WISH.

ἡ βούλησις ἐστὶ τοῦ τέλους.

*Qu.* Are we free to choose the end?

*Ans.* (1) δοκεῖ δὲ τοῖς μὲν ἀγαθοῦ εἶναι.

Plato says that we wish for what is really good.

(2) τοῖς δὲ τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ.

The Sophists that we only wish for the apparent good.

## THE REAL GOOD.

τὸ βουλευτὸν τὰγαθόν.

*Qu.* What is the objection to the first theory?

*Ans.* If we really wish for the absolute good, then when we wish for some apparent good, it is because we *mistake* it for the absolute, and we don't really wish for it at all.

We can see that this is untrue; men *do* wish for what is bad. *e.g.* A drunkard wishes for drink, not because he mistakes it for the absolute good, but because the temptation overcomes him.

## THE APPARENT GOOD.

τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθὸν τὸ βουλευτόν.

*Qu.* What is the objection to the second theory?

*Ans.* The Sophists who say that men wish for the apparent good, must admit then that men wish, just as their fancy moves them, so that one man may wish for a thing, and his neighbour for the opposite.

*e.g.* One man may wish to get drunk, and another to keep sober, and both are in the right.

There will be no *real standard of desire*, but what



we wish for is just a matter of taste. Each man doing what is right in his own eyes.

#### A MIDDLE COURSE.

*ἀρα φατέον ἀπλῶς καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλευτὸν εἶναι  
τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον ;*

*Qu.* How does Aristotle settle the difficulty?

*Ans.* There is a real object of wish fixed by nature, and the wise man, who is in harmony with nature, will see this.

But men will be led away to wish for the apparent good.

*e.g.* The really healthy man wishes for what is truly healthy, but the sick may not find it so.

*ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὢν.*

*Qu.* What are the characteristics of the good man? (*σπουδαῖος*)?

*Ans.* He sees the truth in all cases, "being as it were the rule and measure," while the rest of the world make pleasure their good, and pain their evil.

*Qu.* Summarise this?

*Ans.* Some say men wish for what is really good, and if they wish for anything else, it is no true wish; they would not do it, if they knew. But we *see* men wishing for what is bad, knowingly.

The second theory is that men wish for what seems good to them, and that wishes are a matter of taste.

This denies that there is anything good to wish for.

Aristotle harmonises these two theories, men do really wish for what is bad.

Nevertheless nature has made a standard of good, and to this standard, the good man who is in union with nature, will strive.

Aristotle appeals to our feeling on the subject, we feel that there is something worth wishing for, and we see that some men go right and others wrong.

#### CHAP. V.

*Six reasons to disprove "virtue is voluntary and vice involuntary." Habits are less voluntary than single acts. Actions at all events are voluntary.*

*ἐφ' ἡμῖν δὲ καὶ ἡ ἀρετή, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἡ κακία.*

SIX REASONS TO PROVE IF VIRTUE IS VOLUNTARY,  
VICE IS VOLUNTARY ALSO.

i. (1) The means to the end are in our power  
(2) if we have the power to perform, we must have the power to abstain, and *vice versa*.

ii. It may be argued, no one can really of his own free-will be evil.

The answer is, if the man is not the cause of his own actions, what is?

iii. Mankind believes that there is such a thing as free-will.

If they did not, they would not punish or exhort.

No one punishes you for being cold or hot.

iv. If a man pleads he did not know it was wrong.

The answer is he has brought it on himself by his mode of life; it is his fault, and not his misfortune.

Perhaps he cannot *now* cure himself; neither can the man who has delirium tremens.

v. Men censure those who have brought bodily diseases on themselves.

It follows that the vices we are censured for, are self-caused.

vi. Are men responsible for their conception of the end? or is it fixed for them by nature?

(1) If it is fixed by nature, virtue is as involuntary as vice; this men instinctively disbelieve.

(2) If the end is fixed the means nevertheless are free.

(3) We in a certain measure form our habits, and so are responsible for our impression of the end.

### I. THE MEANS ARE FREE.

*βουλευτῶν δὲ καὶ προαιρετῶν τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος.*

(1) *Qu.* What does this prove?

*Ans.* Means are the object of purpose and deliberation, and therefore, even if the end is not in our power, the separate acts which lead up to it are?

*ἐν οἷς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡμῖν τὸ πράττειν, καὶ τὸ μὴ πράττειν.*

(2) *Qu.* "We have the power of acting well." What does this prove?

*Ans.* That we also have the power of *not* acting well, that we have it in our power to do evil. If virtue is voluntary, vice is so too.

### II. THE EFFICIENT CAUSE IS IN ONESELF.

*οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ.*

*Qu.* Does any man choose evil? Is any man pleased to be evil, or sorry to be good?

*Ans.* Man is the efficient cause of his own actions, what other efficient cause is there, if he is not? and if he is the cause of his actions he is responsible for

them (εἰ μὴ ἔχομεν εἰς ἄλλας ἀρχὰς ἀναγαγεῖν παρὰ τὰς ἐν ἡμῖν).

### III. PUBLIC OPINION:

τούτοις δ' ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἐκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νομοθετῶν.

*Qu.* Does the general opinion make men responsible?

*Ans.* Both public opinion, and the legislators enforce this view in using rewards and punishments.

καίτοι ὅσα μήτ' ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστὶ, μήθ' ἐκούσια, οὐδεὶς προτρέπεται πράττειν.

*Qu.* How does this prove that vice is voluntary?

*Ans.* No one tries to persuade you not to feel hot or cold, because they know it would be no good (ὥς οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου ὄν).

### IV. IGNORANCE OF GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

εἰὰν αἵτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας.

*Qu.* But suppose that a man does wrong through ignorance?

*Ans.* Is his *ignorance self-caused*, if so it is no excuse. If a man does wrong when he is drunk, the laws punish him twice as much (τοῖς μεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ ἐπιτίμια).

τοῦ γὰρ ἐπιμεληθῆναι κύριοι.

*Qu.* On what principle is this?

*Ans.* A reckless disposition takes no care: and if a man is of a reckless disposition it is his own fault:

he lives carelessly or evilly, and makes himself what he is.

τοῦτο δὲ δῆλον ἐκ τῶν μελετώντων πρὸς ἡντινοῦν ἀγωνίαν.

*Qu.* What analogy can you quote for this?

*Ans.* Men who are training for a trial of strength, practice continuously, everybody but *an absolute idiot knows that habits will follow on particular acts*: if a man keeps on acting unjustly he *voluntarily* becomes unjust.

οὐ μὲν ἐάν γε βούληται, ἄδικος ὧν πάυσεται.

*Qu.* How would you answer the objection, "if he voluntarily becomes unjust, he would be able to *leave off* being unjust when he pleased?"

*Ans.* By another analogy. Supposing a man has brought on an illness by living incontinently and disobeying his physicians, though he made himself ill of his own free-will, he may not be able to cure himself, however much he wishes: he may have ruined his constitution. cf. "The evil that I would not that I do."

#### V. VICE IS CENSURED.

τῶν δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐπιτιμῶνται.

*Qu.* "Vice is censured," does this prove anything?

*Ans.* In some bodily diseases we pity the sufferers, in some we blame them.

*e.g.* Whether a man is blind by nature, or blind from over-drinking, makes a great difference.

Therefore when we are censured for vice, it is because men believe it was in our power to avoid it.

## VI. THE CONCEPTION OF THE END.

*τῆς φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι.*

*Qu.* Every man strives after what appears good in his eyes: how can he help the conceptions his mind forms?

As each man's character is, such will be his conception of the end of action.

N.B. *φαντασία*. "A brain-image" which we receive without any act of our own.

*Ans.* 1. Either a man is the cause of his moral condition; 2. or not.

*ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἐξέως ἐστὶ πῶς αἷτιος.*

1. If he *is* the cause of his moral condition, then he is also responsible for his impression of what the good is.

*ἢ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φύναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα.*

2. *Qu.* If he *is not* the cause of his moral condition?

*Ans.* Then virtue is a moral sight, by which a man judges the real good, and which cannot be learned from another, and which is *a gift of nature* (*εὐφύτα*).

*Qu.* If this is true, what would it prove?

*Ans.* That both vice and virtue are involuntary.

τὸ δὲ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει.

*Qu.* What is Aristotle's final position?

*Ans.* Either the end is fixed for us by nature, or not.

(1) If it is not fixed by nature: we are responsible for choosing a wrong *end*.

(2) If it is fixed by nature, then we are free to take or abstain from the *means* that lead to this end.

In either case *vice is as voluntary as virtue*.

τῶν ἔξεων συναίτιοι πῶς αὐτοί ἐσμεν.

In either case, we have *some* share in forming our habits, and from them we get our conception of the end.

#### SUMMARY OF ARISTOTLE'S POSITION ON VIRTUE.

1. γένος. The genus has been roughly described. ἔξεις. They are habits. *v.* II., v.

2. μεσότητες. They are mean states. *v.* II., vi.

3. That acts that produce them, and that their own nature makes them, tend to reproduce these acts.

4 ἐφ' ἡμῖν καὶ ἐκούσιοι. *v.* this chapter.

5. Regulated by right reason. *v.* ch. iv. of this book.

#### HABITS ARE NOT AS VOLUNTARY AS ACTIONS.

οὐχ ὁμοίως δὲ αἱ πράξεις ἐκούσιοί εἰσι καὶ αἱ ἔξεις.

*Qu.* In what sense are habits voluntary?

*Ans.* We can control our actions from their commencement to the end.

But we can only control our habits *at first*, each

little increase being imperceptible. (καθ' ἑκάστα ἡ πρόσθεσις οὐ γνῶριμος.) Our habits are voluntary, in the sense that it was once in our power to adopt or not to adopt the course that led to them.

Therefore it *was* of our own free will that we are subject to them.

*Qu.* Summarise this?

If virtue is voluntary, vice is so too.

Men believe that there is free-will, and treat one another accordingly, as a man can make his body unhealthy, so he can his soul.

Man may not wish to be evil, but if he acts badly there comes a point where he is helpless to do better.

At all events if man cannot help his nature he can help his individual acts, and these re-act on his nature.

If the inducements of pleasure, anger, or desire are too strong for him, it is his own fault: if he were compelled to do them they would be painful to him and not pleasant. v. p. 81.

#### CHAP. VI.

*Here commences an account of the different virtues, v.*

*Catalogue of the Virtues, Bk. II. Courage is first treated of. The Object of Courage.*

τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ.

*Qu.* What is that we fear?

*Ans.* All evils, e.g., poverty, disease, friendlessness, and death.

ἐνία καὶ δεῖ φοβεῖσθαι καὶ καλὸν.

*Qu.* Is courage shown in defiance of all evils?



*Ans.* The courageous man fears some evils, such as loss of reputation: it is only the shameless man who does not. A man should fear disgrace for his wife and children: nor should he be of good courage if he is going to be scourged.

λέγεται δ' ὑπό τινων ἀνδρείος κατὰ μεταφοράν.

*Qu.* Why do you call the fearless man brave?

*Ans.* He has a certain *likeness* to the brave, for they both are fearless.

ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ περὶ ταῦτα ἄφοβος ἀνδρείος.

*Qu.* Is the man, who is fearless where he ought, brave?

*Ans.* A man shouldn't fear poverty, or anything that comes not from vice, or by one's own instrumentality, but nevertheless, though a man is *fearless* in loss of fortune, he may not be *brave* in battle.

φοβερώτατον δ' ὁ θάνατος, πέρας γάρ.

*Qu.* With what fears is a brave man concerned?

*Ans.* About the greatest of all dangers; and death is greatest of all; for there is nothing beyond, either good or bad for the dead.

οὐδὲ περὶ θάνατον τὸν ἐν παντί.

*Qu.* Is the brave man concerned with all kinds of death?

*Ans.* Only with the noblest death, death in war, where the noblest and greatest danger is. The proof of this is that states and sovereigns reserve their honours for this kind of courage.

ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν.

*Qu.* Define courage.

*Ans.* Brave men put forth their courage where there is room for prowess, or where to die is noble.

ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις φθοραῖς οὐθέτερον ὑπάρχει.

*Qu.* Why does death at sea, or by disease, give no room for courage?

*Ans.* Aristotle's definition excludes them: (1) there is no room for prowess; (2) nor for a noble death.

Yet the brave man meets it without fear, and not *like* the seamen, whose *experience* keeps up their heart.

(All Evils) Fearful Things.

|   |                           |
|---|---------------------------|
| <div style="text-align: center;">┌──────────┴──────────┐</div>                  |                           |
| Ought to be feared.   | Ought not to be feared.   |
| <div style="text-align: center;">┌───┴───┐                      ┌───┴───┐</div> |                           |
| Disgrace, insult, envy.   | Death, poverty, sickness. |
| <div style="text-align: center;">┌───┴───┐</div>                                |                           |
| In battle.    Not in battle.  |                           |
| (courage)   |                           |

*Qu.* Summarise this.

*Ans.* Aristotle says that the sphere in which courage displays itself is the encountering evils, but not all evils: for some we ought to fear, such as disgrace.

Some we ought not to fear, but as there is no room for personal prowess, and the death is not noble: we do not call men brave who are fearless in them. It is only brave to die on the battlefield. Aristotle then has a wrong fearlessness, a right fearlessness, and courage.

The brave man then will fear some things, not fear others, and on the battle-field he will show bravery.

## CHAP. VII.

*Fear is further spoken of: and the character of the brave man, and of the men in the extremes.*

ὁ δ' ἀνδρείος ἀνέκπληκτος ὡς ἄνθρωπος.

*Qu.* Do all men fear alike, τὰ κατ' ἄνθρωπον.

*Ans.* Compare the previous chapter, and you will see the different kinds of fearlessness: and which the brave man has.

Some dangers he must fear, such as an earthquake, unless he is mad. But though he fears he will meet them when reason orders him.

λέγομεν δέ τι καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον.

*Qu.* What is the attitude of the brave man towards supernatural evils?

*Ans.* There are some evils which are exceedingly fearful; these everyone in his senses fears.

τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς.

*Qu.* What is the end, the perfection of courage?

*Ans.* The end of the habit is the end of each action which the habit prompts.

The end of courage is "the noble," and each courageous act will have for its end the noble.

We define each thing according to its end; and the act is marked out by possessing the characteristic, for the sake of which it is done.

That is, if an act was not noble, we shouldn't call it courageous, and therefore nobility must be the end of courage.

### THE BRAVE MAN AND THE COWARD.

*ἔστι δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἥττον ταῦτα φοβεῖσθαι.*

*Qu.* Contrast the behaviour of the brave man and those who err on the side of fear.

*Ans.* 1. The excessive in fear, fears (1) more than he ought, (2) when, (3) how he ought not, (4) he fears where no fears is, but the brave man, though he fears as he ought, encounters fears at the call of what is noble: the coward is faint-hearted: the brave man of good courage.

2. The deficient in fear, like the Celts, fears neither the waves or earthquake, and is mad.

### THE BRAVE MAN AND THE RASH MAN.

*ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τὰ θαρραλέα.*

*Qu.* Contrast the brave man and those who err on the side of confidence?

*Ans.* (1) The deficient in confidence = the excessive in fear.

(2) The excessive in confidence is a boaster who makes a pretence of bravery and imitates the brave man in such points as he can.

Many of the fool-hardy are blusterers (*θρασύδειλοι*), before danger they are headlong, in danger they hold aloof, while the brave men are keen in action and calm before it. cf.

The young man's wrath is like straw on fire,  
Like red-hot steel is the old man's ire.

In peace there's nothing so becomes a man  
As modest stillness and humility.

*μαλακία τὸ φεύγειν τὰ ἐπίπονα.*

*Qu.* What does Aristotle think of SUICIDE?

*Ans.* To fly from love, poverty, or any other ill, is the part not of a brave man, but of a coward.

*Qu.* Summarise this?

*Ans.* Some things are too fearful for man to bear: some evils are natural, and here the brave man will act as he ought, neither being deficient in confidence like the coward, nor will he be deficient in fear like the Celts.

The brave man is not like the man who exceeds in fear, he keeps up a good heart: nor does he exceed in confidence, like the man who tries to imitate him: he is quiet and calm before danger, but in danger he is quick. cf.

Beware

Of entrance to a quarrel: but, being in,  
Bear't that the opposed may beware of thee.

Bravery aims at the noble, and each brave act that is done is called brave because it is noble.

## CHAP. VIII.

*Five other forms of bravery beside the true one.*

*ἑτεραι κατὰ πέντε τρόπους.*

WHAT ARE THESE FIVE FORMS?

I. The Political, (1) which aims at honour, (2)

prompted by fear. II. Of experience. III. Of passion.  
IV. Of the sanguine. V. Of ignorance.

I. ἡ πολιτικὴ δι' αἰδῶ καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν.

*Qu.* What is the best kind of these likenesses to courage?

*Ans.* The Political (I) when it comes δι' ἀρετην, from a sense of honour to win what is noble, to avoid what is base. cf.

He taught them honour, virtue's bashfulness.

Hector is afraid of the contempt of Polydamas, Diomedes of Hector's triumph.

Lord Percy sees me fall.

(2.) φεύγοντες οὐ τὸ αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ τὸ λυπηρόν.

There is another kind of courage which is prompted by fear.

Hector threatens to throw those who skulk to the dogs.

The Persians flog their soldiers into battle.

Some draw them up in front of trenches.

II. ἡ ἐμπειρία ἡ περὶ ἕκαστα.

*Qu.* What is the second likeness to courage?

*Ans.* Experience in war, and *for this reason Socrates thought courage a science.*

δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι πολλὰ κενὰ τοῦ πολέμου.

The professed soldier is used to the terrors of war, he has good arms and armour and knows how to defend himself: but if he finds he is over-matched he runs away.

ὅπερ καὶ πρὶ τῷ Ἑρμαίῳ συνέβη.

At the betrayal of Coronea the troops turned out

cowards, the citizens died in its defence (*τὰ πολιτικὰ μένοντα*) in the Hermæum, an open spot in the city.

III. *καὶ τὸν θυμὸν δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἀνδρείαν ἐπιφέρουσιν.*

*Qu.* What is the third likeness to courage ?

*Ans.* Passion, where a man rushes on his enemies, like a wild beast on those who wound him : this man is pugnacious (*μάχιμος*) not brave.

Notice for this the various quotations from Homer describing his heroes moved with passion.

*διὰ τὸ πάθος.*

*Qu.* Is it right to feel passion ?

*Ans.* Yes : if we don't act on it alone, like the ass who won't leave his food, or the beasts who fight, because they can't hide.

*διὰ τὸ καλὸν.*

*Qu.* Does the brave man feel passion ?

*Ans.* Passion co-operates with him (*ὁ θυμὸς συνεργεῖ αὐτῷ*).

But when the blast of war blows in your ears,

Then imitate the action of the tiger.

Passion is most physical of all the likenesses to courage ; when it is accompanied by a proper purpose, or a proper motive, it is courage.

IV. *οὐδὲ δὴ οἱ εὐέλπιδες ὄντες ἀνδρεῖοι.*

*Qu.* What is the fourth likeness to courage ?

*Ans.* The courage of the Sanguine : they have experienced the same before, and they expect to con-

quer when they find that they are mistaken, they do not fight to the last.

The brave man endures not only what *is* fearful, but also what *appears* so, and therefore the brave man shows best in sudden dangers, where courage must come from habit and not from preparation. Even the drunken are Sanguine.

V. ἀνδρείοι δὲ φαίνονται καὶ οἱ ἀγνοοῦντες.

*Qu.* What is the fifth likeness to courage?

*Ans.* The courage of ignorance, when men are deceived as to the danger. *e.g.* The Argives attacked the Spartans, thinking they were Sicyonians, and fled when they found out their mistake.

He jests at scars who never felt a wound.

#### CONTRAST THE FIVE FORMS OF COURAGE.

I. (1) Political, whose aim is honour is nearest to the true courage whose aim is the noble, for honour is the stamp of nobility: the sign that your fellow-men recognise your worth.

(2) The bad political courage is prompted by fear and not by honour.

II. The courage of experience shows men often that there is no danger, and teaches them how to defend themselves: soldiers are often more warlike than the brave are.

III. The courage of passion differs from real courage in that it is not aroused by the noble, but by pain or hope of revenge.

IV. The courage of the sanguine differs from real



courage, because it comes not from a determination to bear danger, but from *over-estimating* one's power.

V. The courage of ignorance, which is worse than that of the sanguine, it comes from *under-valuing* the danger, they have no self-confidence (ἀξιώμα), and so make no stand at all, as the sanguine do.

### CHAP. IX.

*Courage involves loss of all—therefore it is most noble—this nobility is its reward.*

τῷ δὴ τὰ λυπηρὰ ὑπομένειν ἀνδρεῖοι λέγονται.

*Qu.* What quality is it makes a brave man?

*Ans.* A brave man bears himself as he ought, both in circumstances to inspire terror and confidence.

Though he is not a blusterer and boaster, still we call him brave because he faces what is *painful*.

τὸ κατα τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλῳ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι.

*Qu.* Is courage only a grand endurance of pain?

*Ans.* The brave man leaves everything behind him, the *greater his virtue* the happier he is and the sweeter his life: it is worse for him to die and so nobler for him to do it: and this nobility is his "exceeding great reward." (τοῦ καλοῦ ἔνεκα, τοῦτο γὰρ τέλος τῆς ἀρετῆς). cf.

I could not love thee, dear, so much,  
Loved I not honour more.

But honour calls with strength like steel:  
He put the vision by.

τοῖς πύκταις τὸ τέλος ἡδύ.

*Qu.* To what can you compare the brave man's wounds and death, and the end for which he strives?

*Ans.* To the blows and toil of the boxer, and the crown for which he fights.

οὐ δὴ ἐν ἀπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν.

*Qu.* Is all virtue pleasant?

*Ans.* In some virtues, courage especially, it is impossible to find pleasure in the acts: it is the end that makes it worth while to go through the acts, which *in themselves* are disagreeable.

τὸν βίον πρὸς μικρὰ κέρδη καταλλάττονται.

*Qu.* Will men of true courage be the best soldiers?

*Ans.* No, for two reasons.

(1) They may not have the experience.

(2) They will not be ready to fling their life away on every quarrel, but only where it is noble to do so.

τί δ' ἐστίν, οὐ χαλεπὸν τύπῳ γε περιλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.

*Qu.* Give an outline of courage.

### ESSAY ON COURAGE.

Courage is concerned with what inspires fear and confidence.

There are some things that a man ought not to fear, and yet he is not brave for not fearing them: there are some things too that he should fear.

The brave man does not run into unnecessary dan-

ger, or for an inadequate reason, but only where honour calls him, and in the most terrible of all dangers, where he has *actively* to encounter death on the field of battle.

There are five kinds of courage which are *not* the true courage, but which are often mistaken for it, some are more noble than others.

A brave act is only brave when done as a brave man would do it, that is with a noble motive, and this noble motive is at once the mark of true courage, and its sole reward.

The brave man is pained at dying, the more as his virtue makes life so well worth having, and his sacrifice is so much the greater: it is not recklessness, or ignorance of the value of life; it is not cowardice, like the suicide who flies from pain, but knowing full well the pleasantness of life, he lays it down, tasting to the full the pain of death, to lay hold of the end, which is a sufficient recompense to him, the noble.

Calling up to the Greek mind, though with far deeper admiration, the picture of the athlete, who, through blows and pain, strives for the crown of olive.

## CHAP. X.

*Courage and temperance—Virtues of the irrational—  
Temperance concerned with bodily pleasure—only  
with one kind of bodily pleasure—that only in  
certain parts.*

δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν.

*Qu.* What are the virtues of the irrational parts ?

*Ans.* Courage and temperance.

*Qu.* What is the sphere of temperance ?

*Ans.* Pleasure and pain ; or rather nearly altogether with pleasure.

διηρήσθωσαν δὲ αἱ ψυχικαὶ καὶ αἱ σωματικαί.

*Qu.* With what pleasures is temperance concerned ?

*Ans.* Pleasure may be divided into mental and bodily.

With intellectual pleasures such as ambition and love of learning the body has nothing to do, and neither has temperance ; nor does it touch gossip and trifling.

### BODILY PLEASURES.

*Not concerned with Temperance.*

περὶ δὲ τὰς σωματικὰς εἴη ἂν ἡ σωφροσύνη.

*Qu.* With what bodily pleasures is temperance unconcerned ?

*Ans.* Three senses, sight, hearing, smell.

οἱ γὰρ χαίροντες τοῖς διὰ τῆς ὄψεως.

Men may rejoice too much or too little in form, colour and painting, but we don't call them temperate or intemperate.

ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἀκρόην.

\* Though a man rejoices too much in sweet sounds, or in hearing plays, we don't call him intemperate.

οὐδὲ τοὺς περὶ τὴν ὀσμήν.

Those are not intemperate who take pleasure in the scent of roses, incense, and perfumes.

πλὴν κατὰ συμβεβηκός.

The smell of food may by association call up ideas of gluttony.

οὐδὲ τοῖς ἄλλοις ζώοις.

*Qu.* Do animals have pleasure in these three?

*Ans.* None, except incidentally : the dogs rejoice in the *smell* of the hare, because it makes them aware of its presence : and the lion in the *lowing* of the ox, because he hopes to eat it.

*Concerned with Temperance.*

ὧν καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα κοινωνεῖ.

*Qu.* With which pleasures has temperance to do?

*Ans.* Such as the animals share.

ἀφῆ καὶ γεῦσις.

Taste is perhaps altogether employed in discriminating flavours.

τὸν φάρυγγα μακρότερον γεράνον.

Temperance is almost wholly confined to touch. Compare the story of the man who wished for a throat longer than a crane,

αἱ ἐλευθεριώταται ἀφήρηνται.


And from the pleasures of touch you must take away the most liberal. No one calls a man intemperate for taking too much pleasure in gymnastics.

τὸ δὴ τοιούτοις χαίρειν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαπᾶν θηριῶδες.

*Qu.* What makes intemperance one of the worst vices?

*Ans.* It is an over-indulgence in animal pleasures.

### SPHERE OF TEMPERANCE.



*Qu.* Summarise this?

*Ans.* 1. The sphere of temperance is pleasure and pain.

2. It has little or nothing to do with pain.
3. Pleasures are divided into mental and bodily.
4. Mental are of two classes.
5. Bodily are those of the five senses.
6. Hearing, smell, and sight, are only incidentally connected with intemperance.
7. Taste is to discriminate flavours.
8. Touch, the lowest of all the senses, is the sphere of temperance.
9. And only touch in certain parts, such as the gullet, not touch as a whole, as in gymnastics.

## CHAP. XI.

*Natural desires—acquired desires—contrast of the brave and temperate—the pain of the intemperate—the character of the temperate.*

αἱ μὲν κοιναὶ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι, αἱ δ' ἴδιοι καὶ ἐπίθετοι.

*Qu.* Into what two classes are desires divided?

*Ans.* (1) Into those that are shared by all.

(2) Into those that are peculiar and acquired, though these last have natural promptings.

ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς φυσικαῖς ἐπιθυμίαις ὀλίγοι ἁμαρτάνουσι  
καὶ ἐφ' ἑν, ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖον.

*Qu.* What form does error take in natural desire?

*Ans.* Only *one*, and that is excess. cf. γαστρίμαργοι.

*Qu.* What form does error take in acquired tastes?

*Ans.* (1) Rejoicing in wrong things (μισητὰ γάρ).

(2) Or if the objects of desires are right, then the time and mode are wrong.

περὶ δὲ τὰς λύπας οὐχ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνδρείας.

*Qu.* Contrast the brave man and the temperate in their attitude towards pain.

*Ans.* The brave man *endures* pain.

The temperate *does not feel* pain because he does not obtain pleasure.

τὴν λύπην δὲ ποιῇ αὐτῷ ἢ ἡδονή.

*Qu.* Why is the intemperate wrong for feeling pain?

*Ans.* The intemperate yields so much to his desire for pleasure, as to prefer it to all else ; and thus pleasure makes his pain (μετὰ λύπης γὰρ ἡ ἐπιθυμία).

πόρρω ἄν εἴη τοῦ ἄνθρωπος εἶναι.

*Qu.* Is there anyone who takes pleasure in nothing : a man to whom one thing is the same as another ?

*Ans.* Even the animals distinguish their foods. Such insensibility is not human.

#### THE CHARACTER OF THE TEMPERATE MAN.

1. He is pained at what pleases the intemperate.
2. The absence of a pleasant thing does not pain him.
3. What is conducive to health he likes in moderation.
4. And such other pleasures as are not contrary to what is noble, and not beyond his means.

*Qu.* Summarise this ?

*Ans.* Some desires are common, and in these the only form of error is in excess.

Some are acquired, and these may be wrong in themselves, or in the way they are gratified.

The temperate man does bear pain bravely, but does not feel it when his desires are unsatisfied, while the intemperate is so swayed by his desires, that pleasure makes his pain.

#### CHAP. XII.

*Is cowardice as voluntary as temperance—(1) as a habit—(2) in single acts desire resembles a child.*



ἐκουσίῳ δὲ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἡ ἀκολασία τῆς δειλίας.

WHICH IS THE LEAST VOLUNTARY, INTEMPERANCE  
OR COWARDICE?

δόξειε δ' ἂν οὐχ ὁμοίως ἐκούσιον ἡ δειλία εἶναι τοῖς  
καθ' ἑκαστον.

Cowardice is less voluntary in *single acts*.

(1) Because intemperance comes from pleasure, and cowardice from pain: and pain upsets and destroys our natural balance.

(2) There is no danger in getting used to pleasure, but there is in becoming accustomed to pain.

οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἀκόλαστος εἶναι.

Temperance is less voluntary as a *habit*.

(1) Because each of the single acts are pleasant.

(2) But no one wishes to be intemperate as a habit.

#### THE INTEMPERATE AND THE CHILD.

τὸ δ' ὄνομα τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ ἐπὶ τὰς παιδικὰς ἀμαρ-  
τίας φερομεν ἔχουσι γάρ τινα ὁμοιότητα.

Qu. How can the term intemperance be applied suitably to the errors of children?

Ans. That which yearns for what is disgraceful, and grows apace, ought to be chastened: and desire and a child are both like this.

If the desires are allowed to grow they trample out reason: so desire ought to be taught to obey the reason, as a boy should live by his tutor's rule. cf. I., xiii. p. 27.

## SUMMARY OF TEMPERANCE.

*Is temperance concerned with pleasure and pain?* With one pleasure of the body, touch, and that only in certain parts; the pleasures of the mind, and the other bodily pleasures are not concerned with temperance.

*With pain*—not in the sense of endurance, but that the temperate man has his desires so under control that he does not feel the pain of them when unsatisfied.

*How is intemperance like childish error?* Both children and desires need correction; both must obey a superior, for when left unguided they yearn for what is disgraceful and grow apace.

## SUMMARY OF BOOK III.

## TREATISE ON THE VOLUNTARY.

*Why should we discuss the voluntary?* You cannot blame or praise what is involuntary, nor can you punish or reward.

*Is Aristotle speaking with a deep philosophic view?* He does not touch on the ceaseless but invisible chain of causes, by which man may be bound to the wheel of destiny.

*Does he speake like a jurist?* He divides all actions into classes: force will make our actions involuntary, and if there is no force, then ignorance; providing that it is ignorance of particulars.

Ignorance of general principles is no excuse at all. If a man knows what he is doing, then we must con-

sider the circumstances of the case, and see if he has any excuses to offer (mixed actions). This division of actions is practically used to-day in every trial in a Court of Justice, and in every-day life.

It is a maxim of law that ignorance of the law does not excuse, everyone is supposed to know the law.

### Purpose.

*What has purpose to do with the voluntary?* A purpose is a deliberate exercise of choice; it implies more than the voluntary, a settled steady determination to take certain means to reach certain ends, and with those ends in view.

There must be purpose to determine virtue.

*What has purpose been compared with?* With passion, desire, wish, and opinion, but there are many reasons why it should be none of these, though it may be prompted by all of them.

### Deliberation.

*Since purpose is a deliberate choice, what is deliberation?* Deliberation is a consideration of the best way to reach our end: we only deliberate on what is in our power, if any of the means are out of our power deliberation stops.

When our course is settled, then we purpose.

### The object of wish.

*Are our wishes free?* Can we help what we wish for: is it my fault if I am colour-blind, and take for red what all the world sees blue; don't I really wish for blue all the time?

*Is good only apparent?* Is a thing good only because men happen to think it so?

*Is there a real good?* Is right and wrong immutable; can we say in all circumstances, in all cases, "It is better to be just than unjust, it is better to be pure than impure"?

*How does Aristotle harmonise these two ideas?* There is an absolute good, though some men may not see it: yet the wise man that is in harmony with nature can say, "I know that there is an absolute good."

Is virtue voluntary, and vice involuntary?

It is against this theory that Aristotle contends; that anyone could give the answer, "Virtue and vice are alike involuntary," he regards as utterly out of the question.

*What arguments does he advance to prove vice is voluntary?* At any rate each individual action is in our power; we can say "I have power to put out my hand or not."

*Does no one really wish to be evil?* Then why is he so, what compels him?

*I am the victim of circumstances.* No one should yield to circumstances?

*What is Aristotle's position?* All through it is an appeal to instinctive belief: a simple looking at the social and political state of the question.

Praise and blame are given to what is voluntary: we purpose, deliberate, and wish. We can help our wishes, otherwise we should not be blamed for them when wrong: who blames physical misfortunes?

"There is a flaw in the reasoning, that denies free-will, though no reason can show where. Make that plea before a judge. Do it insolently and you are condemned. Do it in earnest and you are placed in a madhouse."

*Say that we cannot help our wishes.* At all events we can our acts, and these form our habits, and so in the end influence our wishes.

*If vice is involuntary, so is virtue?* To accept the dilemma would be to upset the whole fabric of life, to do away with right and wrong, to reject the whole experience and belief of all mankind.

This Aristotle considers as a "reductio ad absurdum," which need not even be alluded to.

For the Summary of Courage and Temperance *v.* pp. 97—101, 103—105.

#### CONNECTION BETWEEN BOOKS III. AND IV.

Book IV. carries on from Book III. the account of the virtues.

## BOOK IV.

*Liberality—Magnificence—High-Mindedness—Ambition—Gentleness—Friendliness—Truthfulness—Wit—Shame.*

### CHAP. I.—LIBERALITY.

*The meaning of Prodigal—The Liberal—Remarks on Liberality—Two types of Prodigality—Stinginess—Relative harmfulness of the two vices.*

#### Sphere of Liberality.

περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λήψιν, μᾶλλον δ' ἐν τῇ δόσει.

*Qu.* Since this is the sphere of liberality, define property.

*Ans.* Property is all those things whose value can be measured in money.

#### Two Meanings of "Prodigal."

1. τοὺς γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς καὶ εἰς ἀκολασίαν δαπανηροὺς ἀσώτους καλοῦμεν.

The greater number of prodigals are intemperate, for they give away their money, without a thought of the noble, and they incline to pleasure: so the word has come to have this meaning. cf. "And spent his substance in riotous living."

#### Real Meaning of "Prodigal."

2. βούλεται γὰρ ἄσωτος εἶναι ὁ ἔν τι κακὸν ἔχων τὸ φθείρειν τὴν οὐσίαν.

The proper sense of prodigal is one who brings himself to destruction: since to waste the means of living is in a way self-destruction.

Compare *χρῆσις* and *κτῆσις*.

*χρῆσις* is spending and giving.

*κτῆσις* receiving and keeping.

### THE LIBERAL MAN.

What is the character of the liberal man?

*Aus.* τῆς γὰρ ἀρετῆς μᾶλλον τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν ἢ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν.

Liberality consists in giving rather than in abstaining from taking, for virtue is rather active than passive.

(1) ὠφέλιμοι. (2) τοῦ καλοῦ ἕνεκα. (3) ταῦτα ἡδέως.

What further points are there?

(1) The liberal are useful, and therefore this virtue is a favourite one.

(2) Their motive is noble, as in all the virtues.

(3) They give gladly. cf. "Not grudgingly, or of necessity." Counting a noble action as worth more than money.

### Asking favours.

*οὐκ ἂν εἴη δὲ οὐδ' αἰτητικός.*

The liberal man is not inclined to asking favours: a man who benefits will not over-lightly receive a benefit.

### Looking after one's Property.

*οὐδε ἀμελήσει τῶν ἰδίων.*

No neglect of property: for it is this which enables him to benefit others: a right receiving must be incidental to a right giving.

## Indiscriminate Charity.

*οὐδὲ τοῖς τυχοῦσι δώσει.*

Liberality is not indiscriminate.

## Thinking last of himself.

*τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἐπιβλέπειν ἐφ' ἑαυτὸν ἐλευθερίου.*

If anything the gift is too great, and too little left to be given.

## The will for the deed.

*κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν δ' ἡ ἐλευθερίοτης λέγεται.*

A gift must be judged by the property of the giver, not by its value. cf. "She hath cast in all that she hath."

## REMARKS ON LIBERALITY.

### Self-made Men.

*Qu.* What general remarks can be made on liberality?

*Ans.* ἐλευθεριώτεροι δὲ εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἱ μὴ κτησάμενοι ἀλλὰ παραλαβόντες τὴν οὐσίαν.

Those who inherit wealth don't know what poverty is: a man values what he has produced; like parents and poets.

### Nice people are always poor.

*ἐγκαλῆνται τῇ τύχῃ ὅτι οἱ μάλιστα ἄξιοι ὄντες ἥκιστα πλουτοῦσιν.*

"Nice people are always poor," "to care for money is the way to have it."

And who is poor as happens always.



A bad hand at a bargain.

*εὐκοινώνητος εἰς χρήματα.*

A liberal man can be taken in, for he does not reverence money: he would sooner spend too much than too little.

The Moor is of a free and open nature,  
That thinks men honest that but seem to be so.

Wealthy or Wise?

*τῷ Σιμονίδῃ οὐκ ἀρεσκόμενος.*

"It is better to be wealthy than wise; for the wise sit at the tables of the rich." So said Simonides.

#### PRODIGALITY.

Unmixed evil destroys itself.

*τὰ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἀσωτίας οὐ πάνυ συνδυάζεται.*

*Qu.* What are the vices of prodigality?

*Ans.* Excess in giving, defect in receiving: they don't often exist together: for the latter soon leaves nothing to give.

First type of prodigal.

*ἐπεὶ ὃ γε τοιοῦτος δόξειεν ἂν οὐ μικρῷ βελτίων εἶναι τοῦ ἀνελευθέρου.*

This prodigal, who excels in giving, has all the elements of liberality; age and poverty will cure him of his excess, and then, as his vice is not from a bad disposition but only from folly, he will become liberal.

Second type of prodigal.

*ληπτικοὶ γίνονται διὰ τὸ βούλεσθαι ἀναλίσκειν.*

This prodigal is grasping: his means are exhausted, and he replenishes his resources from any quarter.

*τὸ μὴθὲν τοῦ καλοῦ φροντίζειν.*

He cares nothing for what is noble, and will receive in a mean way.

He gives away wrongly to flatterers and those who get him pleasure.

Weakness is akin to Wickedness.

*Διὸ καὶ ἀκόλαστοι αὐτῶν εἰσὶν οἱ πολλοί.*

The consequence of this is most of them become intemperate.

Prodigality then may be cured.

## ILLIBERALITY.

### Incurable.

*ἡ δ' ἀνελευθερία ἀνίατός ἐστιν.*

(1) Old age and every kind of weakness seem to make men sordid.

(2) It is more natural than prodigality ; the majority of men are stingy.

It is wide-spread, and has many forms.

### Two kinds of Illiberality.

*ἐν δυσὶ γὰρ οὖσα, τῇ τ' ἐλλείψει τῆς δόσεως.*

I. φειδωλοί, thrifty ; γλίσχροι, tight-fingered ; κίμβικες, mean ; are actuated by the following motives :—

1. Proper feeling and a wish to avoid what is base.
2. Don't take lest they might have to make a return (skinflint).

### II. The Parasite.

*τῇ ὑπερβολῇ τῆς λήψεως.*

παρνοβοσκοί (who keep houses of ill-fame), τοκισταί

(usurers) on small sums at large interest. The gain of all these is disgraceful, and for small sums.

Under this head is included *κυβευτής* (dicer), *λωποδύτης* (cut-purse), and *ληστής* (thief).

Live like a Prince.

*Exceptions.* We do not call tyrants prodigals, because their resources are inexhaustible : nor do we call robbers on a large scale sordid. *e.g.* Those who sack cities.

### Political Economy v. Natural Instinct.

*μείζον τε γάρ ἐστι κακὸν τῆς ἀσωτίας.*

*Qu.* Is illiberality worse than prodigality ?

*Ans.* In rare cases it may be, when a man flings away his money because he is young, and does not yet know its evil.

But in most cases a prodigal is intemperate ; and his selfishness leads him to be as grasping as the most sordid.

Avarice by saving at all events does not waste, while it benefits others by the accumulation of capital : the prodigal should not be excused on the ground that " it is good for trade," because waste is never good for trade, and because he spends his money on unworthy objects. Yet there is no doubt that men hate the one vice far worse than the other. The benefit saving may do is not seen ; while the vice of prodigality looks so like generosity.

*Qu.* Summarise this ?

*Ans.* The character of the liberal man is to give

not recklessly, but with a due consideration of the object, and yet not to calculate too closely ; rather to give too much than too little. He gives gladly and with a noble object : but yet he has no fastidious dislike to take what is his own, seeing that thus he will be most useful. His disposition shows itself in action, it is easier to abstain from taking than to give.

Men notice that this kind of person is rarely rich, that he may be taken in in a bargain, for it is better to be cheated than to be sordid ; it is better to be wise than wealthy.

The prodigal is of two sorts ; one who is merely reckless in the flush of youth ; and the other who doesn't care what he spends supposing it is for his own pleasure, nor does he care where or how he gets his money.

The stingy man is a horrible character, it may be that he never spends a sixpence on anyone, or because he would make profit out of his dearest friend, "gather nettles on his mother's grave."

The skinflint may be less harmful than the prodigal, but he is by far the most hateful.

## CHAP. II.—MAGNIFICENCE.

*Meaning of magnificence.—Proportion of, object of, occasion of the expense—the vulgar—the petty-minded.*

### Meaning of the Name.

*ἐν μεγέθει πρέπουσα δαπάνη ἐστίν.*

*Qu.* What is magnificence ?

*Ans.* A *befitting* expenditure on a *great* scale, as its name signifies: it differs from liberality both in *amount* and in the effect produced.

Expenditure should be relative.

τὸ δὲ μέγεθος πρὸς τι.

*Qu.* Does the magnificent man always spend as much as possible?

*Ans.* His expenditure is relative to his own position, the circumstances of the case, and the object.

*e.g.* There is not the same expense to a citizen who fits out a trireme, as the leader of a sacred expedition.

Taste.

τὸ πρέπον γὰρ δύναται θεωρῆσαι καὶ δαπανῆσαι μέγαλα ἐμμελῶς.

*Qu.* Is there anything needed but spending money to be magnificent?

*Ans:* Good taste, which tells you how to produce the best effect: that the expense may be worthy of the result, and the result of the expense: and also to spend gladly and with no very close calculation.

What to spend money on.

οὐ γὰρ ἡ αὐτὴ ἀρετὴ κτήματος καὶ ἔργου.

He aims to produce a great result: not what will be worth most, but what is great and noble and striking.

### Occasions for Magnificence.

οἷον εἴ που χορηγεῖν οἷονται δεῖν λαμπρῶς ἢ τριηραχεῖν  
ἢ καὶ ἐστιᾶν τὴν πόλιν.

*Qu.* On what occasions will the magnificent display his virtue?

*Ans. Public.*—It was the custom for wealthy citizens to take upon themselves such offices, as equipping a trireme, the expense of putting a play on the stage, paying the cost of an embassy or a sacred procession: these were occasions for the display of magnificence.

A man to do this should be well-born and rich, if he were not it would seem presumption.

τῶν δὲ ἰδίων ὅσα εἰσάπαξ γίνεται, οἷον γάμος.

*Private.*—A marriage, entertainment of strangers, gifts.

His expenditure will not be on himself, but still his house will be well-appointed.

καὶ διαφέρει τὸ ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ μέγα τοῦ ἐν τῷ δαπανήματι.

*Qu.* Is it only on special occasions magnificence is shown?

*Ans.* In every case the result produced is magnificent, even though the expense is small, for instance a child's ball or a flask.

### THE VULGAR MAN (βάνανσος).

λαμπρύνεται παρὰ μέλος, οἷον ἐρανιστὰς γαμικῶς ἐστιῶν, καὶ κομωδοῖς χορηγῶν ἐν τῇ παρόδῳ πορφύραν εἰσφέρων, ὥσπερ οἱ Μεγαρεῖς.

### Ostentation.

The vulgar man makes a show on wrong occasions,

entertaining his club fellows as if it was a wedding breakfast ; and when he has to equip the comic chorus, he will dress them in purple for the opening song, as the Megarians do.

He acts solely to get admiration, and never knows where to spend or to spare.

### THE PETTY-MINDED (*μικροπρεπής*).

#### Penny-wise.

Spends a good deal, and spoils the effect to save a trifle : he is always thinking of the cheapest way to do it, and afraid he is spending more than he need.

*Qu.* Summarise this ?

*Ans.* At Athens men of great position were accustomed to undertake certain services for the state : to fit out a trireme or welcome strangers. Men of position and wealth were expected to act in the way that becomes great nobles or princes : to exhibit not a reckless profusion : nor to look too carefully after money, but to spend liberally and largely, and in good taste on all occasions.

Vulgarity and pettiness are vices, but they are rather subjects for sarcasm than opprobrium, as they do little harm.

### CHAP. III. — HIGH-MINDEDNESS.

*The character of the lofty-minded. Meaning of worth.*

*Value of honour—good-fortune—life. Bearing before the world. The vain—the little-minded.*

THE CHARACTER OF THE LOFTY-MINDED (μεγαλόψυχος).

Knowing his worth.

ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν.

A full consciousness of his own merits, which are as great as possible. The merits must be *great*, for beauty of mind as of body require greatness.

Meaning of "worth."

ἡ δ' ἀξία λέγεται πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά.

The phrase "A man is worth," refers to external goods: and the greatest of these is honour, which is given to the gods. Honour then is what he occupies himself with.

Estimate of honour.

τῆς ἀρετῆς γὰρ ἄθλον ἡ τιμὴ, καὶ ἀπονέμεται τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς.

Honour is the prize of virtue, while the being perfect in each individual virtue is the mark of the high-minded man. (κόσμος τις τῶν ἀρετῶν).

Great honour he will receive as his due, if given by the upright; or rather less than his due, but the best that men can offer him.

Value of good fortune.

δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ εὐτυχήματα συμβάλλεσθαι πρὸς μεγαλοψυχίαν.

Good fortune gives a kind of claim to honour, and so contributes to high-mindedness.

His large fortune,  
Upon his good and gracious nature hanging,



Subdues and properties to his love and tendance  
All sorts of hearts.

Though in reality it should not be so. (κατ' ἀλήθειαν  
δ' ὁ ἀγαθὸς μόνος τιμητέος).

The rank is but the guinea-stamp,  
The man's the gold for a' that.

ὁ δὲ μεγαλόψυχος δικαίως καταφρονεῖ (δοξάζει γὰρ  
ἀληθῶς) οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τυχόντως.

But those who have merely good fortune are arrogant and violent; hence they despise their neighbours without any grounds for doing so.

### The value of life.

ἀφειδῆς τοῦ βίου, ὥς οὐκ ἄξιον ὄν πάντως ζῆν.

As he does not hold even honour very dear, it is not surprising that he should care little for life.

### Reception of favours.

διὸ τὴν Θέτιν οὐ λέγειν τὰς εὐεργεσίας τῷ Διί.

To be benefited places a man in a position of inferiority, so the high-minded dislikes it, and if he receives a favour, tries to return a greater still.

There's none  
Can truly say he gives, if he receives.

### Standing on his dignity.

πρὸς μὲν τοὺς ἐν ἀξιώματι καὶ εὐτυχίαις μέγαν.

### Affable to the Middle Classes.

πρὸς δὲ τοὺς μέσους μέτριον.

Haughty to equals, but not to his inferiors, any more than he would show his strength to the weak.

### Small distinctions.

*καὶ εἰς τὰ ἔντιμα μὴ ἰέναι.*

Caring little for honour, unless on extraordinary occasions.

Theirs was no common party race,  
Jostling by dark intrigue for place;  
Like fabled gods, their mighty war  
Shook realms and nations in its jar.

*ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ φανερόμισον εἶναι καὶ φανερόφιλον.*

Truest friend and noblest foe.

To conceal either enmity or friendship would be cowardice: frank and open: but ironical to the many.

### Opinions of his own.

*καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἄλλ' ἢ πρὸς φίλον.*

Not at all like a flatterer who bends his tastes to other people's; but complaisant to a friend.

Nil admirari.

*οὐδὲ θαυμαστικός.*

Holding nothing worth much admiration.

*οὐδὲ μνησίκακος.*

Forgetting "past injuries:" the past is beneath his notice.

*οὐδὲ ἀνθρωπολόγος.*

Caring not to praise or be praised.

*οὐδε κακολόγος.*

"Speaking no slander," though he may express contempt.

Scorn and defiance, slight regard, contempt,  
And everything that may not misbecome  
The mighty sender.

### Grumbling.

*ἥκιστα ὀλοφυρτικός.*

Caring little for anything he is the last to complain.

Liking rather what is grand than what brings profit.

### Dignified demeanour.

*κίνησις βραδεῖα, φωνὴ βαρεῖα, λέξις στάσιμος.*

Slow movement, deep voice, and deliberate utterance.

### THE EXTREMES.

*οὐ κακοὶ μὲν οὖν δοκοῦσιν εἶναι οὐδ' οὗτοι.*

They are not vicious, for they "are nobody's enemies, but their own."

### The little-minded.

*ὁ μὲν γὰρ μικρόψυχος, ἄξιός ὢν ἀγαθῶν, ἑαυτὸν ἀποστερεῖ ὢν ἄξιός ἔστι.*

This diffidence (*ὀκνηροί*) leads them not to try to do what they are fitted for.

### The Vain (*χαῦνοι*).

*ὥς γὰρ ἄξιοι ὄντες τοῖς ἐντίμοις ἐπιχειροῦσιν, εἶτα ἐξελέγχονται.*

They endeavour to produce an effect by their dress and talk: and put themselves in positions where they are certain to be detected, but yet they use their talents to the uttermost.

Self-love, my liege, is not so vile a sin,  
As self-neglecting.

*Qu.* Summarise this?

*Ans.* High-mindedness is the crown of all the virtues, to be worthy of great things and to know it.

To care little even for the honour that is your due, to see other men are your inferiors, and on occasion to show them that you see them to be so.

To value nothing and no one very highly, not even the honour you know is yours ; only saved from being supercilious by the fact of your being superior to others, as well as believing it.

This virtue shows us how Aristotle could paint the main object of all his virtues ; to respect oneself so entirely, that neither life nor any other good was worth anything in comparison ; to be so sure of oneself, that the opinion of others mattered little ; just worth taking because it was the best they had to offer.

Seem they grave and learned ?

Come they of noble family ?

Free from gross passions, or of mirth or anger,

Constant in spirit, not swerving with the blood ?

#### CHAP. IV.—AMBITION.

*Relation of ambition and high-mindedness—meaning of “lover of”—the extremes—each claim to be right.*

*Qu.* What is the relation of ambition to high-mindedness ?

*Ans.* The same as that of liberality to magnificence. It is the difference between great and small.

Over-ambitious or unambitious.

δηλον δ' ὅτι πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτιοῦτου λεγομένου οὐκ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ φέρομεν τὸν φιλότιμον.

- The phrase "lover of" is ambiguous : "ambitious" means "lover of honour" more than is right, if in a bad sense.

Wolseley, I charge thee fling away ambition,  
By that sin, fell the angels.

"Wanting in ambition," caring for honour less than is right, if in a bad sense.

Look thou not on beauty's charming,  
Sit thou still when kings are arming ;  
Taste not when the wine-cup glistens,  
Speak not when the people listens ;  
Vacant heart, and hand, and eye ;  
Easy live, and quiet die.

#### THE MEAN IS NAMELESS.

Both in the right.

ἄνωνύμου δ' οὕσης τῆς μεσότητος, ὥς ἐρήμης ἔοικεν  
ἀμφισβητεῖν τὰ ἄκρα.

The man who has no ambition, and the man who has too much, both say they are in the right: one thing is clear, since there are extremes there must be a mean: that is a proper desire for honour.

#### CHAP. V.—GENTLENESS.

*The Mild—Want of anger—Four kinds of over much anger—The difficulty of making rules.*

#### Gentleness.

ἐπὶ τὸν μέσον τὴν πραότητα φέρομεν.

*Qu.* What is the proper mean about anger?

*Ans.* There is no exact name for it, so we call it gentleness: though gentleness perhaps signifies a

slight deficiency. The excess is worse than the defect, for it is more common and more harmful.

The gentle man does not easily get angry, and keeps his temper under control.

It is very difficult to describe the virtue further.

*ἀοργησία.*

The man incapable of anger does not defend himself, and allows himself and his friends to be insulted.

For it cannot be

But I am pigeon-livered, and lack gall  
To make oppression bitter.

#### FOUR KINDS OF WRONG ANGER.

*τὸ γὰρ κακὸν καὶ ἑαυτὸ ἀπόλλυσι, καὶ ὁλόκληρον ἢ, ἀφόρητον γίνεται.*

*Qu.* Can all the forms of excessive anger exist together?

*Ans.* One would destroy the other.

*ὀργίλοι.*

The passionate are too quickly angry and quickly appeased, which is the best point in their character, they have it out and have done with it.

*ἀκρόχολοι.*

The quick-tempered too are keen to take offence.

*πικροί.*

The sulky brood over their wrath : if they can revenge themselves, they are placable ; if not their keeping it to themselves, makes getting over it a long process. They are a curse to themselves and their friends.

χαλεποί.

The hasty-tempered will not be reconciled until they have punished their enemies.

### Rules for the temper.

*Qu.* What do our remarks on this virtue illustrate?

*Ans.* The great difficulty of laying down rules in detail for conduct; for sometimes one kind of character is praised as being mild: sometimes the other as being fit to govern. This suggests the question, "Is virtue a science or an art?"

### SOCIAL VIRTUES.

There are three virtues concerned with our intercourse in speech and action. Truthfulness—pleasure in all the daily forms of life—pleasure in amusement.

### CHAP. VI.—FRIENDLINESS.

*The obsequious and flatterers—The evil-tempered—The mean which is like friendship.*

"Making things pleasant."

οἰόμενοι δεῖν ἄλντοι τοῖς ἐντυγχάνουσιν εἶναι.

*Qu.* What is the virtue of social life?

*Ans.* Friendliness: but this may be exaggerated; there are people whose only object is to "make things pleasant" at all costs: and who never disagree, say what you will. These may be divided into two classes.

ἄρεσκι.

The obsequious has no particular object to gain:

his character is a mixture of insincerity and wish to please.

*κόλαξ.*

The flatterer wants to get some benefit in return for his complaisance.

A knave, a rascal, an eater of broken meats: a base, proud, shallow, beggarly knave, art nothing but the composition of a knave, beggar, coward, and pander, and the son and heir of a mongrel.

*τοῦ λυπεῖν οὐδ' ὅτιοῦν φροντίζοντες δύσκολοι καὶ  
δυσέριδες καλοῦνται.*

*Qu.* What is the other extreme?

*Ans.* The evil-tempered and contentious, who are always contradicting, and care nothing for giving pain.

Friendship?

*ὄνομα δ' οὐκ ἀποδέδοται αὐτῇ τι, ἔοικε δὲ μάλιστα  
φιλία.*

*Qu.* Is it quite right to call the mean friendship?

*Ans.* Aristotle so calls it in II. vii., p. 53, but here he says it is like friendship: it would be friendship if affection was added (*τὸ στέργειν προσλαβόντα*). The friendly man treats all people kindly, whoever they may be: though he makes a distinction as to position and to whether he knows them or not.

Friendship and Friendliness.

*οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως προσήκει συνήθων καὶ ὁθνείων  
φροντίζειν.*

*Qu.* Does he make no difference as to friends or strangers?



*Ans.* He naturally cares more about pleasing or paining friends, but he will not shrink from giving pain where the noble or expedient require it. And he will give a slight pain in the present for a great future gain (*συνεπόμενος τῷ καλῷ καὶ τῷ συμφέροντι*).

#### CHAP. VII.—TRUTHFULNESS.

*The sphere of truthfulness—How far purpose enters into it—Three kinds of boastfulness—Two kinds of irony.*

*Qu.* What three characters are concerned with truth in word, action, and in pretension?

*Ans.* ἀνθέκαστος, the man who represents each thing as it is.

ἀλαζών, lays claim to qualities he does not possess.  
εἴρων, denies or depreciates his merits.

ἔστι τούτων δὲ ἕκαστα καὶ ἐνεκά τινος ποιεῖν καὶ  
μηθενός.

*Qu.* Have each of these characters a two-fold phase?

*Ans.* As a general rule a man acts and lives in accordance with his disposition; sometimes however he adopts a character for a purpose.

#### The Straightforward Man.

ἀλλ' ἐν οἷς μηθενός τοιούτου διαφέροντος καὶ ἐν λόγῳ  
καὶ ἐν βίῳ ἀληθεύει τῷ τὴν ἕξιν τοιοῦτος εἶναι.

*Qu.* What is the meaning of straightforward?

*Ans.* It does not apply to a man who keeps his agreement, or to any matter included under the head

of justice: but to a man who loves, and tells the truth for its own sake.

However, as boasting is such a hateful vice, his good taste will lead him, if anything, to a slight depreciation of himself.

### The Braggart.

οὐκ ἐν τῇ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ  
προαιρέσει.

*Qu.* Is it the intention, or the natural capacity, that makes the boaster?

*Ans.* A man may have an instinctive desire to exaggerate: but as a rule it is to gain reputation or some other advantage that he makes himself out better than he is.

I. *μηθενὸς ἔνεκα* (For the pleasure of it).

*Qu.* What do you call the purposeless braggart?

*Ans.* A mean kind of man, or he would not rejoice in a lie, but still rather weak than wicked.

II. *ἔνεκά τινος* (with an object).

*Qu.* If a man boasts with a motive: of what two kinds may it be?

### Popularity-hunter.

*Ans.* i. *δόξης χάριν.*

To gain reputation, and so boasting of things which make men honour you or deem you happy for having.

### Quacks and Spiritualists.

ii. *οἱ δὲ κέρδους, ὧν καὶ ἀπόλαυσις ἐστὶ τοῖς πέλας καὶ  
ἀ διαλαθεῖν ἐστὶ μὴ ὄντα, οἷον μάντιν σοφὸν ἢ ἰατρόν.*

If they do it for the sake of gain; they pretend to have qualities that will be useful to their neighbours, and whose absence it will be difficult to detect.

*e.g.* A soothsayer, or doctor (quack); which are profitable callings, and where it is difficult to say whether a man is skilful or not.

### SELF-DEPRECIATION.

#### The Ironical.

*Qu.* What is the meaning of ironical?

*Ans.* We attach to it an idea of sarcasm and unkindness, but it means those who dissemble some quality that they possess.

*Qu.* Into what two classes can they be divided?

*Ans.* 1. The want of conceit.

*μάλιστα δὲ καὶ οὗτοι τὰ ἔνδοξα ἀπαρνοῦνται, οἷον καὶ Σωκράτης ἐπολεῖ.*

They wish to avoid pomposity: and disclaim any quality held in high repute.

2. Affected humility.

*καὶ ἐνίοτε ἀλαζονεία φαίνεται, οἷον ἡ τῶν Λακόνων ἐσθής.*

Disclaim unimportant merits which they evidently possess, and this is contemptible and a form of boastfulness.

*e.g.* The Spartan who made a parade of simple dress.

And the devil's darling sin  
Is the pride that apes humility.

This is some fellow  
 Who, having been praised for bluntness, doth affect  
 A saucy roughness—he cannot flatter, he!  
 An honest mind and plain—he must speak truth!

*Qu.* Summarise this?

*Ans.* As far as telling the truth goes in ordinary matters of life, the mean is to be straightforward and not to disclaim the possession of a quality, especially if it is no great one; but to incline to tell less rather than more of the truth about your own good qualities.

The man who boasts for no object seems to be a fool rather than anything else, but yet somewhat vicious, or a lie would be distasteful. But most people boast with an object to exalt themselves in the estimation of others: or to obtain some advantage, and this is the meanest character of all.

The ironical, for which word we have no good equivalent, may be men of refinement like Socrates or thinly-veiled braggarts like the Spartans.

cf. "Thus I tread upon the pride of Plato," said Diogenes as he trampled on his carpet; "Yes," answered Plato, "but with greater pride."

There is an affectation and ill-breeding in some humility.

### CHAP. VIII.—WIT.

*The character of the witty man, of the buffoon and the savage.*

*Qu.* What is the sphere of this virtue?

*Ans.* There must be rest in life and rest implies re-

creation : on such occasions our bearing may be in good taste or not.

*Qu.* What are the three characters ?

*Ans.* 1. The witty. 2. The buffoon. 3. The churlish.

### THE WIT (εὐτράπελοι).

τοῦ δ' ἐπιδεξίου ἐστὶ τοιαῦτα λέγειν καὶ ἀκόνειν οἷα  
τῷ ἐπεικεῖ καὶ ἐλευθερίῳ ἀρμόττει.

*Qu.* How does the witty man get his name ?

*Ans.* They are called by this name as if their wits *moved quickly*, and this involves *tact*, which leads them only to have a part in such jokes as become a gentleman.

Be thou familiar, but by no means vulgar.

### RULES (νόμος ὧν ἑαυτῷ).

#### The feelings of a gentleman.

*Qu.* Can we lay down precise rules ?

*Ans.* No, it is a question of good taste, and in this as in the other virtues the witty man will know how to restrain himself.

This above all—to thine own self be true ;

And it must follow, as the night the day,

Thou can'st not then be false to any man.

This might almost be taken as the motto of Aristotle's virtues, v. *Essay on the Virtues*.

The law forbids certain forms of abuse, and a gentleman will refrain from certain forms of ridicule.

### Silence gives consent.

*ἄ γὰρ ὑπομένει ἀκούων, ταῦτα καὶ ποιεῖν δοκεῖ.*

*Qu.* What are the general rules on the point?

*Ans.* 1. The witty man will listen to nothing that he would not say himself.

2. *διοίσει δὲ καὶ τὸ ἐν τοιούτοις λέγειν ἢ τοιούτων ἀκούειν.*

The character of the men to whom he listens or talks will make a great difference.

### THE BUFFOON.

#### Anything for a joke.

*βωμολόχος ἥττων ἐστὶ τοῦ γελοίου.*

*Qu.* What is the difference between buffoonery and wit?

*Ans.* The buffoon will do anything for a joke, sparing neither himself nor anyone else: for his object is to raise a laugh no matter whom it pains; and so he will say things no gentleman would ever say or even listen to.

### Old and new comedies.

*τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἦν γελοῖον ἢ ἀσοχρολογία, τοῖς δὲ μᾶλλον ἢ ὑπόνοια.*

*Qu.* What example in literature is there of this?

*Ans.* The old comedies indulge in grossness, the new in inuendo, the latter are a great improvement on the former in matters of taste.

ἐπιπολύζοντος δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαι-  
ρόντων τῇ παιδιᾷ καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μᾶλλον ἢ δεῖ.

Q<sup>u</sup>. How is it buffoonery is often mistaken for wit?

A<sup>ns</sup>. The ridiculous has a wide range, and most people take more pleasure than they ought in fun and ridicule, buffoons are often called wits because they are agreeable.

#### THE CHURL.—NOTHING PLEASES HIM.

ἄγριοι καὶ σκληροί.

Q<sup>u</sup>. What is the third character?

A<sup>ns</sup>. The churlish and morose, who never see a joke, and never make one: and as recreation and amusement are necessary for active life they are "heavy on hand" in society.

Q<sup>u</sup>. Summarise this?

A<sup>ns</sup>. Recreation is one of the necessities of life; it is well to do your part in contributing to the general amusement, but a joke may be too dearly bought—coarse and unkind joking is what a gentleman will not take part in, even by listening to it.

#### CHAP. IX.—SHAME.

*Shame—suitable to youth—conditionally right—laws of society.*

Shame is emotional.

πάθει γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔοικεν ἢ ἔξει.

Q<sup>u</sup>. Why is shame not a virtue?

*Ans.* 1. Because it is an emotion rather than a formed state of character. As people who are frightened by physical evil turn pale, so those who fear loss of repute blush: and both these affections are physical.

Suitable to youth.

*οὐ πάση δ' ἡλικίᾳ τὸ πάθος ἀρμόζει, ἀλλὰ τῇ νέᾳ.*

2. Shame is commendable in the young, for they are likely to do many things on impulse, if they are not restrained by shame: but an old man ought not to do anything to be ashamed of.

Conditionally right.

*εἴη δ' ἂν αἰδῶς ἐξ ὑποθέσεως ἐπιεικές.*

3. Shame is not absolutely right, you must first do something to be ashamed of; and no good man need do this.

#### OBJECTION.

Laws of society.

*τὰ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν αἰσχρὰ, τὰ δὲ κατὰ δόξαν.*

*Qu.* Is it well to have a capacity for shame, in case of doing something only "conventionally wrong?"

*Ans.* It is not right to offend against convention: thus there is no room for shame in a virtuous character.

Is Continence a Virtue?

*οὐκ ἔστι δ' οὐδ' ἡ ἐγκράτεια ἀρετὴ, ἀλλὰ τις μικτή.*

*Qu.* Why is continence not entirely a virtue?

*Ans.* The continent man is only good after a strug



gle: his desires are very strong, though he succeeds in subduing them. cf. "I had not known sin, except the Lord said thou shalt not covet."

On the other hand the temperate man has no trouble in keeping his body under. "Pure law commensures perfect freedom."

*Qu.* Summarise this?

*Ans.* Shame can only be right, on the supposition that you have done something to be ashamed of: thus it is not a formed state, for you cannot be in a chronic state of shame, unless you are a thorough rascal. "The shameless man" and the bashful man Aristotle mentions in Book II, but does not describe here.

Continence, like shame, is not a virtue, because it implies something wrong before it can come into use. Either a man will grow better or worse: if better he will have no need for shame, and be temperate: if worse he will become incontinent and shameless.

Aristotle does not discuss *Néμεσις*, which is a right emotion, like shame.

#### BOOK IV.—SUMMARY.

*Liberality* deals with property of all kinds, not so much with the giving as the taking; it is not a reckless waste like one kind of prodigality, nor spending evilly like another.

*Sordidness* may be in giving like the skin-flint, in taking like the thief. It may not be so harmful but it is more hateful than prodigality.

*Magnificence* is the virtue of a great man, who is

liberal with an idea to effect—in perfectly good taste and on proper occasions—while *vulgarity* cares only to make a show—and stinginess is always thinking how to save something out of the fire.

*High-mindedness* is the consciousness of perfect virtue, which does not heed, and cares little for men's approval. All that this world has to give is scarcely worth taking—taken only because it is its best. Frank, yet sometimes ironical—proud only to equals and hating benefits—while vanity thinks itself worth all this and is not. Little-mindedness thinks of itself less highly than it ought to think, and its heart failing, does not strive to do what it could.

*Ambition* is sometimes good, sometimes bad, and there is no name for the mean: yet in some way it must be right to seek for honour.

*Friendliness* is the way a man has of treating all people as if they were friends—a kindly feeling to all the world; when it is joined with affection it becomes FRIENDSHIP.

*Flatterers* wish to get some benefit in return for their complaisance, while some men from fear or a desire to curry favour agree with everybody, and the churl agrees with nobody.

*Straightforwardness* is to represent yourself just as you are, to be perfectly frank. You may boast simply from a defect of nature, or to get reputation or profit, and you may disclaim the possession of a quality from refinement or affectation.

*Wit* is the quality that makes men ready and able to be pleasant in society, with a due consideration for

the feelings of others, and what is due to themselves as gentlemen.

*The Buffoon* sacrifices everything to a joke—and the boor has no wish to promote the general amusement.

*Shame* is a good thing when it is wanted, but then only a young man should want it—one who is older should do nothing to be ashamed of, even if it be only a conventional sin.

For a summary of this Book *vide* analyses at the end of the chapter, and the "Essay of the Virtues."

#### CONNECTION BETWEEN BOOKS I.—IV. AND END OF BOOK X.

The first four books are occupied in finding the end of man's existence; the end is happiness—happiness is defined, and the terms of the definition fully explained. A short treatise on the voluntary follows, and then an account of the chief virtues.

At the end of Book X. intellectual virtue is compared with moral virtue, and is seen to be superior to it. Moral virtue belongs to humanity, and intellectual to divinity.

The last chapter of the book discusses in what way men are to attain happiness: this must be by right training, and since the State does not provide for it: the individual must qualify himself to undertake it by the study of Politics.

## BOOK X., CHAP. VI., TO THE END.

*vi.* Happiness is not amusement for seven reasons,

*vii.* Happiness is the conscious manifestation of the reason.

*viii.* The intellectual life is the highest ; contrast of the moral and intellectual life—which is the life of the gods.

*ix.* How is philosophy to be attained? As the State does not concern itself, the individual must study Politics.

### CHAP. VI.

#### HAPPINESS IS NOT AMUSEMENT.

*Recapitulations from Book I.—Reasons for confounding happiness with amusement—Reasons to show this is incorrect.*

*Qu.* Why does Aristotle return to the subject of happiness?

*Ans.* Having treated of virtue, friendship, and pleasure, he gives a sketch of happiness which is the “consummation of things human.”

#### HAPPINESS IS NOT A HABIT.

*εἵπομεν δ' ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἔξις.*

*Qu.* (To recapitulate from Book I., p. 15). Why is happiness not a formed state?

*Ans.* If it were, a man who was asleep or in the greatest misfortune might be happy.

δῆλον ὅτι τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν τῶν καθ' αὐτὰς αἰρετῶν  
τινὰ θετέον καὶ οὐ τῶν δι' ἄλλο.

*Qu.* (To go on with the recapitulation.) Is happiness a 'necessary' or is it an 'absolute' good?

*Ans.* It is all-sufficient; "*nothing is got from it, beyond the action itself.*" v. p. 12.

### Not Recreation.

καὶ τῶν παιδιῶν δὲ αἱ ἡδεῖαι.

*Qu.* What else corresponds to this definition besides virtuous actions?

*Ans.* Recreations which give pleasure, for they often entail loss instead of profit, and are only sought for their own sake.

*Qu.* Is there any other reason for thinking pleasure equivalent to happiness?

*Ans.* People in power seem to consider so (v. p. 10).

οὐκ ἐν παιδιᾷ ἡ εὐδαιμονία.

*Qu.* Despite this, what reasons are there why happiness does not consist in amusement?

### SEVEN REASONS.

#### Opinions of "the Upper Ten."

*Ans.* 1. οὐ γὰρ ἐν τῷ δυναστεύειν ἡ ἀρετὴ οὐδ' ὁ νοῦς.

People in power encourage men who are skilful in providing amusement, and so those whom the world deems happy seem to find their happiness in amusement: but their example is not good authority, for virtue and reason give birth to good acts: and high power does not constitute virtue and reason.

This is proper to the clown,  
Though smock'd, or furr'd and purpl'd, still the clown.

Knowing no better.

2. οὐδ' εἰ ἄγευστοι οὗτοι ὄντες ἡδονῆς εἰλικρινοῦς καὶ  
ἐλευθερίου.

Men who have never tasted pure pleasure are not qualified to give an opinion; for children think that what they hold in honour are the noblest of all goods.

3. τίμια καὶ ἡδέα ἐστὶ τὰ τῷ σπουδαίῳ τοιαῦτα ὄντα.

The good man is the judge, when opinions differ, and he finds virtue most choiceworthy.

Life is not a game.

4. ἄτοπον τὸ τέλος εἶναι παιδίαν.

It is absurd to say that we go through all the trouble of life for the sake of amusement.

“All work and no play.”

5. παίζειν δ' ὅπως σπουδάζῃ, κατ' Ἀνάχαρσιν.

Relaxation is rest (*v. IV.*, p. 131) and we rest that we may work again, that is as a means to an end.

“Something serious in life.”

6. βελτίῳ τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαῖα τῶν γελοίων καὶ  
τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς.

A happy life implies virtue, and virtue earnestness: the better the man the more earnest he will be.

“Not life but existence.”

7. εὐδαιμονίας δ' οὐδεὶς ἀνδραπόδῳ μεταδίδωσιν, εἰ  
μὴ καὶ βίου.

The lowest of the low can enjoy bodily pleasures; but no one would say a slave could share in happiness

any more than that he enjoys a "career" ("the life of a freeman and a citizen").

*Qu.* Summarise this.

*Ans.* At the end of the work it is well to give a sketch of happiness, the consummation of all things human.

Happiness is not a formed state, and it is sought only for its own sake, *so is amusement*. This similarity and the conduct of the great give some reason for confounding happiness and amusement.

#### BUT THERE ARE SEVEN REASONS AGAINST IT.

1. To be great does not imply virtue and intelligence. cf. "An aristocracy of virtue and intelligence and their necessary consequence in this republic—dollars."

2. The men who hold this opinion only know one side of the question.

3. The opinion of the good man is decisive.

4. Is it not absurd to say we live for amusement.

Fate cannot harm me I have dined to-day.

5. Relaxation implies rest, and we rest in order to act.

6. Earnestness is better than amusement, and the better the man the more earnest.

7. A slave can enjoy bodily pleasure; can he be happy?

## CHAP. VII.

*Happiness is the conscious manifestation of the reason  
—it is contemplative—it is divine—it is the life  
of man's true self.*

## HAPPINESS THE EXCELLENCE OF THE REASON.

εἰ δ' ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐνέργεια, εὖλογον  
κατὰ τὴν κρατίστην· αὕτη δ' ἂν εἴη τοῦ ἀρίστου.

*Qu.* Which is the highest excellence of our noblest faculties?

*Ans.* The excellence of true reason; at all events the excellence of that which guides us: and is divine in itself, or the most divine things in man.

## FIVE REASONS.

ὅτι δ' ἐστὶ θεωρητικὴ, εἴρηται.

*Qu.* How do you prove that perfect happiness is contemplative?

## Highest Faculty.

*Ans.* 1. κρατίστη τε γὰρ αὕτη ἡ ἐνέργεια.

Reason is the highest faculty: and the highest objects of thought are those on which the reason is employed.

## Most Continuous.

2. ἔτι δὲ συνεχεστάτη.

It is more possible to contemplate continuously than to do anything else.

## Happiness involves pleasure.

3. οἴόμεθά τε δεῖν ἡδονὴν παραμεμῖχθαι τῇ εὐδαιμονίᾳ.

1. The pleasure of wisdom is confessedly the highest.



2. The pleasures are most pure and certain.

3. This life is pleasanter to those who know it than those who are only *seeking* it.

### All-sufficiency of Happiness.

4. ἡ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν  
μάλιστ' ἂν εἴη.

The philosopher and the just man equally need the necessities of life: but the philosopher is most all-sufficient.

The just man needs people with whom and towards whom he can act justly: and so do all those who possess the other moral virtues.

The philosopher may be better off if he has fellowship, but he can contemplate if he is absolutely alone.

### Happiness involves peace.

5. δοκεῖ τε ἡ εὐδαιμονία ἐν τῇ σχολῇ εἶναι.

It has no aim beyond itself: it is able to be at perfect ease and to be free from care, for it is all-sufficient.

### Politics and war contrasted with the virtues of practical life.

τῶν μὲν κατὰ τὰς ἀρετὰς πράξεων αἱ πολιτικαὶ καὶ  
πολεμικαὶ κάλλει καὶ μεγέθει προέχουσιν.

Politics and war are the sphere of the best practical virtues: and each have some aim beyond themselves.

πολεμοῦμεν ἵν' εἰρήνην ἄγωμεν.

We make war that we may have peace: no one prefers enmity to friendship.

ἐτέραν οὖσαν τῆς πολιτικῆς, ἣν καὶ ζητοῦμεν δῆλον  
ὥς ἐτέραν οὖσαν.

In politics we strive for place and power : and that we regard these as distinct from happiness is quite clear.

Addition of ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ.

ἡ τελεία δὲ εὐδαιμονία αὕτη ἂν εἴη ἀνθρώπου, λαβοῦσα  
μῆκος βίου τέλειον.

Qu. What does contemplation need of outward things?

Ans. "ἐν βίῳ τελίῳ" in happiness there must be nothing insufficient, and we must have a sufficient length of life. (cf. I., p. 16.)

"Must men think humanly."

ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν.

Qu. Should we, being mortal, not meddle with what is immortal?

Ans. The life of reason is higher than the life of our composite nature : it is divine as contrasted with ordinary life, and we should endeavour to live up to what is best in us.

Physically it may be insignificant, in capacity and worth, it is the highest part of our nature. cf. "If there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think on these things." v. p. 25.

Man's true self.

δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ εἶναι ἕκαστος τοῦτο, εἴπερ τὸ κύριον  
καὶ ἄμεινον.

Qu. Is this life above men, or in it does man find his true self?

*Ans.* In each being that which is naturally its own (*ἰδιον*) is best for it and sweetest. Reason is the essence of humanity, and man, if he did not lead its life, would be leading the life of some other being than himself.

Man should live up to the highest and best parts of his nature: for this it is that makes him man. cf. "Mens cujusque est quisque."

### HAPPINESS.

*Qu.* Summarise this.

*Ans.* Happiness is in accordance with excellence, the highest excellence of our nature, that is, the reason.

It is found in contemplation, for reason is the noblest of our faculties, and one that we can use most continuously.

It has a pleasure of its own, which enhances its vigour.

It consists in leisure, while the practical virtues all have some other end to attain besides happiness.

The philosopher too is all sufficient, he is free from care, and only needs a few wants supplied, and time in which to enjoy his happiness.

Though this happiness is divine, as the reason is compared to man's compound nature, yet as the reason is the essence of humanity, according to the general law of nature, man finds his real being in living up to his highest and best faculty.

## CHAP. VIII.

*The intellectual the highest life. Five reasons.  
Opinion of philosophers. Value of facts. The  
favour of heaven.*

## THE INTELLECTUAL THE HIGHEST LIFE.

δευτέρως δ' ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἄλλην ἀρετήν.

Qu. Why is the life of all other virtue happy only in a secondary sense?

## FIVE REASONS.

Not of this world.

αἱ δὲ τοῦ συνθέτου ἀρεταὶ ἀνθρωπικαί.

Ans. 1. All its energies are human, buying and selling, bravery, and justice, all are between man and man.

Not physical.

2. (1) πολλὰ συνφκειῶσθαι τοῖς πάθεσιν ἢ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετή.

Moral virtue is closely bound up with the physical emotions.

Prudence.

(2) συνέρευκται δὲ καὶ ἡ φρόνησις τῇ τοῦ ἥθους ἀρετῇ.

(This reason is nearly the same as the last): prudence is in accordance with moral virtue, and virtue has prudence for its standard.

(φρόνησις is opposed to σοφία.)

All-sufficient.

4. δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ τῆς ἐκτὸς χορηγίας ἐπὶ μικρὸν ἢ ἐπ' ἔλαττον δεῖσθαι τῆς ἡθικῆς.

(1.) Though both the politician and the philosopher

have each physical needs, yet here the resemblance ceases.

### Comparison of the practical and intellectual life.

(2.) ἀμφισβητεῖται δὲ πότερον κυριώτερον τῆς ἀρετῆς ἢ προαίρεσις ἢ αἱ πράξεις, ὥς ἐν ἀμφοῖν οὔσης.

For the practical virtues cannot exist in perfection without adequate externals: perfect virtue requires not only perfect purpose, but perfect acts: and for acts the generous man needs money, the temperate man opportunity, the brave man danger in battle.

While externals are rather in the way of the philosopher: of course in that he is human, and lives with his fellows; he makes choice of virtue. (For the other side of the question, v. p. 43.)

### The life of gods.

5. (1) τοὺς θεοὺς γὰρ μάλιστα ὑπειλήφαμεν μακαρίους καὶ εὐδαίμονας εἶναι· πράξεις δὲ ποίας ἀπονείμει χρεὼν αὐτοῖς;

If the gods are happy, is their happiness moral virtue? Do they make bargains? do they withstand danger? Is there a currency among them? Are they temperate, that is, can a god have evil passions?

Their life has no concern with moral virtue.

(2) τῷ δὴ ζῶντι τοῦ πράττειν ἀφαιρουμένου, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον τοῦ ποιεῖν, τί λείπεται πλὴν θεωρία;

Yet the life of the gods is not passed, like that of Endymion, in sleep.

We have shown that moral activity is out of the question (1). *A fortiori* artistic activity is also. It

follows that they must be employed in contemplation.

And man is happy so far as he is like them : no other living thing but himself has this capacity.

Happiness is contemplation.

(3) οὐ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν θεωρίαν.

So far as man is employed in contemplation so far he will be happy ; for happiness is not an incident of contemplation, but they are convertible terms.

The need of prosperity.

δεήσει δὲ καὶ τῆς ἑκτος εὐημερίας ἀνθρώπων ὄντι.

*Qu.* Has man no concern with external goods ?

*Ans.* *Man* needs health and maintenance to be happy, but there is no need for great wealth, he need not be ruler of land and sea.

To bear the golden yoke of sovereignty.

Philosophie opinion.

πίστιν μὲν οὖν καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχει τινά.

*Qu.* Do the philosophers give any support to Aristotle's opinion ?

*Ans.* *Solon* defines the happy as "those who are moderately equipped with externals, whose acts are noblest, and whose lives are temperate."

*Anaxagoras* said he expected that his idea of happiness would appear fantastic to the multitude, for they judge by externals.

The logic of facts.

τὸ δ' ἀληθὲς ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ἐκ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τοῦ βίου κρίνεται.

*Qu.* Is opinion, from however great a man, decisive?

*Ans.* In practical matters, facts are the ultimate appeal: if our theories do not accord with them, they are false.

Heaven's favourite.

*θεοφιλέστατος ἄρα.*

*Qu.* Do the gods care how men employ themselves?

*Ans.* Common opinion holds they do: and if they do the philosopher must be dear to them: for he loves what they love: and therefore they look kindly on him. cf. "A man after God's own heart."

Therefore on this account too the philosopher will be happy.

#### INTELLECTUAL EXCELLENCE.

*Qu.* Summarise this.

*Ans.* Intellectual is better than moral virtue, for moral virtue presupposes an imperfect state, the life of men, and the *struggle* to do right.

There is need too of externals for moral virtue to have full play: while externals are in the way of a philosopher.

Yet as he is a man amongst men, the philosopher uses moral virtue.

What is the life of the gods? they do not lie sleeping like Endymion: yet in that life of theirs there can be no need of moral virtue; and still less of artistic production.

Their life then is one of contemplation: man only among other living creatures can share it, and so far he will be happy, for contemplation is happiness.

In that he is man he needs external goods, not great prosperity, but enough to live in comfort.

So Solon and Anaxagoras think; not that their opinion is conclusive: in matters of practice theory must bow to fact.

If heaven cares for man at all, and men think it does, then the philosopher will be heaven's favourite, for the same thing is dear to both of them. Heaven's favourite then, apart from other reasons, should needs be happy.

## CHAP. IX.

*End of philosophy is practice. Value of precepts. Ways of being good. State education. Home-training. Duty of a parent. Home influence. Definition of science. Professors of legislation. Medical books. Heads of Politics.*

## PRACTICE NOT THEORY.

οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς τέλος τὸ θεωρῆσαι ἕκαστα καὶ γινῶναι.

*Qu.* Does the discussion on happiness, virtue, and pleasure end our work?

*Ans.* The object of the Ethics is not speculative but practical. cf. οὐ γινῶσις ἀλλὰ πράξις.



### Value of precepts.

πολλοὺς ἂν μισθοὺς καὶ μεγάλους δικαίως ἔφερον κατὰ τὸν Θεογνιν.

*Qu.* Will moral precepts effect the end?

*Ans.* If it were so, men who made them would command high pay. They are only useful for those of *liberal mind*, but for the most part they are useless.

*The majority* are ruled by fear and not by shame, and know nothing of what is really noble: what good can exhortation do to men like these?

We ought to be thankful if *with many advantages* men turn out well.

### Nature, precept, practice.

γίνεσθαι δ' ἀγαθοὺς οἴονται, οἱ μὲν φύσει, οἱ δ' ἔθει, οἱ δὲ διδαχῇ.

*Qu.* What means can we take to make men good?

*Ans.* Some think virtue comes by nature, some by habituation or teaching.

#### Nature.

With this we have nothing to do; this depends on some dispensation of heaven. v. pp. 37—41.

#### Precept.

A man must be noble-natured, before he will listen or understand; as the earth must be broken up before it will nourish the seed.

For he who lives by passion is deaf to precept, and will obey nothing but force. v. p. 8.

### Habituation.

There can be general training except the laws provide it ; and this will not only be needful in youth, but also for men of full age, for the majority are ruled by punishment. v. Essay on Education.

### State education.

*ταῦτα δὲ γίγνεται ἂν βιούμενοις κατὰ τινα νοῦν καὶ τάξιν ὀρθήν, ἔχουσιν ἰσχύιν.*

*Qu.* How is this to be obtained ?

*Ans.* A man should be properly brought up, and live properly all his life, and never do or wish to do wrong.

While the bad man must be kept in subjection by punishment, and if incurable expelled.

This needs a fixed system, enforced by a sanction.

*ἡ μὲν οὖν πατρικὴ πρόσταξις οὐκ ἔχει τὸ ἰσχυρὸν οὐδὲ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.*

*Qu.* Why should not parental authority do all this ?

*Ans.* 1. It has not sufficient strength.

2. We object to dictation from a fellow-man, even if he is in the right.

*ὁ δὲ νόμος ἀναγκαστικὴν ἔχει δύναμιν, λόγος ὢν ἀπὸ τινος φρονήσεως καὶ νοῦ.*

*Qu.* What authority should perform this duty ?

*Ans.* The law, which is the dictate of abstract prudence and reason, and so can wound nobody's pride.

Yet only in Lacedæmon, and one or two other States, does the law take any pains about the matter.

Men in general live Cyclops-fashion, each one a king in his own family.

### Duty of a parent.

*νομοθετικὸς γενόμενος.*

*Qu.* What is the next best thing to do?

*Ans.* Every man must do the best he can for his own children, and to do this he must acquaint himself with the theory of legislation: for as in other cases, it makes no difference, whether you have to deal with one or a number.

### Home influence.

*Qu.* Has private education any advantages?

*Ans.* 1. *προϋπάρχουσι γὰρ στέργοντες καὶ ἐνπαιθεῖς τῇ φύσει.*

Children are naturally affectionate and docile: and these qualities are strengthened by the tie of relationship and gratitude.

2. Furthermore individual attention to character counts for much.

*ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ἰατρικῆς.*

The general rule for a fever is repose and low diet; but in a particular case it might be advisable to adopt a different treatment.

### Definition of science.

*τοῦ κοινοῦ γὰρ αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι λέγονται τε καὶ εἰσίν.*

*Qu.* Can anybody undertake education?

*Ans.* Is it possible that by empirical (experience) rules a man may treat a particular case, but a man who wishes to be perfect, must get a scientific knowledge, that is, a knowledge of general rules.

### Professors of Legislation.

ἀρ' οὖν μετὰ τοῦτο ἐπισκεπτέον πόθεν ἢ πῶς νομοθετικὸς γένοιτ' ἂν τις;

*Qu.* How is a man to acquire this general knowledge?

### Politicians.

ἢ παρὰ τῶν πολιτικῶν;

Is it to be, as it would be in other cases, from the politicians?

*Ans.* Statesmen have an *empirical knowledge* and a natural capacity, but they cannot teach what they know, or they would surely do so, as a boon both to their friends and the state: it would be a much better way of spending their time than in making speeches in the law courts or in the assembly.

### The Sophists.

τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταὶ, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδεὶς.

*Qu.* Are the Sophists fit to teach it?

*Ans.* Not for the following reasons.

1. They have no practical knowledge, and this is most necessary; for men become statesmen by familiarity with office.

2. They evidently don't know it even theoretically.

- (1) For they confound it with or subordinate it to rhetoric.
- (2) They think all you have to do is to make a collection of laws and pick out the best.

### Power of appreciation.

ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν οὖσαν συνέσεως καὶ τὸ κρίναι  
ὀρθῶς μέγιστον.

*Qu.* Why is it absurd to say you have only to *pick out* the best laws?

*Ans.* Because this is just the difficulty; all one of the general public can hope to do is to see if a thing is good or bad *when it is done*; but to know *how to do it* requires a master.

It requires an artist to paint a picture; it is well if the ordinary man knows a good picture from a bad one when he sees it.

Laws are the products of political science, as pictures of painting.

### Household medicine.

οὐ γὰρ φαίνονται οὐδ' ἱατρικοὶ ἐκ τῶν συγγραμμάτων  
γίνεσθαι.

*Qu.* Prove *practice* is requisite by the analogy of medicine?

*Ans.* Reading medical books never made a physician, although all the cases are described. Medical works are useful to the physician.

### Book learning.

*Qu.* Is it no good to study collections of laws?

*Ans.* A man with a previous knowledge of the subject will get a great deal of good from it, but if he knows nothing about it, all the good he will get will be a greater power of appreciation.

### The philosophy of man.

*ὅπως εἰς δύναμιν ἢ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία  
τελειωθῇ.*

*Qu.* How can we remedy the defective state of education?

*Ans.* As previous writers have left the subject alone, in order to complete, as far as we can, the philosophy of man we will discuss the theories of legislation and government.

### Headings of Politics.

*Qu.* What does Aristotle intend to do?

*Ans.* (1) To examine what is suitable in his predecessors' works.

(2) Examine particular constitutions and frame general rules.

(3) See how far they are applicable to particular constitutions.

(4) The merits and demerits of particular forms of government.

So as to be able to determine,

(a) The best form of government.

(b) The particular laws and customs suitable to each form of government.

This leads us on from Ethics to Politics.

For Summary of this book vide the Summaries at the end of each chapter.

## A BRIEF SUMMARY OF THE ETHICS.

### BOOK I.

Is there an end of life for man: if there is it must be absolute and all-sufficing.

We must seek for it, and be satisfied only to discover it in outline for the subject is a difficult one.

In man's function the chief good for man will be found, and this leads on to the definition of happiness.

The definition coincides with the opinion of other philosophers, and is examined in relation to some popular difficulties.

Next the nature of virtue is to be discussed, and to do this the soul is briefly examined.

### BOOK II.

Virtue it is decided is not innate, it depends on our own actions, and therefore pleasure and pain must be taken into account.

The genus and differentia of virtue are settled on, and the doctrine of the mean established.

This doctrine is shown to hold good in practice in a catalogue of the virtues.

The objection to the doctrine of the mean that it is a mere compromise is answered, and some general rules are laid down how to attain to it.

### BOOK III.

Commences with a division of voluntary and involuntary actions: the nature of wish, deliberation, and purpose is then examined.

Then follows a criticism of the doctrine that virtue is voluntary and vice involuntary.

The rest of the book is taken up with Courage and Temperance.

### BOOK IV.

Is wholly devoted to the virtues.

### BOOK. X., Ch. vi., *ad finem*.

First returns to the question of happiness, and settles that it is not an amusement: that intellectual is better than moral excellence: that in the life of God there is no room for moral excellence.

The Ethics close by discussing the question how moral excellence is taught, and the passage from Ethics to Politics.



## I. INTRODUCTION TO THE ETHICS.

There are three stages of moral progress in man.

I. Unconscious morality.

II. A period of examination, and a belief that in each individual is his own final court of appeal.

III. A conscious belief in laws that are sacred in themselves, and which men administer with a full trust that they are for the best.

*The first stage* follows a high and noble standard without a question, and may be seen pictured in the pages of Homer, the bible of the earlier Greeks.

*The second stage* is reached when men question and examine the rules of morality, and endeavour to substitute for the authority of convention the individual consciousness: then "virtue becomes knowledge and ignorance vice," and this when pushed too far makes "man a law to himself."

*The Third Stage* finds that there is a great law that governs man, to obey which is happiness, the individual conscience is allowed full liberty and yet is ready to obey: "pure law commensures perfect freedom." "As the chemist, the navigator, and the naturalist attain their ends by means of a law, which is beyond their power to alter, but with which they can work in harmony, so can we." Then Ethics begin to have an existence as a separate science; to harmonise popular opinion, to point out its defects and errors; to formulate its claim to be the science of human happiness, and to create or adapt a terminology. This stage is fully reached in Aristotle's Ethics.

## II. ANCIENT AND MODERN ETHICS.

What are Ethics? Most of us understand what we mean by "Politics," or Political Science; the science which treats generally of the way in which States are governed, and the reasons why such and such a constitution is in force, and is good or bad.

As Politics is the science of the state, so Ethics is the science, not of the whole man, but of human actions considered as virtuous or vicious: of course by pressing the question strictly we might say every action was virtuous or vicious, but we do a good many things without right or wrong intent about them.

### Ancient and Modern Ethics.

Do men of these later ages look on Ethics from the same point of view as Aristotle did?

### Different starting points.

In what different ways can you approach Ethics?

#### Objectively.

You can fix some object before you, which it is well to attain to, such as beauty, happiness, pleasure, and then see how you can best reach it.

#### Subjectively.

Or you may start in another way and say: what capacities have I, what am I best fitted for, what is it my *interest* to do?

#### Duty, Right, Ought.

And you may go on further, and ask am I not *morally bound* to do what I can do?

### Aristotle's view.

What does Aristotle do? Look back at the first chapter of the *Ethics*: everything has a *τέλος*, and in reaching that *τέλος* it is perfect—it attains the absolute good. There is a law of harmony and beauty in nature; the law of balance and proportion, and that man must strive after; it brings pleasure with it, because man is consciously perfect: but the law is *outside* man, the final and formal cause of his conduct.

### III. PHILOSOPHIC TERMS.

*What is the influence of philosophic terms on thought?* Language is the expression of reason; a word may be invested by association with many meanings, so that merely to mention it is to call up numberless thoughts.

Then the knowledge of what that word means, of the sense in which it is used will be absolutely necessary, before it is possible to understand the theory of which it is a part.

There are some races of people who do not comprehend the idea of telling the truth; they manufacture a falsehood with no object, with no wish particularly to deceive; and on second thoughts they contradict themselves again, and have no idea that it merits contempt, they simply cannot understand what "truth" is.

Until you could explain fully to them the meaning of "truth," the English moral code would be a rigmarole.

In the same way there are words like *ψυχή*, *τέλος*, *ἐνέργεια* in Aristotle, and unless you know what he meant by them, you will be trying to follow out reasoning, which depends on a certain set of ideas, while you do not understand what those ideas are.

#### IV. *θεός*.

##### Divine providence.

I., ix. 2. *Does God care for man?* Is there a divine providence? If the gods care for men, happiness would be their gift, for it is most divine; but "this question belongs to another science," i.e., theology. (v. p. 21.)

X., viii., 13. *Again the question is asked does God care for man?* If he does, and men believe he does, then the philosopher who loves what he loves, will be dear to him above all other men. (v. p. 150.)

##### The Nature of God.

I., xii., 4. We call the gods blessed, our happiness is only human, subject to pain and misfortune, whereas theirs is perfect and everlasting.

I., xii., 4-6. *Can we give God praise?* That is approve of Him. If we did so it would be to say there was something higher than himself, with which he was in harmony. (v. p. 26.)

##### The life of the gods.

X., viii., 7-8. The life of the Gods is one of actuality, of consciousness. *Do they employ themselves in moral acts* (*πραξις*)? Is it not absurd to conceive of them as needing justice, temperance, or bravery;

that is to think that they make agreements, that they have passions to control, or danger to encounter. (*v. p. 148.*)

*Do gods produce anything?* (*ποιήσις.*) Why, all art is below moral virtue, and moral virtue is not akin to them.

*Yet their life is conscious?* It is not passed in sleep like Endymion's: it must then be one of contemplation (*θεωρία*). Man is like to God, so far as he lives this life.

#### V. NATURE, NECESSITY, CHANCE, INTELLIGENCE.

*What are the four causes of all things?* Nature, necessity, chance, the intelligence of man.

Nature acts for the best: in all things that it rules we trace beauty and design (*v. p. 74*); so far as the operation of its laws extend they are immutable and eternal, what nature has fixed nothing can alter (*v. p. 37*).

*Necessity* is the handmaid of nature, the sun sets and rises, the rain falls by necessity or nature: this *must* be so in obedience in natural laws. (*v. p. 74*).

There is room for *chance* only in the actions of men; a man may stumble on a treasure by accident.

And the intelligence of man is another agency that nature does not control: we possess certain natural powers, and within their limits we can act as we please.

#### VI. THE FOUR CAUSES.

*What is the reason why anything is what it is?*  
Why is a table a table?

### The Final Cause.

Some one conceives the idea of a table ; he designs it in his own mind.

### The Material Cause.

There must be something out of which to make it, otherwise it could not come into existence ; and he takes a piece of wood, iron, or some other material.

### The Efficient Cause.

He sets to work to carry out the idea.

### The Formal Cause.

And the table begins to assume the form he wishes ; it begins to fulfil the idea he had in his mind.

### τέλος.

The end, the final cause, is however the most important of all : the one which sets all the other causes to work : if the idea of the table was never conceived, the table would never exist.

Everything then tends towards the fulfilment of some idea : everything exists to carry out this idea, to reach an end. Man as well as the rest of all existing things.

### Moral Government of the World.

*Is it God who conceives this idea ?* The question must arise, but Aristotle puts it aside. v. p. 163.

Does man perform certain actions just like a plant throws out leaves ?

### μετὰ λόγου.

Man *consciously* attains a certain end, the animals and plants do so unconsciously.

## Is the end happiness ?

Happiness is the *popular* name for it, but Aristotle himself always speaks of "the beautiful" as the end of action.

The conception of the "end-in-itself" then is the keystone of the Ethics : it is the ideal which every action and every thought should reach : it puts aside all trivial or gross pursuits, triumphing over pain it carries with it a deeper and purer pleasure, that follows on the conscious attainment of "the beautiful."

## VII. ἐνέργεια, δύναμις, ἔξις.

### Energy.

Is energy the right translation of ἐνέργεια : energy means force and vigour, ἐνέργεια a great deal more. We understand the meaning of ἐνέργεια by contrasting it with δύναμις first, and then with ἔξις.

### Two Meanings of δύναμις.

1. *Capacity for existence* : the flower has the capacity for existence in the seed : the statue in the marble. When the seed grows into the flower, when the marble is hewn into the statute, there is the ἐνέργεια of "existence" (opus).

2. *Capacity of acting* : the eyes have the "capacity of sight," even when closed ; the ἐνέργεια is seeing : "acting" (actio).

### Two kinds of δυνάμεις, v. p. 37.

1. *Physical and innate*. We have the "capacity of sight" before we use it : it is innate in us : and

since it comes by nature it can only be used for "seeing."

2. *Mental or moral, and acquired.* There is no such thing as a *δύναμις* of virtue, if there was, those who had it *could* not but be virtuous.

Mental and moral capacities may result in *contraries*: our capacity is one "of vice *and* of virtue," and may turn out either way, under the influence of desire and purpose.

*ἔξις.*

"We must do just actions before we can be just," v. pp. 37-8. Directly we have done an act, it gives a bias to our capacity one way or the other: if it is good towards virtue, if bad, towards vice; and a series of these acts result in a *ἔξις*.

Our indefinite capacity of "virtue or vice" is turned into a "formed faculty" of one or the other, "of virtue" *or* "of vice."

When once we have an *ἔξις*, we have a disposition to do fresh acts of the same character as the acts which gave rise to it; our capacity is no longer indefinite, but has a definite tendency.

Consciousness.

Viewed objectively, that is, externally *ἐνέργεια* is an activity which is the developement of life; "living." Viewed subjectively it is "the sense of life," not only living harmoniously, but the knowledge you are doing so.

## VIII. THE MEAN.

In all times men have seen that there is a certain



beauty in moderation, but Aristotle's idea of the mean goes beyond this.

*τὸ γὰρ κακὸν τοῦ ἀπείρου.*

The Pythagorean doctrine was that evil was of the infinite; we use infinite in a different sense, we think of it as something "boundless and deep," but they as something that was "vague and shapeless," for them the infinite was chaos, and the finite order (*κόσμος*). (v. p. 49.)

### Parallel of nature and art.

Everything in nature owes its perfection to its taking a form, its fulfilling some idea; it is shapeless and discordant, and it becomes symmetrical and harmonious.

*τόν τί ἦν εἶναι λέγοντα.*

But this is only an intellectual account of virtue, an attempt to explain it in words: and the objection is brought against it "is virtue merely a matter of more or less."

*κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἄριστον καὶ τὸ εὖ ἀκρότης.*

In another and deeper view Aristotle says virtue cannot be accounted for as a mean. There is an "infinitude in all truths which recoils from the sharp dogma which puts truth into words. Virtue must be felt, not talked about or understood. It is impossible for the intellect to cut into the heart of truth: layer after layer, and covering after covering is taken off, till we come to the central nothing." (v. p. 50.)

### IX. *ψυχή*.

What do we mean by the "soul," we mean the

vital principle, and we attach to this too the idea of immortality and of responsibility. How does the *ψυχή* of Aristotle differ from this?

In the first place he conceives of the *ψυχή* as giving man life, sensibility, and understanding: there is the vegetable, animal, and intellectual life.

Scarcely either of these three ideas comes exactly into our idea of soul: we speak of body, soul, and spirit, each to express different ideas, and we also talk of intellect and mind: the soul seems to us to be the man's personality, which *directs* all the rest, and which is responsible and immortal.

### Immortality.

Aristotle touches lightly on the state after death I., x, and there, in concession to popular feeling, he leaves the question as to whether there is a future state.

Again he says that the brave man acts bravely (v. p. 90) to attain a *τέλος*: and in this there is no looking forward, but the end he places before himself is absolute, and swallows up everything else.

Yet Aristotle speaks of the intellect, as if not divine, being something very like it: and this may not perish.

But for God there is no moral virtue, it is beneath Him: if there is an immortality it will be one of the intellect, and then individuality is lost, for the intellect in man is impersonal.

It would be wrong to think that Aristotle lays down any such doctrine as this: he rather puts the subject aside altogether: it only comes in incidentally and has no bearing on his system of morals.

## X. VIRTUE.

## Excellence.

Do we mean the same thing by virtue as Aristotle meant by *ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ*: moral virtue in the Ethics is "excellence of character:" everything has an excellence, the horse, the dog, and the flower, and so has the man, but he is conscious of his own excellence, and they are not.

## Virtue.

Is this all *we* mean by virtue? Do we only mean conscious excellence? When we call a man virtuous we say he is morally *good*. That he fulfils the *purpose* of his being: and in saying that we assert that he is under some obligation that "vice is something more than a grand imprudence."

## The Mean.

For Aristotle's idea of moral virtue *v.* p. 51.

## The Wise Man.

Supposing the objection was raised to the theory of virtue, "Who is to say what the mean is?" Men contradict one another *v.* Ambition and Bravery. The wise man (*ὁ φρόνιμος*) is the impersonation of reason, and he will judge rightly.

## XI. THE VIRTUES.

Should we to-day draw up a catalogue of the virtues like Aristotle's on p. 53, and secondly should we do it on the same principle as he does?

## A catalogue of the virtues.

We should have bravery, temperance, liberality,

and magnificence, we should also have the social virtues, but it may be doubted whether we should take what he calls high-mindedness: and we should certainly add many to the list; such as humility, charity, long-suffering.

### Different principles.

We have seen in the *Essay on Ethics* (v. p. 161) that Aristotle wrote from a different stand-point to what we have now: we mean to fix a certain standard.

### The beautiful.

Our every act was to be beautiful: there "was an objective standard of beauty to be maintained, the ideal motive of correspondence with an existent law of rectitude." It was to be brave, not to win applause, not from fear of what might follow, but with a full consciousness of the loss to lay life down calmly: there could not be anything higher than this.

### Different age and Country. Greece.

But in Aristotle's day to fight against the enemy was more needed than now, and men revered it not too much, but they did not reverence other things enough; and so though to meet pain, poverty, and sickness without fear was what a brave man would do, still only meeting death in battle could be rightly called brave.

Again look at the magnificent man, with great means and knowing how to employ them, he bears his part well in the pageant of life: a glorious and beautiful figure, on whom the eyes of his fellow-countrymen fall with awe and admiration.

The high-minded man is above all motives, not only those that are base, but even those, which might summon him down from his pinnacle to be jostled by his fellows, only when there is some supreme greatness to be gained will it befit him to step in and dare greatly.

He forgives injuries, or rather he forgets them, because to remember them would be to assume that he is as other men are, and can be injured.

### England.

These qualities are great ones, they lead to noble effort and to an avoidance of what is base: but now we should be rather inclined to resent the attitude of the man who would stand above his fellows, who, would make great show on right occasions, and who conscious of his own supreme merit, would move among us in splendid attire, with grave majestic gait, deigning to receive our homage.

### The Beautiful and the Right.

We have said that there are many of our noblest virtues not to be found in Aristotle's list, charity, humility, and patience: they might perhaps be placed there, for they all fulfil the law expressed in the mean, but that some of them should be unmentioned is the clearest mark of the difference between his standard and our own.

No one now would hesitate to call brave the endurance of pain in whatever form it came, and indeed we are beginning to recognise that fortitude may need

the harder struggle of the two, that it is braver to die daily than to die once.

The meekness of the Greek was not to be angry where anger was unwarranted. Their humility not to claim too loudly the praise you deserved, but to suffer wrong patiently, would be mean-spirited; you might indeed be content to have no honour paid you by others, but only in contempt of it or them.

Past injuries were not to be recalled, not because you forgave them, but that to remember them argued a certain weakness.

Benefits were to be requited, not so much from goodwill and gratitude, as that to leave them unrepaid or not more than repaid, placed the recipient in an uneasy position of inferiority.

Aristotle's virtues are great ones, and the keynote of them all is self-respect: be true to the great law of beauty; you are a man, make yourself a perfect man.

The idea of "duty to God and my neighbour" comes in and substitutes another standard.

"Aristotle's men of virtue are a standard to themselves: they live by their own opinions: they may stand as a rock in the midst of a corrupt age, men of firmness, integrity, wisdom and strength, and moreover of self-reliance.

"There is yet another class of men who walk by the standard of the will of God. It is from the knowledge of that will that men learn the infinite littleness of their own achievements. To these latter the view changes: they walk meekly and humbly beneath the infinite heaven of duty that arches overhead. The one

lives a life of beauty full, not of self-love, but of self-reliance, and the other walks humbly, with an infinite standard in view, and learns, not self-neglecting, but self-forgetfulness."

## XII. *Eὐδαιμονία*.

Happiness is the highest good, in itself absolute and all-sufficing: it consists in the calling out into activity the highest part of our being: we depend in some degree on fortune: but happiness is permanent and stable: and pleasure follows it, coming from the consciousness of life.

Happiness is not a *ἔξις*, but consists in the continual calling out of our powers: not in mere amusement, for happiness is something serious and earnest: as we are men moral virtue is necessary for us, we must struggle to subdue our lower nature, but the perfect happiness is peace, free as far as may be from the troubles of the world, and reaching up in the higher nature, which is man's true self, to the unclouded exercise of reason, to contemplation where man lives the divine life, or a life which is its nearest likeness.

### Happiness and pleasure.

Happiness is not another name for pleasure: Aristotle gives this name to the chief good, because it is the popular one: he regards pleasure, not as the aim of life, but as that which follows necessarily on a perfect life: the grace which adds the finishing touch.

## XIII. PLEASURE.

Bk. I., Ch. viii. Pleasure belongs to our conscious-

ness, and therefore whatever we are fond of must give us pleasure. The virtuous life does not need pleasure to be added to it, like an amulet hung round the neck, but carries pleasure with it, and is pleasant in itself.

Most men's pleasures bring a sense of strife with them, for they violate the laws of their nature, but the virtuous man has a pleasure which is not a discord but a harmony, for it is in accordance with the law of nature and of his being.

Bk. I., Ch. xii., 5. Eudoxus argued that pleasure was the chief good because it was *not* praised; and Aristotle admits that this appeal to the use of language is right, for praise, given to anything, implies that it is in conformity with a standard higher than itself.

The absence of praise seems to show there is no higher standard to appeal to.

Bk. II., Ch. iii. *Pleasure and pain are the test of our being virtuous*: we are virtuous when we do a thing for its own sake: that is when the action is its own reward.

Plato's definition of right education.

"To rejoice and to feel pain at what we ought." This definition is correct, for pain and pleasure are the motives that lead us astray.

Every feeling men have is followed by pleasure or pain, therefore to have these properly regulated is to be safe, to be virtuous.

The opinion of the Stoics controverted.

Is "virtue an apathy," as the Stoics and Cynics



teach? Aristotle distinctly says "no," for three reasons.

1. It is impossible, if it were advisable, to destroy the nature of man.

2. It is inadvisable, if it were possible, to remove all human motive.

3. Everything that is worth having is difficult, and virtue the crown of life should have the mastery of pleasure, which is the great battlefield of human nature. cf. "There is nothing good that cannot be abused."

### Practical counsels as to pleasure.

Bk. II., Ch. viii. Pleasure is the test not only of virtuous habits, but also in another way the test of our proneness to some particular vice; and we must be very careful of the sin that doth most easily beset us.

2. When we are prone to one thing, we must make for its opposite, like the men do, who straighten warped wood.

3. "Suspect what is agreeable:" as the the Trojan Senate sent Helen away, for fear her beauty should mislead their judgment.

### The place of Pleasure in a Treatise on Virtue.

Pleasure and pain follow on every feeling, pleasure and pain are the motive of life. Virtue works then in the sphere of pleasure and pain.

### Does pleasure compel us?

Bk. III., Ch. i. ii. If we could plead that pleasure was irresistible, (1) all our actions would be involuntary. (2) Compulsion implies pain, (3) and we cannot

transfer our responsibility to externals, (4) it is ridiculous to say, "when I do right it is to *my* credit, but if I do wrong, *pleasure* is in fault."

Bk. III., Ch. vii. 19. Intemperance is more voluntary than cowardice in the individual acts, for pain compels us, while pleasure is followed freely.

Bk. III., x. 2. *The pleasures of the body and of the mind* must be distinguished; and of the pleasures of the body some are base, and some not.

Bk. X., i.—v. fully discuss pleasure: with this we have nothing to do.

#### XIV. EDUCATION.

How is man to be rendered virtuous? This question recurs again and again in Aristotle.

νέος τὴν ἡλικίαν ἢ ὁ νεαρός τὸ ἥθος.

It is no good for the young man to join in our enquiry, for he will not practice although he knows: so here knowledge goes for very little. v. p. 8.

ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ δτι.

Men must be well-trained to know the fact, and afterwards you can teach them the reason. v. p. 10.

How do we get happiness?

Then comes in the question is it from heaven or chance: putting aside the one as outside the subject, and the other as unnatural, is it from teaching or habituation, and here we get no satisfactory answer. v. p. 21.

Is Virtue innate?

Virtue is not innate or it would be no use to teach it, and neither is it against nature, therefore we have

a capacity to receive it from nature : this opens the question of how far one man may have a better nature than another; πεφυκόσι ἡμῖν δέξασθαι ἐγγίνονται αἱ ἀρεταί. v. p. 37—38.

We become just by just actions.

By acting under the direction of a master we learn justice, as we learn art. Virtue then comes from practice and not from precept : we get our faculties by use, ἔχοντες ἐχρησάμεθα, οὐ χρησάμενοι ἔσχομεν. v. p. 42.

Have we a moral sense ?

This Aristotle does not state : but he recognises that there is such a thing as knowing right and wrong intuitively, ἐν τῇ αἰσθήσει ἡ κρίσις. v. p. 59.

Teaching or Habituation.

You may teach but scarcely any one will listen even if they understand : to produce any effect you must have compulsory power. v. p. 152.

State Education.

The state has this power, and as it is impersonal it raises no idea of unwarrantable interference, but the State has not as yet taken the task into its own hands. v. p. 153.

Home Education.

Home education has the advantage of being capable of adaptation to special needs, and is assisted by natural affection : there are no proper teachers of education ; practice and precept are divorced in the Sophists and Politicians : and the only thing to do is to turn to the study of Politics. v. p. 154—155.

## XV. THE METHOD OF THE ETHICS.

In what way did Aristotle treat of this subject: what points do we find to notice as we go through the Ethics?

τέλος.

The whole Ethics depend on the idea that there is some end in itself for man to reach. v. p. 2—4.

ἀκρίβεια.

Too much accuracy is not to be expected: the science is in a tentative state. v. p. 7.

### Induction or Deduction.

Induction is the best method of proceeding, because it is the only way to proceed. v. p. 9.

ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ δτι.

Yet if a fact amounts to a principle, we really start deductively, *i.e.*, from principles.

### The definition of Happiness.

The starting point of the Ethics is this definition: and Aristotle shows how all the actions of life depend from it: how all previous theories can be harmonised by it: this is to proceed *deductively*. v. p. 14.

## ARISTOTLE'S ATTITUDE TOWARDS OTHERS.

How did Aristotle look upon the opinions of other people?

### Common opinion.

He examines briefly the belief as to what happiness is, as shown in the lives men lead. I. v. He takes the idea as to the future state: and says it would

be *λίαν ἄφιλον* to say the dead had no concern with the living. I. xi.

We use exhortation and advice, which shows we believe the irrational can obey the rational. I. xiii.

We praise or blame certain actions, therefore they are voluntary. III. i.

Compulsion implies pain. III. i.

No one would say this except in a disputation. I. v.

### Appeals to language.

Has language any authority? Language is the expression of reason: if a thing goes by a certain name, or is spoken of in a particular way, that shows what people think of it.

### Instances.

Is happiness worthy of "honour" or "praise?" I. x.

We are not called good or bad for our feelings. II. v. 3.

We speak of being "moved" in regard to our feelings, and "disposed" as to our virtues.

The common saying of a good work, that neither can anything be added or taken away. VI. 6.

*ἡθικὴ* is derived from *ἔθος*: therefore moral virtue is not innate. II. i.

We cannot say we purpose to be happy. III. ii. 9.

We praise opinion with "correct," but purpose with "of what it ought to be" and "rightly."

Virtue is not "feeling," because "impulse" is spoken of feeling, and "disposition" of virtue. II. v. 4.

Common language is looked on as the expression of common experience. cf. "A proverb is the wit of one and the wisdom of a million."

### Other Philosophers.

Aristotle shows that his definition of happiness is not in contradiction to the opinions of other philosophers: but that rather it brings them all under a higher law, and so harmonises them.

In I. ix. he goes through the opinions of several to show their substantial agreement with him.

### Allusions to other Philosophers.

Eudoxus on the value of pleasure. I. xii. 5.

Solon's paradox. I. x.

Plato on right education. II. iii. 2.

Heraclitus says it is harder to contend with pleasure than with anger. II. iii. 10.

The Pythagoræans make good belong to the finite, II. vi.

Socrates. Virtue is voluntary, vice involuntary. III.

Socrates' definition of courage. III. viii. 6.

Socrates' irony. IV. vii. 14.

Socrates and Anaxagoras agree with himself. X. viii. 2.

### Quotations from the Poets.

Quotations from the poets are brought in both because they are well-known and as containing a latent philosophy.

### Homer.

The warning of Circe. II. ix. 2.

Pleasure compared to the charms of Helen. II. ix. 6.

The proceedings of Homeric Kings to illustrate the process of the mind. III. iii. 18.

To illustrate political courage. III. viii. 1.

To illustrate the courage of rage. III. viii. 10.

### Hesiod.

The master, the man willing to learn, and the dullard.  
I. v. 7.

### Theognis.

If virtue were teachable, the teacher would get great rewards. X. ix. 3.

### The use of Familiar Illustrations.

Merope killed her son thinking he was a stranger.  
III. i. 17.

Æschylus revealed the mysteries not knowing what he was telling. III. i. 17.

The fortunes of Priam. I. x. 14.

The Megarians are ostentatious. IV. ii. 20.

Milo the great Athlete. II. vi. 7.

The Spartans have an affected humility. IV. vii. 14.

Sardanapalus is the type of the man of pleasure. I.  
v. 3.

The Lacedæmonians and the Cretans regulate the lives of their citizens. I. xiii. 3.

The Celts care nothing for the terrors of nature.  
III. vii. 7.

To live Cyclops-fashion, each man ruling his own family. X. ix. 13.

The Gods do not pass their time like Endymion, in a dream. X. viii. 7.

The Alcmaeon of Euripides killing his mother for a ridiculous reason. III. i. 8.

Thetis did not remind Jove of her services : nobody likes it. III. iii. 25.

The Argives fall on some Spartans thinking they are Sicyonians ; this was the courage of ignorance. III. viii. 16.

In the Hermæum of Coronea, the citizen troops stood fast and the Boeotian auxiliaries fled. Political courage *v.* courage of experience. III. viii. 9.

#### XVI. ARGUMENT FROM ANALOGY (Simile and Metaphor).

What is meant by argument from analogy ?

What is true of the first pair of things will be true of the second pair, because there is the same relation between the terms of the second pair, as there is between the terms of the first pair.

In Simile the comparison is made more to *illustrate* than to prove ; while in Metaphor the relation between the first pair is *transferred* to the second.

*Analogy.* The eye is to the body as faith is to the soul.

*Simile.* Faith is *like* the eye of the soul.

*Metaphor.* Faith is the eye of the soul.

The strength of the argument depends entirely on the amount of resemblance, and on no wider conclusion being drawn than the resemblance really warrants. This argument is inductive.

The principal use of all except the clearest analogies, and therefore of metaphors and similes, is not to found an argument, but to aid us in understanding it :



to show the probability that there is an argument; and to explain and illustrate what we have not seen by that which we have.

*δεῖ γὰρ ὑπὲρ τῶν ἀφανῶν τοῖς φανεροῖς μαρτυρίαις  
χρῆσθαι.*

### Instances.

The bowmen shooting at a mark, and the practical use of Ethics. I. ii. 2.

The Political Philosopher and the Oculist. I. xiii. 7.

The palsied man compared to the incontinent. I. xiii.

Moral extremes and excesses in gymnastics. II. ii. 6.

The unjust man can't cure himself, and the sick man can't make himself healthy. III. v. 14.

The man who talks about philosophy is like the patient who listens carefully to his doctor, and carries out none of his orders. II. iv. 6.

Different things suit the sick and the healthy, compared to the real and apparent good. III. iv. 4.

Physical disease is pitied when it is not wilfully brought on, therefore moral disease being unpitied is wilfully induced. III. v. 15.

Go to the extreme which is least dangerous. Straighten bent wood. II. ix. 4.

Avoid your besetting sin: Charybdis is more dangerous than Scylla. II. ix. 3.

### XVII. THE CASUISTRY OF ARISTOTLE.

"Casuistry is the department of Ethics, the great

object of which is to lay down rules for action whenever there is room for doubt."

Aristotle declines to lay down rules for special cases, "there is no fixed law in matters of morals any more than there is in matters of health." In Book II. Ch. ix., general rules are given to direct the conduct as a whole: but individual cases must be decided on their own merits: the decision rest mostly on details. For instance in one class of mixed actions it is nearly impossible to pronounce judgment. III. i. 9.

### XVIII. ETHICS AS A PRACTICAL SCIENCE.

What is the object of the Ethics? The answer is "οὐ γὰρ ἔν' εἰδῶμεν τί ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ σκεπτόμεθα, ἀλλ' ἔν' ἀγαθοὶ γενώμεθα"; and again, "οὐ γινώσκεις ἀλλὰ πράξεις." The man who studies Ethics and doesn't practice them is like the patient who listens to the doctor and carries out none of his prescriptions.

ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πράξεις οἱ μὲν καθόλου κενώτεροί εἰσιν, and then follows a catalogue of the virtues to show they are all in the mean.

The discussion is limited.

The discussion must not be pushed too far, ὅπως μὴ τὰ πάρεργα τῶν ἔργων πλείω γίγνηται. I. vii. 20.

Whether the rational and irrational are distinct οὐθὲν διαφέρει πρὸς τὸ παρόν. I. xiii.

Whether opinion comes before purpose or follows it makes no difference, i.e., the question in discussion is, are they identical.

Mixed actions are voluntary: they are voluntary when you do them, τὸ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρὸν ἐστίν.

Besides this should be mentioned his rule as to accuracy, and his respect for popular opinion, and his endeavour to show that other philosophers agree with him, or rather that his opinion includes theirs as the greater includes the less.

## XIX. ETHICS AS A BRANCH OF POLITICS.

*πολιτική τις οὔσα.*

How does Aristotle carry out the idea that he starts with I. ii. Does he treat Ethics as if they were a species of Politics, or only mention the latter casually at times?

There is an idea that in a perfect state the citizens would all be trained up properly.

The scattered allusions are—

Lawgivers, like those of Crete and Lacedæmon try to make the citizens virtuous. I. xiii. 3.

A good constitution differs from a bad in making the citizens virtuous. II. i. 5.

The discussion of the voluntary is useful for legislators. III. i. 1.

The political philosopher must know about the soul. I. xiii. 7. v. also X. ix.

## XX. WORDS WITH MORE THAN ONE MEANING.

*ἀρχή* (1) A starting point. I. iv. (2) An universal principle. I. iv. (3) The efficient cause. III. i.

ἄσωτος (1) Prodigal. (2) Prodigal and intemperate.  
IV. 7.

λόγον ἔχειν (1) To possess reason, (2) to listen to reason.

σπουδαῖος (1) In earnest, (2) good.

τέλειος (1) Reaching its end, (2) Absolute.

## XXI. WORDS CONTRASTED.

ποίησις. Producing, *e.g.* shoe-making.

πρᾶξις. Doing, *e.g.* a just action.

θεωρία. Contemplating what we already know. cf.  
"The Scriptures, read, mark, learn, and inwardly *digest* them."

ψυχή. The vital principle. *v.* Essay on the soul.

βίος. A career ; a slave has no βίος. We say that  
is the life (βίος) I have marked out for myself.

## XXII. WORDS FOR WHICH THERE IS NO EXACT EQUIVALENT.

ἀρετή, δύναμις, ἐνέργεια, ἔξις, τέλος, ψυχή, πολι-  
τική τις οὐσα. *v.* Essays.

Can ἀρχή be translated "principle?" Not as con-  
veying the idea of a "man of high principle."

τὸ δέον. "That which is binding," not our "duty,"  
but that which it is "well" to do.

## DEFINITIONS.

## BOOK I.

τάγαθόν.

1. διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφάναντο τάγαθόν, αὐτὸ πάντ' ἐφίεται.

p. 2.

2. τέλος τῶν πρακτῶν ὃ δι' αὐτὸ βουλόμεθα. p. 4.  
εὐδαιμονία.

ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια κατ' ἀρετὴν ἐν βίῳ τελείῳ. p. 16.

## BOOK II.

πάθος.

πάθη οἷς ἔπεται ἡδονὴ ἢ λύπη. p. 46.

δύναμις.

δυνάμεις καθ' ἃς παθητικοὶ τούτων λεγόμεθα.

ἕξις.

ἕξεις καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς.

ἀρετὴ (generally).

πασα ἀρετὴ, οὐκ ἂν ᾗ ἀρετὴ, αὐτὸ τε εὖ ἔχον ἀπο-  
τελεῖ. p. 48.

The absolute mean.

τοῦ μὲν πράγματος μέσον τὸ ἴσον ἀπέχον ἀφ' ἑκα-  
τέρου τῶν ἄκρων. p. 48.

The relative mean.

πρὸς ἡμᾶς δέ, ὃ μήτε πλεονάζει, μήτε ἐλλείπει.

Moral Virtue.

ἔστιν ἄρα ἡ ἀρετὴ ἕξις προαιρετικὴ, ἐν μεσότητι  
οὖσα τῇ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, ὀρίσμενῃ λόγῳ καὶ ὥς ἂν ὁ φρόνι-  
μος ὀρίσειεν. p. 51—2.

## BOOK III.—THE VOLUNTARY.

## ἀκούσια.

δοκεῖ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βία ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινόμενα.  
p. 64.

## βίαια.

βίαιον οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὐσα ἐν ἣ μηδὲν  
συμβάλλεται ὁ πράττων, ἢ ὁ πάσχων. p. 64.

μικταὶ πράξεις. p. 65.

ἐκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἀπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια.  
τοῦ δὴ δι' ἄγνοιαν.

1. ὁ μὲν ἐν μεταμελείᾳ ἄκων δοκεῖ. p. 67.

2. ὁ δὲ μὴ μεταμελόμενος οὐχ ἐκῶν.

ἀγνοῶν.

ἀγνοεῖ ἂν δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον. p. 83.

ἐκούσιον.

τὸ ἐκούσιον δόξειεν ἂν εἶναι οὐ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδότε  
τὰ καθ' ἕκαστα ἐν οἷς ἡ πράξις. p. 69.

δυνατά.

δυνατὰ δὲ ἂν δι' ἡμῶν γένοιτ' ἄν. pp. 72, 74.

ἡ προαίρεσις.

ἡ προαίρεσις ἂν εἴη βουλευτικὴ ὁρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡμῖν.  
p. 78.

## The Virtues and Vices.

## φόβος.

διὸ καὶ τὸν φόβον ὀρίζονται προσδοκίαν κακοῦ. p.  
87.

## ἀνδρεία.

ἀνδρίζονται ἐν οἷς ἐστὶν ἀλκὴ ἢ καλὸν τὸ ἀποθανεῖν.  
p. 89.

χρήματα.

πάντα ὅσων ἡ ἀξία νομίσματι μετρεῖται. p. 109.

μεγαλόψυχος.

ὁ μεγάλων αὐτὸν ἀξιῶν ἄξιος ὢν. p. 119.

*Qu.* Show the connection of subjects in Ethics I.—IV. by referring to the order in which the chief definitions follow one another.

*Qu.* Give the definition of—if possible in Greek.

## EXAMINATION QUESTIONS.

### BOOK I.

1. By what arguments does Aristotle prove that
  - (1) There is a chief good. p. 4, 14.
  - (2) It is the end of πολιτική. p. 5.
  - (3) It is ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς. p. 15.
2. What is the relation of the individual to the state? p. 5, 6.
3. τὸ ἀγαθὸν εἰκόασιν ἐκ τῶν βίων ὑπολαμβάνειν. What are these βίοι, and what are the objections to each? p. 10.
4. (1) What views of other philosophers has Aristotle embodied in his definition of the chief good? p. 19.
- (2) τὰ ἐπιζητούμενα περὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν. What are these; and how do they harmonise with Aristotle's dictum?
5. Is the possession of virtue equivalent to happiness? p. 15.

6. (1) What is the question discussed as between Aristotle and Solon, and how far is it decided? p. 23.

(2) Analyse Aristotle's treatment of Solon's dictum.

7. Describe the effect of adversity upon the virtuous man. p. 16, 20—24.

8. Distinguish between final and efficient causes, and show what the efficient cause of happiness is. p. 15, 165.

9. How does Aristotle discuss the question, "Can virtue be acquired?" p. 21, 22, 37, 43.

10. Give Aristotle's analysis of the *ψυχή*. p. 28—30, 45.

11. What explanation does Aristotle give of the action of the *ἀκρατής*? p. 29.

## BOOK II.

1. How does Aristotle prove that moral virtue is not innate in man? p. 37.

2. What has habituation to do with the formation of character? p. 37, 43.

3. (1) Explain the apparent contradiction in saying that we become just by the practice of justice. p. 42—45.

(1) What difficulties arise as to Aristotle's theory of the formation of habits and how is it met?

(3) In what points does the analogy between art and moral virtue fail, and in what does it hold good?

4. (1) Give the steps by which Aristotle succeeds in determining the genus of moral virtue? p. 45—47.



(2) Give arguments to prove that virtue is a *ἔξις*.

5. (1) By what analogies is the law of the mean established in morals? How far is it true and useful? p. 48—50.

(2) What is meant by argument from analogy? p. 178.

6. What difficulties does the theory of the mean involve both in language? p. 50, 51, 168.

And in actual fact? p. 56—60.

7. State exactly in Greek or English Aristotle's definition of moral virtue, briefly explaining each of the terms. p. 47, 51, 52, 73.

8. "Virtue is only a vice a little exaggerated or a little controlled." Show that this is a misrepresentation. p. 50, 51, 167, 168.

### BOOK III.

#### THE VOLUNTARY.

1. (1) What are the successive tests which Aristotle applies to determine the voluntariness of an action? p. 64—70, 82—87.

(2) Under what circumstances does Aristotle say that a man is not responsible for his actions?

(3) What excuses for a wrong act would Aristotle reject?

(4) Explain accurately the circumstances (*ἐν οἷς καὶ περὶ ἃ ἡ πράξις*) of a moral action.

(5) How many kinds of ignorance are mentioned by Aristotle? Give an example of each kind, and

show under what conditions ignorance is an excuse for wrong-doing?

(6) How does Aristotle refute the assertion that actions proceeding from ἐπιθυμία and θυμός are involuntary?

2. What is

(1) The exact nature of προαίρεσις. p. 73.

(2) Its relation to βούλευσις and βούλησις. p. 78.

(3) The part of the ψυχή to which it belongs? p. 71, 30.

3. (1) Discuss fully βούλευσις, p. 79—81, and the objects on which it is employed. p. 72, 76.

(2) What are the arguments of Aristotle for and against the real good as the object of wish?

4. Write an account of the mental processes (in their proper order) which precede the performance of an action. p. 75, 76.

### THE VIRTUES.

5. Enumerate the spurious forms of courage, and show how each falls short of the true courage. p. 92—95.

6. Give Aristotle's account of σωφροσύνη, as far as possible in his own words. p. 103.

7. Δοκοῦσι γὰρ τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν αὐταὶ εἶναι αἱ ἀρεταί. Explain fully how this phrase can be applied to the virtues intended. p. 96, 99, 104.

8. Illustrate the connection between Prodigality and Intemperance by describing their various forms. p. 112, 113.

9. How does Aristotle distinguish between *ἐλευθεριότης* and *μεγαλοπρεπεία*, *μεγαλοψυχία* and *φιλοτιμία*. p. 58. (and each virtue.)

10. Describe the chief characteristics of the liberal man. p. 115.

11. Describe the virtue of truthfulness, its place in the list, and the faults connected with it. p. 53, 128—131.

12. Describe the social virtues. p. 127, 137, 138.

#### GENERAL QUESTIONS.

13. *φαίνεται δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν προσδεομένη (ἡ ἀρετή)*. p. 88, 117, 119, 144, 148.

Illustrate this statement by reference to particular virtues in Aristotle's list. p. 163, 164.

14. Mention any passages where the feelings and motives from which an action should proceed are described. p. 90, 96, 97, 121, 129.

15. What can be inferred as to Aristotle's opinion of Humility, Self-denial, Gratitude, Moral Courage, Truthfulness? p. 130, 111, 112, 120, 154, 88, 128, 170—173.

16. What are the principal features of a virtuous character according to Aristotle? In what would it be at variance with modern ideas? p. 170.

#### BOOK X., CH. VI.—IX.

1. (1) In what respect does amusement resemble happiness, and in what differ from it? p. 139, 142.

(2) *οὐκ ἐν παιδίᾳ ἄρα ἡ εὐδαιμονία*. How is this shown?

2. What did Aristotle mean by a *βίος θεωρητικός*?  
p. 146.

3. How does it fulfil the conditions of virtue stated in the first book? p. 17, 18.

4. State his main arguments for holding such a life to be the highest. p. 147, 151.

5. How does Aristotle discuss the question of education in reference especially to its methods and aims?  
p. 177, 178.

*For further questions read over the table of contents and the index, especially noting the summaries, and refer to any part which is unfamiliar. Mark with pencil those points which do not at once present themselves to the mind so that you can easily refer to them before examination.*

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
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